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Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring (1999) was a landmark US Supreme Court 
decision holding that unjustified segregation of people with disabilities is impermissible 
discrimination; specifically, if the clinician and client believe community integration to 
be appropriate, the state must have reasonable accommodations in place for the client to 
be in the community.  Enforcement of the Olmstead decision for people with serious 
mental illness has taken many shapes, from the DOJ’s settlement agreements requiring 
substantive development of community mental health services and aggressive community 
integration protocols, to the Third Circuit approach which requires only lower census 
numbers in the state psychiatric hospital (SPH).  This dissertation, through legal research, 
identified five distinct Olmstead response types (DOJ, Third Circuit, Ninth Circuit, 
Minnesota, Florida) created by litigation in ten states.  Using growth curve models, the 
present study explored connections between those five response types and fifteen 
dependent variables: SPH census; state budgets for SPH, community treatment, police, 
judiciary, and corrections; incarceration rates; suicide rates; employment rates; disability 
benefits applications, approvals, and recipients; community treatment rates; readmissions 
to inpatient care within 30 days; and data collection trends.   
  
 
All states decreased SPH census numbers, but only Minnesota showed an increase 
in community treatment rates; however, both changes were happening primarily before 
Olmstead litigation.  The Ninth Circuit states had lower rates of people on disability 
benefits, while the Third Circuit had a significant increase in filings for disability benefits 
immediately after litigation.  Suicide rates were much lower in Florida but showed 
alarming increases in the DOJ state of New Hampshire.  Minnesota had greater increases 
in employment rates after litigation, and all states had slower incarceration rates after 
litigation.  States managed their budgets in different ways after litigation, but overall, 
there was not an increase in funding for community mental health treatment after 
litigation outside of DOJ states.  DOJ states, the Third Circuit, and Florida had the 
highest rates of missing data across all variables, while Minnesota had the lowest rate of 
missing data.  Implications, limitations, and future directions are discussed, as well as 
ideological and ethical considerations for applying Olmstead’s requirements with a 
recovery orientation.   
   
  
  
  
 
DEDICATION 
I dedicate my dissertation to my incredible family, especially my siblings – Alex, 
Gabe, Marisa, Eli, John, Jacob, Zack, Nico – my parents – Henry and Gina – and my 
grandparents – Pablo, Blanca, Tommy, and Jeanette.  I only had the opportunity to pursue the 
extremely rare privilege of over twelve years of postsecondary education and training 
because of the sacrifices, hard work, and pursuit of excellence that characterizes the roots of 
my family tree.  I am grateful and humbled when I think of the years of rigorous work, the 
immigration journey, the racism, and the financial uncertainty endured by my grandparents to 
support my parents into being the first members of their respective families to earn a college 
degree.  I could never adequately express my gratitude to my parents, who in turn, supported 
me with love, high expectations, and unwavering belief in my potential.  This document 
bears not only my name, but our name.   
I also dedicate this dissertation to my other family – the family I chose, and who 
chose me – my partner, Dan Hoelting, and my roommates, the Orchard Street Social Club.  
Dan – your kindness and generous spirit never fail to amaze me.  You make happy things 
better and sad things lighter.  Thank you for always driving so I can work, maintaining our 
household when I cannot, using Girl Scout cookies to keep me going when I want to quit, and 
opening our home to what some people would consider to be too many rescue dogs (those 
people would be wrong).  I love our life.  To the OSSC – Ellie Rohr, Josh Haby, Matt 
Nockels, and Melissa Fike – UNL has given me so much, not the least of which was the 
opportunity to meet you and earn your friendship.  You each brought joy and buoyancy to a 
journey that was long, arduous, and not always rewarding.  Thank you for every meal shared, 
every class endured together, every glass of beer and wine toasted, and every front porch 
conversation.  Let’s do family dinner soon.   
  
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First, I gratefully acknowledge my mentor, Dr. William D. Spaulding.  Will, it has 
been an honor and a privilege to work with you for eight years.  Your mentorship has 
afforded me the opportunity to not only learn cutting edge scientific methods, legal theory 
and analysis, and technical skills, but to understand these concepts in the larger frameworks 
of recovery and psychiatric rehabilitation.  I leave UNL with not only additional knowledge 
and capabilities, but more importantly, an understanding of my moral and ethical obligations 
to challenge systems that all too often fail our clients, and to speak truth to power.   
I also extend my heartfelt thanks to my committee members, Dr. Rich Wiener, Dr. 
Mario Scalora, Dr. Eric Evans, and Dean Richard Moberly, for your thoughtful contributions 
to this project, and my graduate training overall.  I am grateful for my colleagues in the 
Serious Mental Illness Research Group, and for the leadership and guidance of Mary 
Sullivan, Dr. Joseph Swoboda, and Dr. Jocelyn Ritchie.  A special thanks to Jennifer Blank, 
who was exceptionally helpful with data collection and entry for this project as well as 
providing feedback on the variable selection and interpretation.  I also extend my sincere 
gratitude to Dr. Amanda Holmgreen and Dr. Eve Brank for your formal, and informal, 
mentorship over the years.  Thank you, UNL – I am so deeply proud of my time here. 
I would be remiss if I failed to humbly acknowledge the courage and sacrifices of 
E.W. and L.C., Frederick L. Nina S., Kevin C., and Steven F., as well as every other plaintiff 
and plaintiff’s attorney in Olmstead litigation around the country.  Civil rights have never 
been freely given by the group in power; they must be won.  Stigmatization, unjustifiable 
segregation, and unequal access to the protections of our laws will always prevail without the 
courage and determination of those who challenge discriminatory systems to demand justice.   
  
 
DISCLAIMER 
From June 2015 through May 2017, I provided psychological services as a 
Psychology Extern at OUR Homes, an organization that provides assisted-living services 
and day programming for people with serious mental illness, among other services.  OUR 
Homes was one of many externship sites available for graduate students to gain clinical 
experience, and one of four clinical externship sites where I provided psychological 
services during my time as a graduate student.  Some have argued that a rigorous 
application of Olmstead requirements would fundamentally alter the way OUR Homes 
provides its services, an assertion which OUR Homes management and owners contest.  
My externship was created by a contract between OUR Homes and the University of 
Nebraska-Lincoln Clinical Psychology Training Program (CPTP).  While the externship 
was a paid experience, my stipend was paid for and guaranteed by CPTP, regardless of 
which externship I participated in.  Thus, my personal finances and doctoral degree 
would in no way be impacted by any potential changes in business practices required of 
OUR Homes by Olmstead.  The idea for this dissertation was inspired by my experiences 
at OUR Homes, but my analysis is independent.   
  
  
 
GRANT INFORMATION 
 It is with gratitude that I acknowledge my funding source.  In June 2017, I began 
a year-long dissertation fellowship with the Disability Research Consortium of the 
Mathematica Policy Center, funded by the Social Security Administration.  I was 
provided with a stipend to support me while I worked full-time on my dissertation for a 
year.  I was one of four PhD students nationwide from a variety of disciplines selected 
with the intention that our dissertation would contribute to the literature on effective and 
empowering disability policy.  My funding was predicated solely upon my proposed 
dissertation project and was completely dispersed before data collection even began.  My 
funding and participation in the program were in no way predicated upon my findings.   
The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a grant from the U.S. 
Social Security Administration (SSA) funded as part of the Disability Research 
Consortium.  The opinions and conclusions expressed are solely those of the author(s) 
and do not represent the opinions or policy of SSA or any agency of the Federal 
Government.  Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of 
their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability 
or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the contents of this 
report.  Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade 
name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply 
endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or any 
agency thereof. 
  
  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
CHAPTER 1: THE OLMSTEAD RULING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
CHAPTER 2: SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS – IMPACT AND DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
CHAPTER 3: FEDERAL POLICIES ON MENTAL HEALTH BEFORE OLMSTEAD  . . . . . . . . . 11 
Deinstitutionalization and the Community Mental Health Act of 1963 . . . . . . . . 13 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
Chapter 4: The Supreme Court’s Olmstead Ruling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
Procedural History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
Majority and Plurality Opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31 
Concurrences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38 
Dissent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39 
Chapter 5: Olmstead Rulings in the U.S. Circuit & District Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
Appellate Court Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 
Third Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43 
Ninth Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51 
District Court Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54 
Fourth Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54 
Eighth Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56 
Eleventh Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
Other Developments in the District and Appellate Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61 
Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63 
Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64 
Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 
North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 
New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80 
CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON THE IMPACT OF OLMSTEAD ON MENTAL HEALTH 
SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 
CHAPTER 7: THE PRESENT STUDY: HYPOTHESES AND METHODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87 
Olmstead Response Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 
  
 
Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  92 
Dependent Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  95 
Data Analysis Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  98 
CHAPTER 8: THE PRESENT STUDY: RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  100 
Hypothesis 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 
Hypothesis 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 
Model 2A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  104 
Model 2B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  110 
Hypothesis 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 
Hypothesis 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 
Model 4Ai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 
Model 4Aii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  123 
Model 4Aiii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 
Model 4B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  130 
Model 4C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  134 
Model 4D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  134 
Model 4Ei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 
Model 4Eii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  142 
Model 4Eiii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 
Model 4F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  151 
Hypothesis 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 
Summary of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  155 
Chapter 9: The Present Study: Discussion of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  157 
Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  158 
  Hypothesis 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 
  Hypothesis 2 - Model 2A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  159 
Hypothesis 2 - Model 2B . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 
  Hypothesis 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 
Hypothesis 4 - Model 4Ai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 
Hypothesis 4 - Model 4Aii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  166 
  
 
Hypothesis 4 - Model 4Aiii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 
Hypothesis 4 - Model 4B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  169 
Hypothesis 4 - Model 4C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  170 
Hypothesis 4 - Model 4D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  170 
Hypothesis 4 - Models 4Ei-4Eiii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  172 
Hypothesis 4 - Model 4F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  174 
Hypothesis 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 
Legal Analysis of Each Olmstead Response Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  175 
Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  177 
Third Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 
Ninth Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 
Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 
Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 
Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  186 
Future Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  187 
CHAPTER 10: RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  188 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  191 
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  194 
APPENDIX OF FIGURES AND TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  206 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
LIST OF MULTIMEDIA OBJECTS 
Tables 
Table 1. Side by side comparison of the language from the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, § 202 and from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 . . . . . . . . . 222 
Table 2. Comparison of major terms of Department of Justice settlement agreements by 
state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  223 
Table 3. Summary of case information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  226 
Table 4. Summary of Olmstead Response Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  227 
Table 5. Dependent Variables, Covariates, and Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for covariates and dependent variables in Hypotheses 1-4 . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 
Table 7. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in hospitalization rates over time . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 
Table 8. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on hospitalization rates 
growth rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 
Table 9. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  233 
Table 10. Correlations for dependent variables in models 2A & 2B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 
Table 11. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the state per capita spending on 
community mental health over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  235 
Table 12. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth rate of a 
state’s per capita spending on community mental health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  236 
Table 13. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 2A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 
Table 14. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the state per capita spending on 
the state psychiatric hospital over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  238 
Table 15. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the state’s per capita 
spending on the state psychiatric hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  239 
Table 16. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 2B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  240 
Table 17. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in community treatment rates 
over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  241 
Table 18. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on a state’s community 
treatment growth rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242 
  
 
Table 19. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  243 
Table 20. Correlations for dependent variables in models 4Ai-4Aiii . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  244 
Table 21. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the percent of people receiving 
disability benefits over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 
Table 22. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on a state’s disability 
benefits growth rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  246 
Table 23. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Ai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  247 
Table 24. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the filing rate for disability 
benefits over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 
Table 25. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on a state’s disability 
benefits filing rate growth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249   
Table 26. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Aii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 
Table 27.  Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the percent of people being 
approved for disability benefits over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 
Table 28. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth rate of 
people being approved for disability benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  252 
Table 29. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Aiii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  253 
Table 30. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the state suicide rate over time 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254 
Table 31. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth rate of a 
state’s suicide rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  255 
Table 32. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  256 
Table 33. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the state employment rate over 
time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  257 
Table 34. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth rate of a 
state’s employment rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 
Table 35. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 
Table 36. Correlations for covariates and dependent variables in models 4Ei-4Eiii . . . 260 
Table 37. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the judicial budget over time . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261 
  
 
Table 38. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth rate of a 
state’s spending trajectory for the judiciary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262 
Table 39. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Ei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 
Table 40. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the police budget over time . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264   
Table 41. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth rate of a 
state’s spending trajectory for the police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 
Table 42.  Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Eii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 
Table 43. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the per capita rate of 
correctional spending over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 
Table 44. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth rate of a 
state’s correctional spending trajectory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268 
Table 45. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Eiii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  269 
Table 46. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the incarceration rate over time 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270 
Table 47. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth of a state’s 
incarceration rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  271 
Table 48. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  272 
Table 49. Summary of Results for Hypotheses 1-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 
Table 50. Total numbers and percentages of missing data by Olmstead response type and 
dependent variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 
 
Figures 
Figure 1.  Nationwide average daily census of the state psychiatric hospitals from 1903 to 
2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  206  
Figure 2.  Procedural history of the Olmstead case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 
Figure 3.  State psychiatric hospitalization rates over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 
Figure 4.  Community Mental Health Treatment Budget per capita rates over time . . . 209 
Figure 5.  Total state budget per capita rates over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 
Figure 6.  State psychiatric hospital budget per capita rates over time . . . . . . . . . . . . .  211 
Figure 7.  Community Mental Health Treatment rates over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  212 
  
 
Figure 8.  Rates of people receiving disability benefits over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 
Figure 9.  Disability benefits filing rates over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214 
Figure 10.  Disability benefits application approval rates over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 
Figure 11.  Suicide rate over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  216 
Figure 12.  Percentage of employed consumers over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  217 
Figure 13.  State judicial budget per capita rates over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218 
Figure 14.  State police budget per capita rates over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 
Figure 15.  State correctional budget per capita rates over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  220 
Figure 16.  Incarceration rate over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 
 
Equations 
Equation for Models 1, 3, 4Ai-4Aiii, 4B, 4D, and 4F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 
Equation for Models 2A, 2B, and 4Ei-4Eii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  99
 
  
  
 
1 
CHAPTER 1: THE OLMSTEAD RULING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring (1999) is a United States Supreme Court decision 
from 1999, written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, interpreting Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012).  
Specifically, the Court held that if a person who has been institutionalized for 
developmental, mental, or physical disability wants to move into a less restrictive setting 
and is found to be appropriate for that level of care by a mental health professional, the 
state must have reasonable accommodations in place to allow that person to do so.  
Failure to comply with these standards is a violation of the ADA, and not justified solely 
by a lack of state resources.   
Many states subsequently implemented “Olmstead plans,” especially after the 
Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice began aggressively enforcing 
Olmstead through litigation in 2009 (Civil Rights Division, 2011).  Not all circuits 
interpreted the Olmstead case similarly, creating nationally disjointed criteria for a 
“good” Olmstead plan (Tidwell, 2009).  Courts also assumed their criteria set would lead 
to a variety of desired outcomes, which may or may not be true (Tidwell, 2009).  
Subsequently, Olmstead plans vary widely in requirements, outcome objectives, 
adherence to scientific evidence, and overall quality.   
Additionally, much of the litigation around Olmstead has focused on people with 
developmental disabilities or failed to distinguish between people with developmental 
disabilities and people with serious mental illness.  This is problematic; disability policy 
cannot be effective if it is approached with a monolithic mentality.  Implementing 
Olmstead effectively for people with serious mental illness should be done differently 
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than for people with developmental disabilities, due to differences in clinical needs.  In 
particular, serious mental illness tends to be chronic but episodic, with a reserved place in 
the treatment continuum for recovery-oriented hospitalization services, either short or 
long-term, to support people through first episodes or relapses, and back into the 
community (Spaulding, Montague, Avila, & Sullivan, 2016).   
However, for some states, the plans or policies put forward in response to 
Olmstead seem to be merely extensions of the deinstitutionalization policy that gained 
traction nationally in the 1950s by requiring only long-term hospitalization bed reduction.  
In fact, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals even looked to the state’s “progress” since the 
1950s, measured only by institutional bed closings, when evaluating Pennsylvania’s 
compliance with Olmstead (Tidwell, 2009, p. 712).  This evaluation criteria, if used by 
itself, is problematic, especially in the context of serious mental illness.  While all 
consumers are negatively impacted by insufficient funding for community treatment 
options, if courts interpret Olmstead to require primarily, or only, a decrease in available 
hospital beds, this disparately impacts the treatment of people with serious mental illness, 
for whom the lack of a continuum of appropriate, recovery-oriented treatment services 
can mean high utilization of crisis services, homelessness, or incarceration.   
As the Olmstead plans are enacted, consumers can be shuffled between long-term 
hospitalization settings, short-term hospitalization settings, assisted-living facilities 
(which fluctuate in degrees of structure and restrictiveness), and living independently in 
the community with often unreliable access to outpatient care.  Since Olmstead has been 
primarily enforced in the courts, examining the relationships between factors on which 
the courts focused allows for an empirical evaluation of the driving force behind 
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Olmstead disability policy.  The objective of this dissertation is to evaluate the 
relationships upon which the courts rely, as well as possible unintended potential side 
effects, specifically within the context of serious mental illness.  The over-arching 
hypothesis is that while the state may achieve the markers the court has identified as 
relevant, there are still vital treatment considerations not being fully examined, possibly 
creating unintended collateral damage, similar to that seen during the 
deinstitutionalization movement of the mid-twentieth century in the United States.   
Using data culled from publicly available documents and datasets, the researcher 
will examine the relationships between state policies and outcomes, both intended and 
unintended.  The empirical question is two-fold: first, do the relational assumptions the 
courts have made between the criteria they set and the outcomes they demand hold true?  
Is there evidence the plans could work as the courts expect?  Second, if so, are those 
relationships being enacted at the expense of other outcomes the courts are not 
considering?  Is there evidence the plans are an overall good idea?  If the plans do not 
work, states are expending significant resources to still be subject to liability.  If the plans 
do work, but with unintended collateral damage, states may be creating more challenging 
situations for all involved.  
Consistent with the researcher’s interdisciplinary training in clinical psychology 
and law, this dissertation will contain legal research, psychological research, an empirical 
analysis, and a legal analysis all related to Olmstead and its subsequent impact on mental 
health law and policy.  Chapter 2 will narrowly define and describe the population of 
interest: people with serious mental illness.  Chapters 3, 4, and 5 will outline legal 
research on federal mental health policy, as indicated by case law and legislation, leading 
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up to and including the Olmstead case and its subsequent litigation.  Chapter 6 will 
review psychological literature related to Olmstead and its outcomes, while Chapter 7 
will introduce the methods for the empirical portion of this dissertation.  Chapter 8 will 
present the results of the empirical analysis and Chapter 9 will analyze those results and 
their meaning within the current legal framework, as well as acknowledging this 
dissertation’s limitations and possible directions for future research.  Chapter 10 provides 
recommendations in light of the findings of this dissertation.   
 
CHAPTER 2: SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS – IMPACT AND DEFINITIONS 
Mental illness continues to be a pervasive public health problem around the 
world.  The DSM-5 defines a mental disorder generally as, “a syndrome characterized by 
clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or 
behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental 
processes underlying mental functioning.  Mental disorders are usually associated with 
significant distress or disability in social, occupational, or other important activities” 
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013, p. 20).  In the United States alone, it is 
estimated that approximately fifty percent of people will experience mental health 
symptoms meeting diagnostic criteria for a mental disorder over the course of their 
lifetime (Mental Health First Aid [MHFA], 2016).  Each year, approximately thirty 
percent of people are experiencing a diagnosable mental disorder (MHFA, 2016).  Four 
of the ten leading causes of disability are mental illnesses; the leading cause of disability 
worldwide is depression (MHFA, 2016).  Sadly, people tend to go ten years, on average, 
from the onset of symptoms before seeking treatment (MHFA, 2016), and only one of 
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every three people with a mental illness ever seeks treatment (World Health Organization 
[WHO], 2001).   
Within this discouraging, larger context of high prevalence rates and low 
treatment proportions of mental illness, exists a small, subpopulation of individuals with 
serious mental illness (SMI).  Definitions of SMI are reliable only in their variation from 
setting to setting (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
[SAMHSA], 2016); however, theoretically, the purpose of defining a “serious” group 
within the population of people with mental illness is to differentiate those with the most 
significant need for clinical intervention (Goldman & Grob, 2006).  In the context of this 
dissertation, the purpose of an SMI definition is to accurately identify the subpopulation 
of people with mental illness who are most likely to be impacted by Olmstead-related 
policies; this would include people who have been in or are at risk for long-term 
hospitalization, frequent or prolonged usage of short-term hospitalization or partial 
hospitalization, or living in facilities focused on providing environments with varying 
degrees of structure primarily to people with mental illness (e.g., assisted-living facilities, 
transitional living facilities, independent living facilities, etc.).   
Typically, organizations rely on either the federal definition or their state’s 
definition, as codified in statute, to make these distinctions in their policies.  The federal 
SMI definition applies only to adults and requires a current or recent (i.e., past year) 
diagnosis of a mental, behavioral, or emotional illness other than a substance use or 
developmental disorder resulting in “serious functional impairment, which substantially 
inferences with or limits one or more life activities, such as maintaining interpersonal 
relationships, activities of daily living, self-care, employment, and recreation.” 
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(SAMHSA, 2016, p. 2).  Alternatively, the state of Nebraska has legislatively defined 
SMI as  
“any mental health condition that current medical science affirms is caused by a 
biological disorder of the brain and that substantially limits the life activities of 
the person with the serious mental illness … includ[ing] but … not limited to 
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, delusional disorder, bipolar disorder, 
major depression, and obsessive compulsive disorder”  
 
(Nebraska Revised Statutes § 44-792, 2002).  The common thread is intended to be 
severity – while all mental disorders create significant distress or disability (APA, 2013, 
p. 20, emphasis added), the label of SMI should be reserved for those whose experience 
of mental illness substantially impacts their ability to perform daily life activities.  
 While these definitions narrow the field substantially, they are still too broad to 
accurately identify the subpopulation of people with mental illness who are likely to be 
impacted by Olmstead-related policies.  For example, SAMHSA’s definition (2016) and 
label of “serious mental illness” have been explicitly edited to avoid the words “chronic,” 
“severe,” and “persistent” as a conscious choice to expel any connotation that serious 
mental illness is intractable or unresponsive to treatment (p. 1).  The definition was 
purposefully broadened to include any mental illness (p. 2-3) and to not be limited to 
chronic conditions (p. 1).  While the attempt to dispel perceptions of SMI as untreatable 
is noble and broadening the criteria may be helpful for some policy discussions, when 
examining Olmstead policies and their impact, it would be most helpful to carefully 
consider the population most likely to be affected.  Additionally, use of a narrower 
definition avoids a common criticism of SAMHSA’s definition – that it has become so 
broad as to be essentially useless, losing sight of the actual SMI population in a deluge of 
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those with less chronic, less severe, and less persistent mental illness (Torrey, 2015; 
U.S.G.A.O., 2014).   
For these reasons, this dissertation will encourage a narrower definition of SMI, 
and employ it when evaluating policies.  Rather than only requiring substantial inference 
in life activities, more precise SMI definitions include aspects of SMI associated with 
impaired functioning and symptom intensity, such as high rates of service utilization, 
engagement with partial hospitalization or higher level of services, and length of illness 
history.  One such definition was crafted by Charlwood and colleagues (2000, p. 94) and 
requires a mental disorder diagnosed by a mental health professional and either a score of 
4 (severe/very severe problem) on at least one, or a score of 3 (moderately severe 
problem) on at least two, of the Health of the Nation Outcome Scale (p. 99-104; not 
including outcome number five, which is “physical illness or disability problems”), 
during the previous six months or a significant level of service usage over the past five 
years (e.g., a total of six months in a psychiatric ward or day hospital, three admissions to 
hospital or day hospital, or six months of psychiatric community care with more than one 
worker or the perceived need for such care).   
This definition is preferable to the broader definitions for the purpose of 
identifying a subgroup of those with mental illness in higher need of clinical 
interventions, more chronically experiencing disability, and subsequently, more likely to 
be a population needing the protections of Olmstead.  This definition has the advantage 
of specificity by narrowing “substantial impairment,” a relatively broad description, to a 
higher threshold of need for services as indicated by problem severity and number.  
Additionally, by using level of services and time engaged in high levels of service, such 
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as hospitalization or partial hospitalization, the possibility of including false positives, 
people with mental illness of a less disabling impact,1 is diminished.  The SMI group is, 
now by definition, the group within people with mental illness who are using higher 
levels of service over longer periods of time while facing more problems of intense 
severity.   
It is also worth noting here that while psychiatric diagnostic categories may be the 
most ubiquitous method of categorizing mental illness, such categorization has many 
criticisms and is not particularly useful when trying to identify those with SMI and the 
highest need of services.  The modern method of categorizing mental illness by diagnosis 
is encapsulated in the American Psychiatric Association’s publication of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual, fifth edition (DSM-5; APA, 2013).  The DSM-5, and modern 
psychiatry generally, have their roots in the work of a German psychiatrist from the turn 
of the 20th century, Emil Kraepelin (Allik & Tammiksaar, 2016; Andreasen, 2007).  
Kraepelin is best known for being the originator of the nosology preceding the DSM 
(Andreasen, 2007).  Kraepelin’s categories identified discrete symptom combinations 
with a specific illness course, creating a “proto-disease” approach to categorizing mental 
                                                 
1  When evaluating definitions of SMI and trying to parse out “more disabling” 
experiences from “less disabling” experiences, the purpose is not to be dismissive of the 
impact and suffering created by non-SMI, or “less disabling” experiences of mental 
illness.  All experiences of mental illness deserve to be met with compassion, dignity, and 
access to high-quality, comprehensive treatment services.  By attempting to identify those 
with greatest need for clinical intervention, the goal and purpose of such categorization is 
to ensure all people with mental illness have access to high-quality services, not just the 
easy-to-treat members of the population.  Further, it tends to be the more chronically and 
severely disabled population that faces abuses at the hands of the system, whose voice 
advocating for herself is most often drowned out, and who most rely on the protections of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act.   
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illness, partially inspired by the development of bacterial theories of physical diseases 
(Kendler & Engstrom, 2017).   
When the first two versions of the DSM did not show substantial interrater 
agreement among clinicians attempting to determine diagnosis, the third and subsequent 
versions replaced general descriptions with specific diagnostic criteria to create discrete 
symptom combinations, due in no small part to the revivers of Kraepelin’s approach to 
mental illness – the “neo-Kraepelinians” (Andreasen, 2007).  Unfortunately, those 
categorical, discrete symptom combinations are somewhat arbitrarily defined by 
contributors to the DSM, without empirical data to show clustering of symptoms or to 
validate cut-points for diagnosis (e.g., needing five out of nine symptoms as opposed to 
four or six out of nine symptoms, et cetera) (Insel, 2013).  Therefore, while these 
nosological approaches may increase interrater reliability, they reflect increased 
agreement on constructs with limited accuracy and clinical utility.   
Recently, many researchers and clinicians have begun routinely challenging the 
usefulness of psychiatric diagnosis and shifting to more functional assessments of mental 
illness and its impact (e.g., Spaulding, Sullivan, & Poland, 2003).  Furthermore, even 
federal agencies have begun challenging the assumed utility of the neo-Kraepelinian 
nosology; the National Institute of Mental Health announced in 2013 they would no 
longer fund research proposals based strictly on DSM-5 criteria, but would instead prefer 
research examining specific symptoms, such as anhedonia or psychomotor retardation, 
across diagnostic categories (Insel, 2013).  Additionally, recent editions of the DSM have 
been criticized for overpathologizing normal experiences as abnormal (Frances & 
Widiger, 2012).   
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Not only does psychiatric diagnostic categorization have many criticisms of its 
utility as an organizational framework for understanding differences in the experience of 
mental illness, it is even less useful as a tool to parse out more chronic and disabling 
conditions from those with a lower impact on functional impairment.  For example, SMI 
is typically associated with cognitive deficits, such as memory and attention problems, 
comprehension, motor skills, social skills, executive functioning, and verbal skills, that 
are directly related to the mental illness but distinct from the clinical symptoms, such as 
mood dysregulation, hallucinations, or delusions (Medalia & Revheim, 2012).  However, 
such deficits are associated with a range of mental illness diagnoses, including 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression, panic disorder, and obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (Iyer, Rothmann, Vogler, & Spaulding, 2005).  These deficits can directly 
interfere with one’s ability to complete day-to-day activities, such as transporting oneself, 
planning ahead to navigate complex situations, problem-solving, and maintaining 
stability in employment, financial resources, and housing.   
 Overall, while the narrowly-defined SMI population is a relatively small subset of 
the general mental health population, their experience of mental illness is significantly 
more impactful and disabling.  Furthermore, they are the population most likely to 
participate in the treatment settings impacted by Olmstead and its subsequent litigation, 
such as state psychiatric hospitals and assisted-living facilities.  Consequently, this 
dissertation will focus on the SMI population, as defined here, and the impact of 
Olmstead on their outcomes.   
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CHAPTER 3: FEDERAL POLICIES ON MENTAL HEALTH BEFORE OLMSTEAD 
This chapter will briefly review the federal government’s approach to addressing 
mental health issues over time.  While a comprehensive discussion of this topic is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, there are several turning points in history that are relevant 
to the questions addressed by this dissertation.  Specifically, this chapter will describe the 
historical background to the Olmstead decision, including the context of 
deinstitutionalization and three major pieces of federal legislation impacting mental 
health services: the Community Mental Health Act of 1963, the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.   
Mental health treatment in the United States predates the federal government; 
there were two major treatment facilities for people with mental illness before America 
was officially the United States of America.  The first psychiatric hospital opened in 1752 
(National Institute of Health [NIH], 2006), approximately twenty-four years before the 
Declaration of Independence was signed (Hubenschmidt, 2017).  It was established by 
the Quakers and was quickly required to add additional space due to the influx of 
admissions (NIH, 2006).  Approximately twenty years later, the Virginia legislature 
appropriated funds for a small, state-run hospital in Williamsburg (NIH, 2006).  This 
hospital was the first of many state psychiatric facilities to come and is still operating 
today as Eastern State Hospital in a suburb of Williamsburg (NIH, 2006).  For the 
majority of America’s history, that is exactly where mental health treatment, especially 
for the SMI population, took place – in the state psychiatric hospital, without influence or 
funding from the federal government (Grob, 1983).   
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State psychiatric hospitals were originally designed as “small, pastoral” 
therapeutic environments that attempted to provide a “warm, familial atmosphere” with 
structured, regular activities, including religious and recreational activities (Morrissey & 
Goldman, 1986, p. 15).  In some parts of the world, the mental health system still reflects 
this approach to treatment (Chen, 2016).  However, for most countries, particularly the 
United States, small, residential units for mental health treatment quickly morphed into 
larger, custodial institutions, and just as quickly, began encountering shortages of 
resources, including funding, staff, and space (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986).   
By the start of the twentieth century, there were around 150,000 people in state 
psychiatric hospitals (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986).  This swelled to 512,000 by 1950, a 
growth rate nearly twice that of the general population in the United States, and up to the 
historical apex of the state hospital census at 559,000 in 1955 (Morrissey & Goldman, 
1986).  This meteoric rise in hospital population was partially due to calculated moves by 
local officials to transfer aged, chronic, or senile individuals from the locally-financed 
almshouses to the state-financed psychiatric hospital (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986).  
This changed the state hospital population from those in need of acute care and typically 
hospitalized for fewer than twelve months to “individuals suffering from a variety of 
diseases and conditions that required custodial care on a life-long basis rather than 
treatment by specific psychiatric therapies” (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986, p. 19).  
Unsurprisingly, almshouses disappeared during this time (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986).   
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Deinstitutionalization and the Community Mental Health Act of 1963 
The combination of the rapidly growing hospital population with the lack of 
resources contributed to the state psychiatric hospitals diminishing significantly in quality 
and positive outcomes, ultimately leading to the major, national shift in mental health 
policy known as deinstitutionalization (Grob, 1983).  Deinstitutionalization was intended 
to move people out of the state psychiatric hospitals, which had begun to be seen as 
inhumane and ineffective, and into the community (Lamb & Bachrach, 2001).  
Transferring people out of the deteriorating hospitals and into the community was 
perceived as a moral imperative, an urgent need, and an axiomatic method of improving 
the quality of life and treatment outcomes of people with SMI (Lamb & Bachrach, 2001).  
Consequently, deinstitutionalization was not preceded by empirical testing of its 
assumptions, and mistakes were made in the implementation of the exceedingly well-
intentioned national policy on mental health (Lamb & Bachrach, 2001).   
While the deinstitutionalization movement was wildly successful at directly 
decreasing the number of people hospitalized, from approximately 559,000 in 1955 
(Bassuk & Gerson, 1978) to approximately 49,000 in 2003 (Bloom, Krishnan, & Lockey, 
2008), most professionals agree it was implemented without adequate safeguards to 
ensure access to appropriate community services.  Without adequate safeguards, such as 
forcing funding to follow people from the hospitals into the community (Kofman, 2012), 
many people were shifted into assisted living facilities (Geller, 2000), became homeless 
(Taylor, 1987), or became participants in the trend of prisons and jails housing 
increasingly high percentages of people with mental illness (Petersilia, 2003).  While it is 
unlikely deinstitutionalization directly caused these issues (Prins, 2011), the lack of 
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comprehensive community-based services to bolster those coming out of long-term 
institutions has certainly created obstacles to community integration among those who 
need the most support (Lamb, 1984).   
Comprehensive community-based services continue to be lacking, particularly for 
those with SMI; it is estimated that 85% of people with SMI are not receiving adequate 
treatment (Wang, Demler, & Kessler, 2002).  This section on deinstitutionalization is 
included in this dissertation as it offers a useful parallel for the potential trajectory of 
Olmstead plans – laudatory intentions for people with SMI, executed without adequate 
empirical grounding, leading directly to the primary goal of fewer consumers physically 
residing in the state hospitals, while unfortunately contributing to a host of unintended, 
negative consequences.   
While arguably the most potent catalyst for deinstitutionalization was the federal 
legislation creating community mental health centers (Cutler, Bevilacqua, & McFarland, 
2003), the state psychiatric hospital population actually peaked about eight years prior to 
federal intervention, in 1955 with an average daily census of about 559,000 nationally 
(Grob, 2005).  By 1963, the average daily census of the nation’s state psychiatric 
hospitals was around 500,0002 (Grob, 2005).  This gradual, pre-federal intervention 
decline in the hospital population was largely due to two major players in the field of 
mental health treatment: the military and psychopharmaceuticals (Cutler, Bevilacqua, & 
McFarland, 2003; Grob, 2005; Morrissey & Goldman, 1986).   
                                                 
2  In 1963, President Kennedy addressed Congress and stated that the state psychiatric 
hospital census was about 600,000 for people with mental illness and about 200,000 for 
people with developmental disabilities (American Presidency Project, n.d.).  However, 
academic sources agree the peak was in 1955 at around 559,000 (e.g., Grob, 2005; 
Bassuk & Gerson, 1978, Morrissey & Goldman, 1986, et cetera). 
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At the time, the United States military and Veterans Administration (VA) were 
noted for their high quality of care and ability to successfully treat mental illness outside 
a hospital setting – advancements that were necessitated by the increase in soldiers 
suffering from mental health concerns after World War II (Smucker, 2005; Morrissey & 
Goldman, 1986; Cutler, Bevilacqua, & McFarland, 2003; Grob, 2005).  Additionally, the 
1950s into the early 1960s saw the advent of several major classes of 
psychopharmaceuticals, including lithium carbonate (mood stabilizer), monoamine 
oxidase inhibitors (anti-depressant), haloperidol (typical anti-psychotic), clozapine 
(atypical anti-psychotic), and benzodiazepines (anti-anxiety), among others (Baldessarini, 
2014).  These advances combined contributed to the decreasing hospital population 
starting in the 1950s, opening deinstitutionalization.   
However, the Community Mental Health Act (CMHA) signing in 1963 marked a 
turning point (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986).  The CMHA’s main promise was to provide 
federal grants to build and maintain community mental health centers (CMHCs) for four 
and a half years, after which it was hoped the CMHCs would be self-sustaining (CMHA, 
1963).  The grants were provided directly to CMHCs, which were in turn required to 
deliver a variety of services, including outpatient therapy, short-term inpatient, partial 
hospitalization, and crisis services (CMHA, 1963).   
President Kennedy’s original vision was grand; he hoped the CMHA would lay 
the groundwork for all people to receive comprehensive treatment in the community, 
including the severely mentally ill, and for their families to receive supportive services 
(American Presidency Project, n.d.; Cutler, Bevilacqua, & McFarland, 2003).  He hoped 
the new network of providers would eventually replace state hospitals completely.  While 
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the goal of wholly eliminating state hospitals is problematic, his intentions seem both 
noble and born from personal experience; he had family members who had experienced 
hospitalizations related to mental health concerns.   
Unfortunately, President Kennedy’s vision for the CMHA was eviscerated before 
the legislation even reached his desk for signing; due to political concerns of anything 
resembling “socialized” medicine, negotiations to pass the legislation resulted in funding 
only being provided for the brick and mortar buildings – no staffing funds were stipulated 
(Cutler, Bevilacqua, & McFarland, 2003).  Within a month of signing the CMHA, 
President Kennedy was assassinated, leaving supplemental legislation for the CMHA to 
the Johnson administration.  Finally, almost two years later, in 1965, amendments were 
passed to fund staff for the CMHCs and applications for the grants began rolling in.  By 
this point, the national state psychiatric hospital census on an average day was about 
475,000 (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986).   
Once CMHCs started appearing around the country, there continued to be 
problems with their implementation.  For instance, the CMHC grants were provided 
directly to the grant recipient without any required coordination with existing state 
psychiatric hospitals or state government, leading to disjointed provision of services 
(Cutler, Bevilacqua, & McFarland, 2003; Shern, Surles, & Waizer, 1989).  One major 
consequence of this was that as people were released from the state psychiatric hospital, 
their transition to care in the community was often not well coordinated (Bassuk & 
Gerson, 1978).   
Additionally, many CHMCs began serving segments of the general population 
who had been previously untreated, rather than identifying and prioritizing the people 
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typically receiving services from the state psychiatric hospital (Morrissey & Goldman, 
1986).  Furthermore, while the CMHCs were supposed to become self-sustaining after 
the initial grant period of four years, the assumption that funds would follow individuals 
from the state hospital into the community was proven false (Bassuk & Gerson, 1978).  
By the late 1970s, a little over five hundred CMHCs were providing services in the 
community (Bassuk & Gerson, 1978).  By 1980, the nationwide state psychiatric hospital 
census was approximately 139,000, or a reduction of nearly seventy-five percent from the 
apex in 1955 (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986).  Its estimated that in order to successfully 
serve that population in the community, there should have been more than three times as 
many CMHCs as there were (Bassuk & Gerson, 1978).   
Despite all of these arguably foreseeable complications, the CMHA had required 
in the original legislation that the number of state psychiatric hospital beds be cut in half 
within twenty years (CMHA, 1963), a benchmark which was swiftly met, well before the 
deadline (Morrissey & Goldman, 1986).  Unfortunately, while deinstitutionalization was 
wildly successful at cutting funding and space in the nation’s hospitals, it failed in 
creating appropriate spaces and resources for people with SMI in the community.  This 
led to the lamentable situation of transinstitutionalization – the transfer of the population 
who historically received services in the state psychiatric hospital to other institutions, 
such as nursing homes, assisted-living facilities, and the criminal justice system.  While 
people were exiting the state hospitals at high rates, the national rate for people in all 
institutional settings did not fluctuate (Scherl & Macht, 1979).   
Transinstitutionalization was created by a number of mechanisms, each enabling 
different pathways to alternative institutions.  For example, when Medicaid was 
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implemented in the 1960s, consistent with prevailing federal policy encouraging people 
to receive treatment in the community, the funds were ineligible for use at psychiatric 
hospitals, but commonly used at nursing homes, creating a financial incentive for people 
to transfer from state psychiatric hospitals (Grob, 2005).  While nursing homes were in 
the community, and therefore ideologically preferable, they were not typically housing 
people with SMI, creating difficulties in delivering high-quality care (Bassuk & Gerson, 
1978).   
Additionally, people with mental illness have become increasingly 
overrepresented in our criminal justice system and are currently present at two to four 
times the rate of the general population (Prins & Draper, 2009).  This overrepresentation 
could stem from a number of etiologies.  The stress of interacting with the criminal 
justice system could exasperate preexisting mental health symptoms or genetic 
vulnerabilities (Ingram & Luxton, 2005).  Alternatively, people with mental illness 
sometimes draw the attention of law enforcement personnel, becoming a part of the 
criminal justice system, rather than receiving treatment in the community, where services 
are typically underfunded and disjointed (Petersilia, 2003).  Often, law enforcement 
personnel are called, even by mental health providers, to address abnormal or 
maladaptive behavior and police may have few alternatives to an arrest (Teplin, 2000).  
To add insult to injury, once people with mental illness are part of the criminal justice 
system, they are more likely to fail community supervision than their general population 
counterparts (Skeem & Eno Louden, 2006), keeping them in the system for longer and 
with potentially compounding severity of sentences.   
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Beyond the fact that deinstitutionalization was essentially untested and hastily 
implemented national policy on mental health treatment, a major contributor to its 
complicated, long-term impact on people with SMI was that its’ advocates and planners 
failed to adequately take into consideration the heterogeneous needs of an SMI 
population.  SMI is typically associated with cognitive deficits, such as memory and 
attention problems, comprehension, motor skills, social skills, executive functioning, and 
verbal skills (Medalia & Revheim, 2012).  These deficits can independently interfere with 
one’s ability to complete day-to-day activities, such as transporting oneself, problem-
solving, and maintaining stability in employment, financial resources, and housing.  
Therefore, they must be accounted for in any policies attempting to help people with SMI 
function more independently in the community.   
Overall, deinstitutionalization was a well-intended shift in national mental health 
policy, but its implementation resulted in a fragmented system, complicated by 
transinstitutionalization.  While this dissertation is certainly not advocating a return to the 
treatment model of the 1950s and prior, it is advocating policymakers learn from the 
mistakes of the past.  Many people benefitted from deinstitutionalization, and CMHCs 
did provide valuable treatment services to a section of the population who had been 
untreated previously.  However, many people with SMI fell through the cracks and into 
our nursing homes without access to comprehensive psychiatric care, or into our jails and 
prisons with their liberty still restricted, but now in a non-therapeutic environment.   
The disparity between the promise of deinstitutionalization and its long-term 
impact is perhaps best illustrated by comparing two quotes from one man, Dr. Robert 
Felix, the director of the NIMH in 1964 (Lyons, 1984).  In 1964, he was quoted as 
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saying, “The needs of the mentally ill are urgent, however, and the public demand that 
they be met is so widespread that it is impossible to await completion of comprehensive 
planning before initiating other facets of the program to meet the needs and the 
demands.”  Twenty years later, he reflected, “Many of those patients who left the state 
hospitals never should have done so.  We psychiatrists saw too much of the old snake pit, 
saw too many people who shouldn’t have been there and we overreacted.  The result is 
not what we intended, and perhaps we didn’t ask the questions that should have been 
asked when developing a new concept, but psychiatrists are human, too, and we tried our 
damnedest.”  As Olmstead plans are designed, implemented, and evaluated, savvy 
policymakers should be mindful of these lessons from deinstitutionalization.   
 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
 While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to review every piece of federal 
legislation proposed or passed related to mental health in the twentieth century and 
beyond, after deinstitutionalization and the CMHA, there were two major pieces of 
federal legislation laying the groundwork for the Olmstead case: the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 
1999).  The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are complimentary pieces of legislation that 
fit together to provide comprehensive protections against discrimination for people with 
disabilities (Leuchovius, 2003).  The Rehabilitation Act preceded the ADA temporally 
and the ADA functioned essentially as an extension of the protections that were first 
codified in the Rehabilitation Act (Leuchovius, 2003).  Not only are both acts discussed 
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individually in the Olmstead opinion, but their language differences are used as a source 
of information in the Olmstead case to interpret Congressional intent regarding the ADA.   
 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 has its roots in federal legislation as far back as 
1917 (Steffen, 2010).  To aid soldiers returning from World War I experiencing “shell 
shock” or trying to readjust to life after a major injury, such as the loss of a limb, 
Congress passed three major laws in relatively quick succession: the Vocational 
Education Act of 1917, the Soldier’s Rehabilitation Act of 1918, and the Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act in 1920.  The latter established the Office of Vocational 
Rehabilitation.  State participation in the programs was not mandatory, but by 1920, 
three-quarters of the states were participating in the vocational rehabilitation program, 
and by 1930, a total of forty-four of the then forty-eight states were participating.  The 
program was made permanent in 1935.   
 Over time, the vocational rehabilitation programs expanded not only their 
geographic span, but also their participation eligibility guidelines (Steffen, 2010).  In 
1940, the requirements broadened to more generally included people with physical 
disabilities and those who were currently employed, but who could benefit from services 
to maintain continued employment.  In 1943, this was further extended to include people 
with mental illness.   
 The office of vocational rehabilitation enjoyed consistent congressional support 
over the years, and in 1973, the Vocational Rehabilitation Act was replaced by the more 
comprehensive Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 2012).  Congress 
explicitly stated that its intent in replacing the Vocational Rehabilitation Act was to 
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expand vocational rehabilitation grants for the states while carefully reserving resources 
and services for those experiencing the most debilitating disabilities.   
While the majority of the Act is outlining expected administration of services and 
funding within the state vocational rehabilitation offices, such as requiring studies of 
services provided and individualized treatment plans, the portion most relevant to 
Olmstead is Title V, specifically § 504 (Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 2012).  Title V 
generally prohibits discrimination on the basis of a disability in employment in the 
federal government or its contractors, and § 504 specifically states,  
“no otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, [defined as 
any individual who (a) has a physical or mental disability which for such 
individual constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment and (b) 
can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of employability from vocational 
rehabilitation services], shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.”  
 
Title V as a whole was an important expansion upon prior versions of vocational 
rehabilitation legislation because it extended beyond just authorizing and funding 
services to actively requiring non-discrimination in both employment and access to 
services by federal agencies, federal contractors, and organizations receiving federal 
funds (Leuchovius, 2003).  While its protections were clearly limited by being applicable 
to only federal or federally funded agencies, it was an important civil rights protection 
law for people with disabilities that laid the groundwork for the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (Leuchovius, 2003).   
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Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
 The ADA was heavily influenced by the Rehabilitation Act, particularly § 504 
(Leuchovius, 2003).  Congress determined that the Rehabilitation Act alone, especially in 
light of its limitation in applicability to only federal and federally funded agencies, was 
inadequate protection against the discrimination faced by people with disabilities 
(Leuchovius, 2003).  Using its power under the commerce clause of the United States 
Constitution, “power to enforce the fourteenth amendment,” and any other power within 
“the sweep of congressional authority,” Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 (Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 2).   
 Where the Rehabilitation Act offers people with disabilities protections in their 
interactions with federal and federally funded agencies, the ADA offers protections in 
their interactions with state, local, and private organizations with at least fifteen 
employees (Leuchovius, 2003).  Title I prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability 
in employment, Title II prohibits discrimination in public services, including 
transportation, Title III prohibits discrimination in public accommodations and services 
operated by private entities, and Title IV prohibits discrimination in telecommunications 
(Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012).  Title V contains miscellaneous 
provisions, such as allocation of responsibility for attorney’s fees, barring someone who 
is facing employment consequences due to drug use from being included in the definition 
of “individual with handicaps,” and excluding homosexuality, bisexuality, and 
“transvestites” from inclusion as disabilities (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 
2012, §§ 501-514).   
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 Congress explicitly stated in its findings that the approximately 43 million people 
with disabilities in the United States “are a discrete and insular minority” with a history 
of “political powerlessness” exposed to “purposeful unequal treatment” due to 
characteristics beyond their control, and the association of those characteristics with 
stereotypes about the individual abilities of people with disabilities (Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 2).3  Furthermore, Congress described the isolation and 
segregation of individuals with disabilities to be a form of discrimination that 
“continue[s] to be a serious and pervasive social problem” in many areas, including 
institutionalization, housing, health services, and access to public services (Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 2).  In articulating the purpose of the Act, Congress 
pronounced their intention to be, inter alia, “to provide a clear and comprehensive 
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities” (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 2).  
                                                 
3  Here, Congress is invoking language associated with Equal Protection Clause 
jurisprudence (U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 5).  In United States v. Carolene Products 
Company (1938), United States Supreme Court Justice Harlan Stone added a famous 
footnote to the Court’s analysis.  While the main analysis of the Court in that case 
involved minimal scrutiny, in footnote four, the Court indicated that if a “discrete and 
insular minority” – essentially, a group without power in the political process to protect 
themselves – was being negatively impacted, the level of scrutiny applied by the Court 
may need to be heightened to ensure the protection of the vulnerable group.  “Discrete 
and insular minority” evolved over time to include factors such as whether the group has 
been historically mistreated or discriminated against, if they are being categorized based 
on immutable characteristics (characteristics that are not changeable, like race, or should 
not be required to change, like religion), or if the categorization reflects a prejudice rather 
than a permissible government objective (Strauss, 2011).  The reasoning behind 
heightened scrutiny for this population is that if they are historically mistreated by the 
government and unable to protect themselves through the political process, the Court may 
need to be more aggressive in its consideration of the constitutionality of laws impacting 
them, triggering a stricter scrutiny.   
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 As the Olmstead case arose under subtitle A of Title II (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. 
Zimring, 1999), this review will focus on that section, and examine others only insofar as 
they are enlightening comparisons.  The Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 
(DOJ) was tasked with regulating and enforcing Title II, subtitle A (Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 204).  Congress used remarkably broad language, which 
the DOJ interpreted as “intended to extend to ‘anything a public entity does’” (Eyer, 
2005, p. 276).  Public entity was defined as any state or local government, including all 
instrumentalities of state and local governments (Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, 2012, § 201).   
 Qualified individuals with a disability were described as people with a disability 
who meet the essential eligibility requirements for receipt of services from a public entity 
or participation in public programs, with or without reasonable accommodations 
(Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 201).  Title II decrees that “no 
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a 
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity” (Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 202).  It is noteworthy that the language is almost 
exactly the same as § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (see Table 1).  The most 
prominent difference between the two is the omission of the word “solely” in the ADA’s 
language regarding the cause of discrimination (“solely by reason of” versus “by reason 
of”).   
Title II refers back to the remedies outlined by the Rehabilitation Act for 
violations of § 504 (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 203), which in turn 
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refers back to the remedies from the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 2012, § 505).  Available remedies include injunctions and appropriate affirmative 
action, which can be pursued as part of a civil action filed by the Department of Justice or 
the aggrieved person (Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2012, §§ 706, 717; Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 2012, § 505; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 203).  In the event 
the plaintiff is successful in their lawsuit, if they are a private citizen, they may recover 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and associated litigation costs (Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2012, 
§§ 706, 717; Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 2012, § 505; Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, 2012, § 203).4   
Finally, before leaving the ADA, it is worthwhile to note the difference in 
language between the prohibition of discrimination in public services in Title II and the 
prohibition of discrimination in employment in Title I, as dissenters in the Olmstead 
opinion used this distinction to bolster their argument.  In Title I, discrimination based on 
disability in employment is prohibited by a “general rule” barring discrimination “against 
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in 
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, 
employee compensation, job training, and other” aspects of employment (Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 102).  The subsection on the general rule is immediately 
                                                 
4  Subsequent to the passing of the ADA and the Olmstead decision, the Supreme Court 
endorsed an as-applied approach to determining whether a private litigant can overcome 
state sovereign immunity when suing under Title II of the ADA (see Tennessee v. Lane, 
2004).  For some areas of Title II’s applicability, a private litigant may be unable to 
overcome the state defense of sovereign immunity, although in some areas, such as 
access to the courts, the ability of private litigants to sue has been upheld (Tennessee v. 
Lane, 2004).  However, nothing in this line of cases impacts the ability of the Department 
of Justice to sue states over Title II violations. 
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followed by a subsection on construction, which details that the term “discrimination” in 
the general rule subsection is intended to include, inter alia, “limiting, segregating, or 
classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities 
or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or 
employee” (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 102, emphasis added).   
 The construction subsection goes on to expound the ways in which an employer 
could potentially discriminate against a job applicant or employee, including participating 
in a contract that subjects the person with a disability to discrimination, discriminating 
against a qualified person because of their relationship to a person with a disability, or 
using qualification standards that tend to screen out people with disabilities, if those 
qualification standards are not related and necessary (Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, 2012, § 102).  The construction of “discrimination” actually extends liability for 
discrimination beyond just the employer-employee relationship into the relationships of 
the employer with other businesses and the employee’s personal relationships.  Where 
Title I’s construction subsection is rather comprehensive, Title II does not have a 
construction subsection – only a comparable general rule against discrimination 
(Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, § 202; see Table 1 for exact language 
from Title II).   
 Title II, subtitle A is remarkably brief overall, especially when compared to other 
titles in the ADA.  It contains only the definition of a public entity and a qualified person 
(§ 201), a general prohibition of discrimination (§ 202), a reference back to the 
Rehabilitation Act for available remedies (§ 203), a section tasking the Department of 
Justice with developing appropriate regulations (§ 204), and an effective date (§ 205) 
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(Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2012, §§ 201-205).  Perhaps its brevity is 
partially responsible for the difficulty the United States Supreme Court had in agreeing 
on its interpretation.   
 
CHAPTER 4: THE SUPREME COURT’S OLMSTEAD RULINGS 
Over forty years after the start of deinstitutionalization, twenty-six years after the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and nine years after the ADA, the United States Supreme 
Court decided the Olmstead case (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999).  Olmstead 
arose from the situation of two plaintiffs in Georgia.  The first plaintiff, L.C., was 
previously diagnosed with schizophrenia and voluntarily admitted to Georgia Regional 
Hospital (GRH) in Atlanta in May 1992.  A year later, her treatment team determined she 
was sufficiently improved to warrant treatment in a state-run community-based treatment 
program.  However, the State failed to actually move her into a community-based 
treatment program for nearly three more years, until February 1996.   
The second plaintiff, E.W., was also voluntarily admitted to GRH, but with a prior 
diagnosis of a personality disorder.  She arrived at GRH in February 1995 and one month 
later, GRH attempted to discharge her to a homeless shelter.  This attempt was stopped 
short after her attorney filed an administrative complaint.  Her treatment team also 
determined she was sufficiently improved to warrant treatment in a state-run community-
based treatment program within a year.  However, the State also failed to actually move 
her into a community-based treatment program for over a year, “until a few months after 
the District Court issued its judgment in this case in 1997” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. 
Zimring, 1999, p. 593).   
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Procedural History 
In May 1995, L.C. filed this lawsuit alleging her continued institutionalization 
against her will and the advice of her treatment team violated, inter alia, Title II of the 
ADA.5  She requested access to the community-based treatment program and “treatment 
with the ultimate goal of integrating her into the mainstream of society” (Olmstead v. 
L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 594).  E.W. soon joined the lawsuit with matching 
allegations and requests.6   
At the District Court level, the plaintiffs won via partial summary judgment (see 
Figure 2 for visual depiction of procedural history).  The court agreed the State was in 
violation of Title II of the ADA because “unnecessary institutional segregation of the 
disabled constitutes discrimination per se” under Title II (1997 WL 148674, p. 37a).  The 
lower court rejected the State’s argument they were not discriminating on the basis of 
disability, but merely out of funds (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, emphasis 
added).  The court not only spurned the State’s attempt to use its limited funds to prove 
there was no discrimination, but it also barred the fact of limited funds from sustaining an 
                                                 
5  L.C.’s initial complaint also alleged her continued institutionalization under these 
conditions violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 588, 593).  However, the lower 
court decided the case by interpreting the ADA and never reached the constitutional 
claim or the § 1983 claim.  Subsequently, the appeals were confined to consideration of 
the alleged ADA-based violation.   
6  The Court noted that while both E.W. and L.C. were receiving community-based 
treatment by the time this case came before the Court, “the case is not moot.  As the 
District Court and Court of Appeals explained, in view of the multiple institutional 
placements L.C. and E.W. have experienced, the controversy they brought to court is 
‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 
594, footnote 6). 
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affirmative defense that the required transfers were not “reasonable modifications” as 
they would “‘fundamentally alter’ the State’s activity” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 
1999, p. 594).  In reaching its decision against the affirmative defense offered, the lower 
court noted Georgia had state-run community-based treatment programs that required 
fewer financial resources per consumer than the state hospital.7   
The State appealed.  The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 
decision of the lower court in part.  The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court 
on the issue of discrimination, and further specified that when a treatment team 
recommends a community-based treatment program, “the ADA imposes a duty to 
provide treatment in a community setting – the most integrated setting appropriate to that 
patient’s needs” (138 F. 3d 893, p. 902).   
However, the appeals court rejected the lower court’s response to the State’s cost-
based affirmative defense.  The District Court’s response seemed to ban any argument 
that the financial burden of services would fundamentally alter the State’s programs.  
Instead, the appeals court indicated the District Court, on remand, should consider 
“whether the additional expenditures necessary to treat L.C. and E.W. in community-
based care would be unreasonable given the demands of the State’s mental health 
budget” (138 F. 3d 893, p. 905).   
Prior to the District Court’s opportunity to reconsider the case on remand, the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari “in view of the importance of the 
                                                 
7  In the plaintiffs’ brief to the United States Supreme Court, they noted that the federal 
Department of Health and Human Services approved up to 2109 Medicaid home and 
community-based care waiver slots for Georgia, but the state only used 700 (Olmstead v. 
L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 601). 
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question presented to the States and affected individuals,” at least partially because 
twenty-two states and the territory of Guam all formerly requested the Supreme Court 
grant certiorari (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 596).  Between the Court 
granting certiorari and deciding the case, the District Court decided the original case on 
remand, using the broader consideration of the fundamental alteration defense required 
by the appeals court.  Unsurprisingly, when considering the cost of treating two people in 
light of the State’s entire mental health budget, the change in treatment was not 
considered “unreasonable” or fundamentally altering the services (Olmstead v. L.C. ex 
rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 596, footnote 7).  The State also appealed that decision, which was 
pending before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals at the time the United States 
Supreme Court announced its opinion on the original case.   
 
Majority and Plurality Opinion 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the opinion of the Court.  The opinion she 
wrote is divided into multiple parts.  Only the first four of the five sections of her opinion 
received the necessary five votes, and thereby, represents a majority opinion of the Court.  
However, six Justices voted in favor of the final judgment.  Additionally, there are 
several concurrences and dissents, indicating a high level of disagreement on the Court 
for the proper resolution of this case.   
In the brief introduction, the issue in the case is described as “concern[ing] the 
proper construction of the anti-discrimination provision contained in the public services 
portion (Title II) of the [ADA]” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 587).  The 
Court also briefly stated its ultimate conclusion – affirming the decision of the appeals 
  
 
32 
court in substantial part, but also remanding “for further consideration of the appropriate 
relief, given the range of facilities the State maintains for the care and treatment of 
persons with diverse mental disabilities, and its obligation to administer services with an 
even hand” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 587).   
After this introduction, the Court reviewed the relevant portions of the ADA upon 
which it would rely in reaching its decision in Part I.  Part I received five votes (Justices 
O’Connor, Souter, Breyer, and Stevens joined Justice Ginsburg) and is considered part of 
the opinion of the Court.  The Court noted Congress had made several germane findings 
in the introduction to the ADA, including that historically, people with disabilities have 
often been segregated from society, that discrimination endures in the area of 
institutionalization, and that such “forms of discrimination… continue to be a serious and 
pervasive social problem,” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 588-589).  The 
Court acknowledged Congress’s intent for the ADA to abolish discrimination against 
people with disabilities.  The Court also quoted the general prohibition of discrimination 
in public services from Title II, as well as the definitions of public entity and qualified 
person, and the section tasking the Department of Justice with issuing regulations 
enforcing this subtitle of the ADA.   
In footnote one, the Court recognized that the ADA builds upon and extends the 
Rehabilitation Act as well as other prior legislation but is the first time Congress has 
explicitly recognized segregation and institutionalization as domains of discrimination 
against people with disabilities.  The Court additionally noted that Title II, subtitle A of 
the ADA is entwined with the Rehabilitation Act in several important ways, including 
similar remedies and required regulatory coordination.  The Attorney General was 
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responsible for both sets of regulations, and in both sets, there is an emphasis placed on 
providing services “in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of” the person 
with a disability (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 591-592).  In the Title II 
regulations, the Attorney General further specified that an integrated setting is one where 
the person with a disability is able “to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest 
extent possible” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 592). 
Another Title II regulation compels any entities providing public services to 
engage in reasonable modifications to prevent discrimination.  A modification is not 
considered reasonable if it “would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, 
or activity” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 592).8  Finally, in footnotes, the 
Court quickly touches on the ADA definition of disability, remedies available, and the 
other portions of Title II, related to transportation.   
Part II also received five votes (Justices O’Connor, Souter, Breyer, and Stevens 
joined Justice Ginsburg) and is considered part of the opinion of the Court.  Here, the 
Court provided the facts of the case, including its procedural history.  Part III is divided 
into three subparts: an introduction, subpart A, and subpart B.  The introduction and III-A 
received the same five votes as Part I and II of the Court’s opinion, but III-B lost Justice 
Stevens’s vote, although the final judgment of the Court did receive six votes.  Part III-A 
addressed the question of whether there was discrimination in this case, while Part III-B 
tackled the limits of the “fundamental alteration” defense.   
                                                 
8  The Court noted that while the controversy in the case touches the regulations, it is 
about the interpretation of the regulations, not their validity or the appropriate amount of 
deference to the agency providing them (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 592). 
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Justice Ginsburg began Part III by noting the Attorney General’s two key findings 
in creating regulations for Title II: 1) that a lack of integration is a form of discrimination 
based on disability, and 2) that while the State had a responsibility to avoid 
discrimination, that charge is limited to reasonable modifications.  In Part III-A, the Court 
held that continued institutionalization against the will of the person with a disability and 
against the recommendations of their treatment team was unjustified segregation, which 
the Department of Justice has consistently argued is discrimination under the ADA.  As 
the Department of Justice is the regulating agency for the relevant portion of Title II, “its 
views warrant respect” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 598), and “may [be] 
properly resort[ed to] for guidance” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 598, 
quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 1944, p. 139-140).   
The Court rejected the argument of the State and the dissent that there was no 
discrimination in this case because the plaintiffs “were not denied community placement 
on account of [their] disabilities” and there is no comparison group of similarly situated 
individuals without a disability who received preferential treatment – only some people 
with disabilities receiving treatment in the community while some remain in an 
institution (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 598).  The dissent further argued 
“this Court has never endorsed an interpretation of the term ‘discrimination’ that 
encompassed disparate treatment among members of the same protected class” (Olmstead 
v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 616).   
The Court responded with three counterpoints to rebuff the arguments of the 
dissent and the State.  First, the Court looked to Congressional intent for the statute in 
question and its regulations.  The ADA escalated its language from prior similar 
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legislation to include mandatory, rather than hortatory, language as well as extending the 
definition of discrimination to include inappropriate segregation itself, and specifically 
noted that institutionalization is an area of persistent discrimination.  Additionally, the 
regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice clearly indicate that integration is a 
requirement of the ADA in its mandate to eliminate discrimination against people with 
disabilities.  Essentially, unjustified segregation, as evidenced by the facts in this case, is 
banned discrimination per se due to the language of the statute and its regulations.   
Second, the Court argued there is a similarly situated group receiving preferential 
treatment: people with physical disabilities.  While people with mental health related 
disabilities are essentially being required to receive treatment in an institution, people 
with physical disabilities are often able to receive treatment in the community.  The Court 
noted this difference in treatment is particularly troubling in light of how 
comprehensively living in an institution reduces one’s ability to participate in social 
relationships, professional development, and community life more generally.   
Third, in responding to the dissent’s assertion that discrimination has never been 
shown by demonstrating differential treatment between members of the same protected 
class, the Court provided examples in a footnote to show “the dissent is incorrect as a 
matter of precedent and logic” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 598, footnote 
10).  For the first example, the Court cited to O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers 
Corp., (1996) a case on age discrimination which held that employees over forty years 
old are protected, even if the person who was favored over them is also over forty, 
provided the plaintiff was discriminated against based on age.  The Court also noted the 
case of Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Assn. (1980) which held that 
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discrimination against black females can be proven even against the context of no 
discrimination against black men or white women.   
In the final point for this section of the Court’s opinion, the Court unequivocally 
stated that nothing in the ADA, its regulations, or this opinion “condones termination of 
institutional settings for persons unable to handle or benefit from community settings… 
the State generally may rely on the reasonable assessments of its own professionals in 
determining whether an individual ‘meets the essential eligibility requirements’ for 
habilitation in a community-based program” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 
601-602).  Additionally, the Court stressed that there is no federal requirement that 
people with disabilities who do not want to be in the community must be placed in 
community-based treatment programs.  The emphasis is on prohibition of discrimination 
via unjustified segregation, not closing every state psychiatric hospital and moving every 
person with a mental health disability into the community.   
In Part III-B, Justice Ginsburg addressed the affirmative defense of fundamental 
alterations, and was joined by Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Breyer.  This is the only 
portion of the opinion that substantively differs from the lower courts’ holdings in this 
case, but it does not have the full weight of an official Court opinion with five Supreme 
Court Justice votes.  Justice Ginsburg argued that the test put forth by the Court of 
Appeals advocating balancing the treatment cost of only the plaintiff(s) against the 
State’s mental health budget “would leave the State virtually defenseless,” as the cost for 
even several people would almost never be unreasonable in light of the entire State 
budget for mental health services (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 603).   
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Alternatively, Justice Ginsburg submitted that the fundamental-alteration test 
should permit a State to successfully defend on the grounds that the State’s obligation to 
care for a large and diverse population of people with mental disabilities would be 
inequitably administered, were they required to provide immediate relocation for the 
plaintiffs.  Essentially, Justice Ginsburg is allowing states to acknowledge the full picture 
of their mental health treatment system when arguing they are being faced with a 
fundamental alteration to the way their mental health treatment system functions.  She 
noted that while the District Court was correct in surmising that the State had lower cost 
per client when providing treatment in a community-based program as compared to 
treatment in an institution, such a “simple comparison … overlooks costs the State cannot 
avoid… [such as] increased overall expenses by funding community placements without 
being able to take advantage of the savings associated with the closure of institutions” 
(Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 604).   
Here again, Justice Ginsburg insisted that the ADA does not require States to 
close all institutions and “plac[e] patients in need of close care at risk,” nor does it require 
States to discharge consumers to any other setting, such as homeless shelters (Olmstead 
v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 604).  One method of showing a state is “maintain[ing] a 
range of facilities and… administer[ing] services with an even hand” is to develop and 
implement a plan for moving willing individuals clinically determined to be appropriate 
candidates for community placement into less restrictive situations (Olmstead v. L.C. ex 
rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 605).  Having a waiting list for these community placements was 
not prohibited, provided the waiting list moved at a reasonable pace and was not 
influenced by a motivation to keep all institutional beds full.   
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Concurrences 
Justice Stevens concurred in substantial part and in the judgment, but ultimately 
withheld his vote from Part III-B.  While he agreed there was discrimination in the case, 
he cited concerns over appropriate reviewing procedure by the Court regarding the 
State’s defense.  Justice Stevens argued that since the appeals court had remanded the 
case to the District Court for consideration of the State’s “fundamental alteration” 
defense, and the District Court’s subsequent decision was pending before the appeals 
court, if the Court wanted to correct the application of the defense, the proper method 
would have been to take the later iteration of the case on appeal.   
Justice Kennedy wrote a two-part concurring opinion, and Justice Breyer joined 
him in the first part.  He began by noting that despite remarkable advances in treatment 
science and advocacy by professionals, people with severe mental illness continue to be 
treated at inadequate rates, at least partially due to historic mistreatment and lack of 
consistent public resources.  He briefly noted that while deinstitutionalization was 
executed with “benign objectives,” and was beneficial for many people, it was also “a 
psychiatric Titanic” for many others (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 608-609, 
quoting Torrey, 1997, p. 11).  He unequivocally stated the ADA should not continue the 
mistakes of deinstitutionalization:  
“It would be unreasonable, it would be a tragic event, then, were the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) to be interpreted so that States had some 
incentive, for fear of litigation, to drive those in need of medical care and 
treatment out of appropriate care and into settings with too little assistance and 
supervision.  The opinion of a responsible treating physician in determining the 
appropriate conditions for treatment ought to be given the greatest of deference… 
States may be pressured into attempting compliance on the cheap, placing 
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marginal patients into integrated settings devoid of the services and attention 
necessary for their condition.” 
 
(Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 610).  He acknowledged Justices Ginsburg’s 
careful treatment of this issue in the opinion of the Court and exhorted lower courts to be 
judicious in their application of this decision.   
 In Part II, he explained why he did not join the majority opinion.  He did not 
interpret the ADA to define unjustified segregation as discrimination per se but did 
endorse the possibility that the plaintiffs may be able to show discrimination via 
preferential treatment of a similarly situation group – people with physical disabilities.  
He recommended the Court remand the case to the District Court in order for there to be 
a factual inquiry if there was differential treatment between the two groups, and thereby, 
discrimination.   
 
Dissent 
 The dissent was written by Justice Thomas and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Scalia.  The dissent argued there was no discrimination in this case.  Using 
the dictionary definition of discrimination, Justice Thomas contended there was no 
evidence of differential treatment between people with disabilities and people without 
disabilities.  They rejected the majority’s contention that Congress intended to broaden 
the definition of discrimination to include unjustified segregation by noting the 
differences in language between the definitions section of Title I and Title II.  
Specifically, as noted in the earlier subsection on the ADA in this dissertation, Title I has 
language instructing that “discrimination” should be construed to include unjustified 
segregation, among other things.  Meanwhile, Title II does not have a section on 
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construction.  The dissent averred this distinction means that Congress did not intend for 
discrimination to be construed as broadly in Title II as in Title I; instead, Congress 
intended discrimination to have its plain meaning when applied in Title II.   
 Additionally, the dissent looked to prior Supreme Court cases interpreting 
comparable sections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act to support their contention that discrimination could only be shown by identifying a 
similarly situated group given preferential treatment.  The dissent also cited concerns 
about federal overreach into state organization of mental health systems and states being 
repeatedly sued for not immediately providing each individual with a disability with the 
treatment they desire.  The dissent does not address the role of the Department of Justice 
regulations in interpreting Title II of the ADA.  As discussed in more depth above, the 
majority answered these contentions by citing case law where discrimination was noted 
between members of the same protected class, using the Department of Justice 
regulations for guidance in interpreting the ADA, and relying upon the strongly worded 
findings section to decipher Congressional intent for the ADA’s application.   
 Overall, the Olmstead decision was a milestone in disability law, particularly for 
people with developmental disabilities and mental health concerns.  Olmstead continues 
to reverberate in federal and state policies shaping mental health treatment systems.  Its 
ultimate mandate is that states must provide community-based treatment programs to 
people who are clinically determined to be appropriate for that level of services and who 
desire to receive treatment in the community, provided that provision of such treatment 
does not require the State to fundamentally alter the way they provide services.  Its final 
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legacy will be determined by the effectiveness with which states modify their mental 
health systems in response to its mandate.   
 
CHAPTER 5: OLMSTEAD RULINGS IN THE U.S. CIRCUIT & DISTRICT COURTS 
After Olmstead was decided in 1999, several states proactively took action to 
develop what became known as Olmstead plans.  By 2004, twenty-nine states, including 
Georgia, had developed Olmstead plans (Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, 2004).  As U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions tend to do, the Court left open several important questions 
about precise implementation in its decision, including how to define “a reasonable pace” 
and exactly what outcomes indicate a State has an effective plan.  Naming a plan 
“Olmstead” does not ensure its compliance with the Court’s ambiguous requirements, 
leaving even well-intentioned states unsure if their plans were sufficient.  Predictably, 
lawsuits ensued.  Initially, those lawsuits were typically filed by advocacy agencies or 
classes of plaintiffs.  In 2009, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice 
started aggressively enforcing Olmstead by suing states with inadequate plans (USDOJ 
Civil Rights Division, 2011).  This chapter will review the different approaches taken by 
courts across the country to apply Olmstead’s vague requirements to state performance.   
The subjects of Olmstead plans vary widely, as the ADA defined discrimination 
very broadly.  State policies may include considerations for people with physical 
disabilities, people with developmental disabilities, and people with disabling mental 
illness, or any combination thereof.  Subsequently, many Olmstead plans are highly 
diverse in their efforts to incorporate people with disabilities into the community.   
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Reviewing all Olmstead-related litigation for all policies for all people with 
disabilities is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  Rather, this chapter, and this 
dissertation overall, focuses on Olmstead policies related to people with SMI, for two 
primary reasons.  First, that is the area of study of the author.  Second, as is argued in the 
first and second chapters of this dissertation, people with SMI are often abandoned in 
major policy shifts for easier-to-treat populations, as was seen in deinstitutionalization, 
and they often do not have much political capital with which to protect themselves.  
Therefore, this chapter’s review of litigation subsequent to the Olmstead decision is 
limited to cases applicable to people with SMI, specifically in their search for access to 
treatment services in the community to avoid unjustifiable segregation.   
First, this chapter will review the only two federal appellate circuits to articulate 
the qualities of an “effective Olmstead plan” in the context of moving people from 
institutions into the community.  Next, relevant district court decisions from other circuits 
will also be examined.  Finally, relevant Department of Justice lawsuits, particularly the 
terms of their settlement agreements (i.e., consent decrees), will be discussed.  As the 
United States Supreme Court has not revisited Olmstead or further clarified its 
requirements in this regard, looking to the style of enforcement by the courts will provide 
instructional sets of evaluative criteria, which will be examined in the empirical section 
of this dissertation.   
 
Appellate Court Decisions 
 While many courts around the country have sought to interpret several of the legal 
grey areas surrounding the Olmstead decision and the ADA, only the Third Circuit and 
  
 
43 
the Ninth Circuit have evaluated state plans for “continuing deinstitutionalization,” and 
they came to markedly different conclusions.   
 
Third Circuit 
 The Third Circuit includes the states of New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania.  
The relevant case that was ultimately decided by the appellate court began in 2001 and 
arose initially from the situation of four adult plaintiffs: Frederick L., Nina S., Kevin C., 
and Steven F. (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2001).  These four plaintiffs were 
hospitalized at Norristown State Hospital (NSH) in Pennsylvania.  One plaintiff, 
Frederick, had been recommended for discharge from the state hospital in July 1997, 
while another, Kevin, had been recommended for discharge in February 1999.  Steven 
had also been recommended for discharge, but the date is not noted in the court’s 
opinions.  Nina had not yet received any such recommendations, but the court seems to 
attribute this to the observed tendency of NSH professionals to be unaware of services 
available in the community (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2001, p. 514).  
Furthermore, the court noted that potential discharges from NSH are only evaluated for 
community readiness “based on the capacity of the individual to fit – however awkwardly 
– into existing programs,” as opposed to considering their community readiness had more 
comprehensive and inclusive community services been available (Frederick L. v. Dept. of 
Public Welfare, 2001, p. 514).   
 The lawsuit overall survived a motion to dismiss, but not without a few casualties; 
some counts were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, but some ADA and all 
Rehabilitation Act claims were able to proceed (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 
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2001).  Over the next four years, the case was decided by the district court, then appealed, 
vacated, and remanded, decided by the district court again, and then appealed, vacated, 
and remanded yet again (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2005).  Both district 
court decisions found in favor of the defendants, holding they had established the 
affirmative fundamental alteration defense described by the Court in Olmstead (Frederick 
L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2002; Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2004b).   
 The first district court decision included recitation of several relevant facts.  First, 
the class of plaintiffs had grown from four individuals to three hundred members 
(Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2002).  All individuals hospitalized at NSH for 
non-forensic reasons were included as members of the plaintiff class.  This group of 
individuals is observed to be most commonly diagnosed with schizophrenia (52%), 
followed by schizoaffective disorder (30%).  Members of the plaintiff class tended to fall 
into one of two categories: about one-third of individuals are hospitalized for a short term 
(less than two years) and about two-thirds are at NSH for a long term (more than two 
years), with the average length of stay being ten months and 12.5 years, respectively.  
The court noted, “defendants admit that at any given time, NSH treatment professionals 
consider approximately one third of NSH’s civil patients clinically stable and ready for 
discharge” (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2002, p. 591).  At the time of initial 
trial, that would have included approximately one hundred members of the plaintiff class. 
 The court also made several important observations about the structure of funding 
for mental health services in Pennsylvania (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 
2002).  The Department of Public Welfare (DPW), as part of the executive branch, 
develops and proposes an annual budget, which is submitted to the legislature for 
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approval or modification.  DPW then receives back funds that are explicitly earmarked 
for particular programs within the budget, with no discretionary funds or authority to 
modify funding allocations.  Under state law, individual counties are responsible for 
developing community mental health services.  The county sends needs assessments and 
annual budgets to DPW for funding.  Overall, DPW and its annual legislatively approved 
budget account for approximately eighty percent of the costs for state psychiatric 
hospitals and ninety percent of the costs for the county community mental health 
services.   
 Additionally, discharge procedures at NSH are described by the court as 
somewhat haphazard.  NSH declined to develop and manage a waiting list of individuals 
ready for discharge, ostensibly because “discharge planning is an individualized process” 
and discharge readiness may change while waiting for placement (Frederick L. v. Dept. 
of Public Welfare, 2002, p. 586).  The length of waiting time for a community placement 
is seen as highly variable, due to rare vacancies in community programs and 
unpredictable acceptance rates by community providers.  There is no evidence presented 
by the defense that there exists a comprehensive plan for efficient movement of 
discharge-ready individuals into less restrictive settings; in fact, the court noted that a 
defense witness explicitly admitted there was no such plan at trial (Frederick L. v. Dept. 
of Public Welfare, 2002, p. 587).   
 As the court began its Olmstead analysis, it is undisputed that the allegation of 
discrimination under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act via unjustified segregation is 
valid; the only real question is whether the changes to the system to reduce this 
discrimination would be reasonable modifications or a fundamental alteration of the 
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state’s mental health programs (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2002).  The 
plaintiffs requested the defendants be required to develop at least sixty community 
placements per year, with an estimated cost of approximately $6.7 million per year.  The 
court acknowledged that while community-based services are less expensive than 
hospitalizations, oftentimes, states face the cost of developing community-based services 
while maintaining hospitals, creating a substantial financial burden.  The court 
additionally recognized that states have a floor effect on how much money they can save 
by increasing discharges from the state hospital, as the state hospital must remain open, 
and so has fixed costs.   
 The court described the plurality decision by the Olmstead Court on the 
fundamental alteration defense as explicitly rejecting both a simple comparison of the 
cost of the plaintiffs’ integration to the whole of the state’s mental health budget (which 
would result in the plaintiffs winning almost every time), as well as rejecting a finding 
that any increase in costs “constitutes a fundamental alteration per se” (which would 
result in the state winning almost every time) (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 
2002, p. 592).  Rather, the fundamental alteration defense requires a more moderate 
analysis: if the requested accommodation is reasonable, while “taking into account the 
resources available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities” 
(Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2002, p. 592, quoting Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. 
Zimring, 1999, p. 603).  The court clarified that “resources available to the State” means 
only the state’s allocated mental health budget.   
 Within this analytical context, the court finds for the defendants.  The analysis 
seems to be driven by two factors: DPW’s established track record of increasingly 
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developing community placements over time and the inadequacy of the financial 
resources allotted to DPW.  The court showed deference to DPW and its consistent 
efforts “to establish more and more community-based programs… to the extent possible, 
given fiscal realities” (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2002, p. 593).  However, 
the court only noted the financial limitations DPW was restrained to work within, and did 
not comment or criticize further, as the mental health budget of the state was approved by 
the legislature, and not subject to judicial review.   
 Essentially, the court seemed resigned that DPW had an insufficient budget but 
had a record of making the best of a bad situation, which assured the court DPW would 
continue to do so in the future.  As the court could only review DPW’s decisions on how 
to use the funds appropriated for it by the legislature, not the legislature’s decision on the 
amount of funds to be appropriated, the court concluded, “simply, absent an increase in 
funding, there is no way for Defendants to provide the relief sought by Plaintiffs without 
depriving others of mental health care” (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2002, p. 
593).  The court noted that not only are the plaintiffs discontented, but the defendants and 
the court are frustrated as well.   
Fortunately, the plaintiffs appealed (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 
2004a).  The appeal drew the appellate court’s attention to three claims primarily.  First, a 
fundamental alteration defense could not be established solely by claiming an immediate 
net increase in cost.  Second, it was an err for the District Court to not review DPW’s role 
in the budget development, specifically prior to the submission of the proposed budget to 
the legislature.  Third, DPW had failed to provide anything resembling a comprehensive 
plan for future efficient movement of appropriate individuals into the community, instead 
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only claiming that as DPW had, in the past, developed community placements as 
proactively as they could with allotted appropriations and any budget excess, they would 
continue to do so in the future.   
First, the court agreed with the appellants that a fundamental alteration defense 
could not be established solely by claiming an immediate net increase in cost; however, 
the court held that DPW had provided evidence that it had repeatedly and unsuccessfully 
attempted to procure additional funds for its community placements as well as spending 
any budgetary excess for that purpose.  Additionally, the court rejected the appellants’ 
argument that the majority of the cost for additional community placements would 
eventually be tempered by savings from hospital bed closures as the exact “reductive cost 
comparisons” the Olmstead plurality had renounced (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public 
Welfare, 2004a, p. 497).  The Third Circuit also agreed with the District Court that the 
legislative process by which annual budgets are set is beyond judicial scrutiny.  Overall, 
in response to the contention that DPW should have managed its funds other than it did, 
the Third Circuit described the requested cost shifting as exactly the type deemed to be a 
fundamental alteration by the Olmstead plurality – that which would require the state to 
unfairly and inequitably administer services, ultimately at the expense of non-plaintiff 
service recipients.   
Finally, the order to vacate and remand the case rested only on the final 
contention by the appellants: DPW had not done enough in providing a plan for the future 
to sustain a fundamental alteration defense.  The Third Circuit agreed with the District 
Court that Pennsylvania could be given credit for its progress in deinstitutionalization 
since the 1950s; however, the Third Circuit further required “a commitment to action in a 
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manner for which it can be held accountable by the courts” in the future (Frederick L. v. 
Dept. of Public Welfare, 2004a, p. 500).   
 The District Court, on remand, reviewed the planning practices of DPW to 
determine their sufficiency for a fundamental alteration defense (Frederick L. v. Dept. of 
Public Welfare, 2004b).  The guidance provided by the Third Circuit was relatively 
vague, requiring primarily the ability to hold the state accountable with only three 
additional concrete parameters: 1) a piece of paper was not required to have a plan, 2) 
NSH’s current practices of monthly reviews of hospitalized individuals was insufficient, 
and 3) ordering DPW to develop sixty community-based residential slots each year was 
too extreme a requirement (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2004b, p. 5).  
Plaintiffs contended that nothing less than a “‘concrete plan’ with ‘measurable outcomes’ 
and a ‘timeline for the discharge of unnecessarily institutionalized class members’” 
would suffice (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2004b, p. 7).  However, the court 
explicitly rejected this argument, noting that if such specific parameters were required, 
the Third Circuit could have easily expressed that.   
Instead, the court focused on the state’s general planning efforts.  Essentially, the 
court found that since February 2000, the state had been developing comprehensive plans 
based on formal needs assessments, organized by the geographic service areas of the nine 
state psychiatric hospitals.  The plans had clearly articulated goals of developing more 
community services and reducing reliance on the state psychiatric hospitals as primary 
providers of mental health care services in the state.  The court also noted the 
development of county level planning initiatives, and an overall trend of 
deinstitutionalization in the state in recent years, including over half of the plaintiffs in 
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the original lawsuit.  Overall, DPW’s plan for the future was declared to be sufficient for 
a fundamental alteration defense, given that it was “comprehensive, holistic, and forward-
looking… [offering] a full range of mental health services, with an emphasis on not only 
discharging current hospitalized patients, but also seeking to avoid hospitalization… 
demonstrat[ing] DPW’s central and long-term commitment that all reasonable steps will 
be taken to continue the past progress”  (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2004b, 
p. 7). 
 Turns out, the Third Circuit actually agreed with the plaintiffs, criticizing DPW’s 
approach as “a vague assurance of the individual patient’s future deinstitutionalization 
rather than some measurable goals for community integration for which DPW may be 
held accountable” (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2005, p. 156).  The Third 
Circuit was particularly disparaging of DPW’s failure to turn the plans for the nine 
service areas into a state-wide plan, and the final plans including “amorphous, i.e., non-
specific goal of closing up to 250” hospital beds per year (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public 
Welfare, 2005, p. 158).  In perhaps the most scathing sentences of the opinion, the court 
wrote,  
DPW remains silent as to when, if ever, eligible patients at NSH can expect to be 
discharged.  Instead, DPW proffers general assurances and good faith intentions 
to effectuate deinstitutionalization.  General assurances and good-faith intentions 
neither meet the federal laws nor a patient’s expectations.  Their implementation 
may change with each administration… they are simply insufficient guarantors in 
light of the hardship inflicted upon patients through unnecessary and indefinite 
institutionalization. 
 
(Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2005, p. 158).   
Ultimately, the Third Circuit held that states must have written plans with specific 
and measurable goals of fewer state psychiatric hospital beds by particular dates.  The 
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court seemed to view brightline markers, such as lower bed numbers by certain dates, as 
crucial elements of accountability.  While the Third Circuit respected Pennsylvania’s 
“strong commitment in the past to deinstitutionalization,” as it had decreased the hospital 
population from 40,000 to 3,000 in the fifty years preceding, the court clearly articulated 
concerns about that trend continuing in the face of changing leadership without clearly 
articulated expectations (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2005, p. 156).  Rather, a 
specific date of discharge for an approximate number of people, along with discharge 
eligibility requirements and “a general description of the collaboration required between 
the local authorities and the housing, transportation, care, and education agencies to 
effectuate integration into the community” was necessary for a state’s fundamental 
alteration defense (Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2005, p. 160).9   
 
Ninth Circuit 
 The Ninth Circuit includes the states of Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, 
California, Nevada, Montana, Idaho, and Arizona.  Both Washington and California have 
                                                 
9  The Third Circuit also decided a remarkably similar case in 2005, a few months before 
issuing their second opinion on Frederick L (Pennsylvania Protection and Advocacy, Inc. 
v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, 2005).  A nursing home that served 
almost exclusively the elderly population discharged from the state psychiatric hospitals 
was challenged as violating the ADA’s integration mandate after staff reported to DPW 
that “80% of its residents ‘could function in the community now if the necessary 
community support services were in place and operational’ and that none of its residents 
were precluded from leaving ‘due to serious medical problems that cannot be met in the 
community’” (Pennsylvania Protection and Advocacy, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department 
of Public Welfare, 2005, p. 378).  The appellate court’s opinion in that case is effectively 
an encore to their first opinion on Frederick L.; DPW failed “to demonstrate a reviewable 
commitment to action… and thus DPW’s fundamental alteration defense must fail” 
(Pennsylvania Protection and Advocacy, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of Public 
Welfare, 2005, p. 383).   
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had cases reviewed by the Ninth Circuit to evaluate the sufficiency of the state plan in 
establishing a fundamental alteration defense by proactively reducing the unjustifiable 
segregation of people with disabilities (Sanchez v. Johnson, 2005; Arc of Washington 
State, Inc. v. Braddock, 2005).10  In both cases, the challenges were related to the 
administration of Medicaid waiver program to aid states in providing services in the 
community.  Specifically, in both cases, plaintiffs contended that the waiver program was 
insufficient because the state should have requested additional waivers from Medicaid, as 
there were eligible individuals unable to move from the institutions into the community 
due to lack of program slots.   
 In both cases, the Ninth Circuit found that due to the state’s enthusiastic use of the 
existing program along with other proactive endeavors to protect and grow the outpatient 
services options, even in the face of budget cuts for other programs, provided a sufficient 
basis for a fundamental alteration defense.  Unlike the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit 
does not require written plans or specific discharge dates for approximate groups of 
people but does require more than just lower hospital populations (Sanchez v. Johnson, 
2005; Arc of Washington State, Inc. v. Braddock, 2005).  The Ninth Circuit requires 
                                                 
10  Both cases had as plaintiffs people with developmental disabilities or private 
organizations that served only people with developmental disabilities, or both.  The 
programs being challenged were directed by an administrative arm of the state executive 
branch dedicated to providing services only to people with developmental disabilities.  
However, the court made no distinction in its analysis specific to the type of disability of 
the plaintiffs, indicating they would likely use the same approach to evaluate a similar 
lawsuit involving people with SMI, meaning this decision is also shaping Olmstead 
policy for people with SMI indirectly.  As will be seen throughout this chapter, there is 
relatively little litigation directly dealing with the original Olmstead issue – the 
responsibility of the state to create and maintain a comprehensive plan that effectively 
moves individuals with SMI who are determined to be ready for discharge by themselves 
and their treatment team into the community – so, states and researchers must take their 
cues from any relevant and applicable decisions.   
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significant budget increases in community services and community-based waiver 
programs, despite fiscal constraints.   
 In California, the Ninth Circuit seemed particularly impressed that “California 
ha[d] a successful record of personalized evaluations leading to a reasonable rate of 
deinstitutionalization” coupled with strong support of community-based treatment 
programs (Sanchez v. Johnson, 2005, p. 1068).  In particular, the appellate court 
applauded California’s database of people currently institutionalized and the services they 
would likely need to be successful in the community, along with the individualized plans 
to connect the person to those resources in the community and develop the skills in the 
person.  Perhaps most convincingly, the Ninth Circuit found that California had increased 
funding for community-based treatment services, including the waiver program, and 
concomitantly decreased its hospital population over the past several years.   
 Similarly, when Washington’s Olmstead plan was challenged, it also survived 
primarily because of the state’s focus on funding community treatment alternatives (Arc 
of Washington State, Inc. v. Braddock, 2005).  While many state agencies had their 
funding decreased in the 1990s, Washington more than doubled its investment in 
community-based treatment programs for people with disabilities during that same time.  
Washington concurrently increased the available slots in its waiver program and 
decreased its institutional population.   
 The Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that an expansion to a state’s administration of 
a Medicaid waiver program was not a per se fundamental alteration, and could, in 
unspecified circumstances, be a reasonable modification.  However, the court emphasized 
that it would not “tinker with” a state’s “comprehensive, effectively working plan” 
  
 
54 
especially if its opportunities for community treatment are continually increasing both in 
budget and real number of program slots, it consistently uses all available community 
treatment opportunities, and it shows evidence of a continuing trend of 
deinstitutionalization (Arc of Washington State, Inc. v. Braddock, 2005, p. 621, quoting 
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 605).  The court described as unnecessary a 
hypothetical statewide plan that provided for immediate community placement as soon as 
an individual became eligible, citing back to Olmstead’s acceptable of a reasonable 
waiting list (Sanchez v. Johnson, 2005, p. 1068, quoting Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 
1999, p. 606).   
 
District Court Decisions 
 There is relatively little litigation directly dealing with the original Olmstead issue 
– the responsibility of the state to create and maintain a comprehensive plan that 
effectively moves individuals with SMI into the community once they are determined to 
be ready for discharge by themselves and their treatment team.  The most pertinent cases 
arose in Florida, Minnesota, and Maryland.  However, there are several additional cases 
which, even if addressing slightly different issues, contribute meaningfully to our 
understanding of how courts are approaching the application of Olmstead to people with 
SMI as they try to integrate into the community following hospitalization.  
 
Fourth Circuit 
 The Fourth Circuit includes the states of Maryland, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia.  Twelve plaintiffs, all diagnosed with a traumatic 
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brain injury or developmental disability, filed suit against a state hospital in Maryland, 
alleging they could receive appropriate care in the community and the state’s failure to 
provide such placements for them violated the ADA inter alia (Williams v. Wasserman, 
2001).  Several of the plaintiffs waited for months for a community placement after their 
treatment team labelled them ready for a less restrictive service setting.  Several plaintiffs 
had also gone back and forth between community and institutional placements, as the 
intensity of their clinical needs changed over time.  The District Court ultimately held 
there were distinct periods of unjustifiable segregated in violation of the ADA, but the 
state successfully mounted a fundamental alteration defense.   
 In coming to its conclusion, the court relied heavily on the state’s history of 
deinstitutionalization.  Specifically, the court noted the state has gradually closed several 
institutions over the past ten years while concurrently expanding community programs, 
including both residential programs, such as group homes or staff drop-ins for private 
residences, and complementary day programming, such as vocational or educational 
programs (Williams v. Wasserman, 2001).  The court also observed that state “mental 
hospitals” went from a population of 7,114 residents in 1970 to approximately 1200 in 
1997, while community treatment services throughout the state increased, including the 
state’s extensive utilization of Medicaid “waiver” programs (Williams v. Wasserman, 
2001, p. 634).  The court applauded the state for also having used savings from hospital 
closings to grow community programs while prioritizing those community programs over 
institutional programs anytime a budget shortage loomed.   
 Interestingly, the court quoted the Olmstead acknowledgement of the dynamic 
nature of many individual’s clinical needs: “Some individuals ‘may need institutional 
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care from time to time to stabilize acute psychiatric symptoms’ … the ADA is not 
reasonably read to compel a State to put patients at risk by closing its institutions or to 
drive a State to move institutionalized patients into ‘inappropriate’ settings” (Williams v. 
Wasserman, 2001, p. 636-637, quoting Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 605).  
For Maryland, testimony from an administrator in the Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene approximated the needed number of on-going hospital beds to be between 1100 
and 1200 - very close to the overall available beds in Maryland at the time of litigation.  
The court noted that the plaintiffs themselves have periodically benefitted from 
rehospitalizations as their needs have fluctuated.   
 Overall, Maryland successfully defended on fundamental alteration grounds due 
to its historical trend of deinstitutionalization down to the limit advised by the chief 
administrator of the state mental health system, combined with an observed focus on 
developing diverse community placement opportunities, even at the potential expense of 
institutional programs (Williams v. Wasserman, 2001).  This approach seems quite 
consistent with the approach espoused by the Ninth Circuit, with its emphasis on a trend 
of deinstitutionalization coupled with the distinct development of varied community 
placement opportunities.   
 
Eighth Circuit 
 The Eighth Circuit includes the states of Nebraska, Iowa, Arkansas, Minnesota, 
Missouri, North Dakota, and South Dakota.  In 2009, a group of individuals with 
developmental disabilities sued the state of Minnesota for inappropriate use of restraint 
and seclusion (Jensen v. Minnesota Dept. of Human Services, 2015).  In 2011, the parties 
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jointly submitted a settlement agreement, which was accepted by the court, with the 
condition of the court’s temporarily continued supervision to ensure initial compliance 
with the terms of the agreement (Jensen v. Minnesota Dept. of Human Services, 2011).  
The settlement agreement terms included all people with disabilities, stretching beyond 
the original plaintiff group.   
While generally, the terms of a settlement agreement are primarily determined by 
the parties, the court’s involvement elevates the agreement beyond the status of a 
voluntary contract to a judgment of the court; it “places the power and prestige of the 
court behind the compromise struck by the parties” (Williams v. Vukovich, 1983, p. 920).  
The Minnesota court in this case took that charge seriously and reviewed the terms of the 
settlement agreement meticulously.   
One of the settlement agreement terms was “System Wide Improvements” - 
specifically, the development of “a comprehensive Olmstead Plan to improve the lives of 
individuals with disabilities” (Jensen v. Minnesota Dept. of Human Services, 2015, p. 
1070).  The court demanded that within eighteen months, Minnesota not only develop but 
implement this plan, which must use “measurable goals to increase the number of people 
with disabilities receiving services that best meet their individual needs and in the ‘Most 
Integrated Setting,’” in accordance with the Olmstead decision (Jensen v. Minnesota 
Dept. of Human Services, 2015, p. 1070).  More than three years after the settlement 
agreement was accepted, and after rejecting four prior versions, the court finally found 
Minnesota’s proposed plan to be sufficient on September 29, 2015 (Jensen v. Minnesota 
Dept. of Human Services, 2015).   
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The court cited three specific attributes as imperative to the plan’s acceptability.  
First, the revised plan had “concrete, measurable goals with corresponding time lines” in 
contrast to the “vague assurances of future integrated options” previously offered by the 
state (Jensen v. Minnesota Dept. of Human Services, 2015, p. 1072).  The goals include 
baseline data with annual improvement targets for multiple domains.  Additionally, 
missing data for relevant goals were explicitly identified for future collection.   
Second, the goals of the revised plan were pertinent to the Olmstead mission with 
“specific and realistic strategies for achieving each goal,” and clearly indicated which 
agencies were responsible for each goal (Jensen v. Minnesota Dept. of Human Services, 
2015, p. 1073).  Finally, the revised plan also included an annual review and formal 
amendment process to ensure the plan was a “dynamic roadmap” that could be 
responsive to newly identified needs while committing to reaching the pre-identified 
goals (Jensen v. Minnesota Dept. of Human Services, 2015, p. 1073).  Interestingly, in the 
last paragraph of the discussion, the court explicitly directs the state, with unambiguous 
language, to treat these commitments as “a top priority… The Court wishes to strongly 
emphasize that the State must prioritize its allocation of funding to meet and achieve the 
Olmstead Plan’s goals.  The State may not rely on the excuse of insufficient funding to 
avoid following through on the important commitments it has made” (Jensen v. 
Minnesota Dept. of Human Services, 2015, p. 1074, emphasis added).  
A review of the document submitted by the state of Minnesota to the court in 
2015 reveals a number of service areas, each given a set of measurable goals, with 
baseline data and annual improvement targets, realistic and specific strategies for 
proposed improvements, and clearly identified agencies responsible for the changes 
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(Minnesota Olmstead Subcabinet, 2015).  Service areas include person-centered 
planning, transition services, housing services, employment, lifelong learning and 
education, waiting lists, transportation, healthcare and healthy living, positive supports, 
crisis services, and community engagement.  Each service area has a section on defining 
the services and needs of people with disabilities, a vision statement, the current situation 
in that area, and specific, measurable goals by annual improvement rate with exact 
baseline data.   
The plan that finally survived the scrutiny of the District Court seems to be a 
combination of the approaches used by the Ninth and Third Circuit.  Similar to the Third 
Circuit, the court requires more than vague assurances of good faith, but specific goals to 
which the state can be held accountable.  However, unlike the Third Circuit, the court 
seem unfazed at commandeering the state’s annual budget development by demanding 
compliance with its obligations under the settlement agreement.  Similar to the Ninth 
Circuit, the court emphasized the concurrent development of community resources rather 
than only lower numbers in the state hospital census.  Ultimately, the court enforced a far 
more comprehensive and intricate standard for a plan than has been seen in other courts.   
 
Eleventh Circuit 
 The Eleventh Circuit includes the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia.  In Florida, 
a class of currently or formerly hospitalized individuals brought suit against a state 
psychiatric hospital, G. Pierce Wood Memorial Hospital (GPW) alleging violations of the 
US Constitution, the ADA, and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA; 
Johnson v. Murphy, 2001).  The majority of the approximately 350 individuals 
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hospitalized at GPW were adults with SMI; 85% were civilly committed.  Every month, 
GPW has approximately thirty people admitted and thirty people discharged.  After a 
month-long trial, the District Court found in favor of the defendants on all allegations.  In 
regard to the ADA claims specifically, the District Court held the plaintiffs did not prove 
that GPW violated the ADA by failing to place clients in the most integrated setting 
appropriate, given their clinical needs.   
 In coming to this conclusion, the court seemed to focus on several GPW policies 
and facts related to planning and performance of patient discharge (Johnson v. Murphy, 
2001).  First, the court found GPW’s preparation for patient discharge to begin at 
admission and proceed satisfactorily until actual discharge.  Upon admittance at GPW, 
both treatment and discharge planning began immediately, were updated regularly based 
on individual changes, and involved communication with people in the community who 
would support the individual upon discharge, including community case workers, family, 
and community mental health providers.  There are usually few people awaiting 
discharge from GPW, with an average wait time of thirty to sixty days (Johnson v. 
Murphy, 2001, p. 9). 
 Second, the court found the options for community placement to be sufficient in 
terms of both being geared towards a diverse array of patient needs and being reasonably 
successful at meeting those needs.  Once treatment providers believe an individual may 
be ready for community placement, there are a variety of community placement options 
available, including assisted living facilities and private apartments, of which “few, if 
any, of them operate at full capacity” (Johnson v. Murphy, 2001, p. 9).  Community case 
managers are heavily relied upon to help connect recently discharged individuals to local 
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services.  Additionally, GPW has a community outreach program “based on” an 
Assertive Community Treatment Team model through which GPW strives to support 
people as they are discharged (Johnson v. Murphy, 2001, p. 8).  The majority of those 
discharged from GPW go to family homes or private apartments, with about 20% going 
into group living situations, such as assisted-living facilities.  After discharge, most 
people are able to remain in the community.   
 In this case, unlike the cases from the Ninth, Fourth, and Third Circuits, the court 
did not find evidence of discrimination via unjustified segregation.  The average wait 
time for discharge after determination of eligibility in this case was thirty to sixty days, in 
stark contrast to the multiple years waited for discharge in the Olmstead and Frederick L. 
cases.  Therefore, there was no need for the state to try to defend on the grounds that the 
requested accommodations were unreasonable as a fundamental alteration of the state’s 
mental health system.   
 
Other Developments in the District and Appellate Courts 
 There are several cases, at both the district court and appellate court levels, that 
outline a few cornerstone principles for how courts are approaching the application of 
Olmstead.  First, in agreement with similar holdings described earlier in this chapter, it 
seems universally accepted that vague financial concerns are not sufficient to support a 
state’s fundamental alteration defense.  In Makin v. Hawaii (1999), a class of people with 
developmental disabilities sued the state for ADA violations, inter alia, alleging the state 
had not provided sufficient community placements, as evidenced by their extended tenure 
on a stagnant waiting list.  The state contended that providing the requested increase in 
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community placements could only be accomplished through the creation of an 
“unlimited” state fund for community mental health services.  The district court was not 
persuaded by the state’s argument, holding that a vaguely-defined potential funding 
problem was not adequate to protect the state against ADA violations.  Additionally, in 
Fisher v. Oklahoma Health Care Authority (2003), the Tenth Circuit declared that 
allowing any alteration of services requiring the state to shift or increase funding to 
qualify as a fundamental alteration would effectively eviscerate the integration mandate 
of the ADA.   
Second, while appellate courts have held that the ADA does not require states to 
develop new programs for people with disabilities (Rodriguez v. City of New York, 1999), 
the Ninth Circuit held that requiring the extension of a current program to a new, more 
integrated location was not the creation of an entirely new program (Townsend v. 
Quasim, 2003).  The court indicated that allowing merely the location of service 
provision to dictate whether the program in question was new would render the 
integration mandate meaningless as more integrated settings tend to be in different 
locations, almost by definition.   
Third, the protections of Olmstead are not limited to those currently 
institutionalized, but also apply to state policies that increase an individual’s risk for 
institutionalization, such as capping the number of monthly prescriptions covered (Fisher 
v. Oklahoma Health Care Authority, 2003) or denying access to supportive medical 
devices that make independent living more achievable (Davis v. Shah, 2016). 
 Fourth, Olmstead cannot be applied in reverse; while it is discriminatory to hold 
someone able and willing to live in the community unjustifiably segregated in an 
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institutional setting, it is not discriminatory to discharge someone who does not want to 
be discharged.  In Illinois (Illinois League of Advocates for the Developmentally Disabled 
v. Illinois Department of Human Services, 2015) and New Jersey (Sciarrillo v. Christie, 
2013), two cases were decided against the plaintiffs when they sued claiming the closure 
of their state institution and subsequent forced discharge into the community was 
discrimination under the ADA.  Essentially, the ADA only prohibits unjustifiable 
segregation, not unwanted integration, so the protections of the ADA are never triggered.   
Finally, Olmstead simply does not apply to individuals who do not want to live in 
the community or whose treatment teams do not agree they are ready to move into the 
community, as those are individuals who are not unjustifiably segregated; therefore, the 
protections of the ADA are not triggered.  Nothing in Olmstead requires states to override 
the clinical judgment of its treatment professionals to place an individual in an integrated 
setting if their treatment team is not confident the individual could be appropriately 
treated in that setting (Black v. Department of Mental Health, 2000).  Similarly, if an 
individual objects to a transfer to a more integrated setting, the state may not justify their 
actions by citing Olmstead, as Olmstead was meant to protect those who want to move 
into the community, not force people with disabilities into alternative settings over their 
objection (In re Easly, 2001).   
 
Department of Justice 
 The Department of Justice has been aggressively involved in Olmstead related 
litigation for almost a decade, resulting in multiple amicus curiae briefs, joined lawsuits, 
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and solo lawsuits about policies affecting people with a diverse array of disabilities.11  
Four states had settlement agreements (i.e., consent decrees) particularly relevant to the 
issue of people with SMI integrating into the community after hospitalization on a scale 
large enough to require comprehensive state mental health policy modification: Georgia, 
Delaware, North Carolina, and New Hampshire.  The requirements of the settlement 
agreement for each state are reviewed here.   
The Department of Justice took a relatively consistent approach to their settlement 
agreements, although its approach was decidedly different than the Third or Ninth 
Circuits, or even Minnesota’s long disputed settlement agreement.  The Department of 
Justice often required specific infrastructure and mental health system development, 
centering around Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) teams and crisis services, 
rather than a focus on census numbers in the state hospital or funding shifts.  Most 
developments are required stepwise over time (e.g., a quarter of the total required is due 
every year over a four- to five-year period), but for the sake of brevity only totals are 
presented here.  See Table 2 for a summary and below for a comprehensive discussion of 
the major terms of the four primary settlement agreements.   
 
Georgia 
 Georgia was sued by the Department of Justice in early 2010, after an 
investigation in 2009.  The settlement agreement was reached by October 2010 and 
                                                 
11  All information in this section is from documents publicly available on Olmstead 
enforcement page of the Department of Justice website 
(https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/olmstead_enforcement.htm).  A database of documents, 
including court filings, settlement agreements, and annual court reports was compiled and 
reviewed for trends in settlement agreement requirements to inform this section.   
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targeted both people with SMI and DD.  The provisions in the settlement agreement 
pertaining to people with DD mainly required closing down the state institution within 4 
years and moving all individuals to the community through creation of 1150 home and 
community-based waivers, along with development of family support and crisis services.  
The provisions in the settlement agreement pertaining to people with SMI targeted 
approximately 9000 individuals total, including those in the state hospitals, frequently 
admitted to the state hospitals or local emergency rooms, chronically homeless, or soon 
to be released from prisons or jails.  This target population included people with SMI 
who also have a forensic status, provided the proper court has authorized community 
placement, although the settlement agreement explicitly states those who must register as 
sex offenders may understandably require additional time to place in the community.   
Crisis Services 
 Georgia was required by the settlement agreement to establish a number of crisis 
services, including walk-in crisis centers, crisis stabilization programs, community-based 
psychiatric hospital beds for short-term stabilization, a crisis hotline, crisis apartments, 
and mobile crisis response teams.  Within about 4.5 years, Georgia needed to create six 
physical locations for crisis walk-in psychiatric and counseling services, staffed twenty-
four hours a day and seven days a week.  Within about 3.5 years, Georgia needed to 
provide three crisis stabilization programs that provided community residential services 
for psychiatric stabilization and detoxification with sixteen beds each.  Additionally, the 
state was required to fund thirty-five psychiatric beds in community hospitals for short-
term psychiatric stabilization to prevent readmittance to the state hospital.   
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Georgia was also to develop and maintain a toll-free crisis hotline to provide 
information about community resources, along with eighteen crisis apartments staffed by 
peer specialists and paraprofessionals within 4.5 years to accommodate those who might 
need respite but not necessarily hospitalization or residential services.  Each apartment 
should be sufficient to serve two individuals.  Finally, Georgia was required to develop in 
the following 4.5 years adequate mobile crisis response teams to be able to respond to 
individuals experiencing a mental health crisis anywhere in the state within an hour.  The 
crisis teams had to be operational to reach ninety-one of Georgia’s one hundred fifty-nine 
counties within an hour and ten minutes within 2.5 years, and then incrementally expand 
its reach and decrease its response time over the next two years.   
ACT  
 Georgia was required to have 22 ACT teams within approximately 2.5 years that 
can include a psychiatrist, nurse, psychologist, social worker, substance abuse specialist, 
vocational rehabilitation specialist, and peer specialist.  Each team can have between 
seven and ten of these professionals, but the only required category is peer specialist.  
The team is to operate in fidelity with the Dartmouth model, be available 24/7 for crisis 
response to prevent hospitalization, and offer case management, assessment, psychiatric 
services, employment/housing assistance, family support and education, substance abuse 
treatment, along with crisis services.  Each team is to have no more than ten clients per 
ACT Team member.   
Case Management 
 Georgia needed to develop eight Community Support Teams (CSTs) within about 
2.5 years to meet with individuals in their homes to connect individuals to resources in 
  
 
67 
the community to prevent hospitalization.  CSTs needed to have at least three team 
members, including a nurse, a peer specialist, and one or two paraprofessionals, and serve 
no more than twenty clients per team member in rural areas and no more than thirty 
clients per team member in urban areas.  CSTs were intended to operate in areas where 
there was a lack of mental health professionals or in concert with ACT services.   
 Georgia also needed to develop fourteen Intensive Case Management (ICM) 
teams within about 3.5 years.  ICM teams would each have ten full-time case managers 
per team to connect individuals to resources in the community to prevent hospitalization 
through service coordination.  These teams were to be supervised by a licensed mental 
health professional and serve no more than twenty clients per team member in rural areas 
and no more than thirty clients per team member in urban areas.  Finally, Georgia was 
also to hire forty-five individual case managers within about 4.5 years to work with 
clients who already had services and supports in place.  Each case manager was to have 
no more than fifty clients.   
Supported Housing 
 Within 4.5 years, Georgia was required to have the capacity to provide supported 
housing opportunities to any of the approximately nine thousand people with SMI in the 
target population who need housing support, including an estimated 2000 individuals 
who were unable to qualify for other benefits (e.g., federal disability).  The Department 
of Justice described supported housing as permanent housing with all the regular tenancy 
rights of rental properties but augmented by opportunities to voluntarily participate in 
flexible psychosocial support programs. 
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Half of the supported housing units were required to be “scatter-site housing”: 
housing units in buildings where no more than twenty percent or two units, whichever is 
greater, are supported housing units, as opposed to grouping multiple units into one 
building.  Of the total supported housing units, only sixty percent could be two-bedroom 
apartments; the remaining forty percent were required to be one-bedroom apartments.  
Georgia was also required to provide bridge funding to support individuals who were 
eligible for other benefits to fund their supported housing.  The bridge funding could be 
used for rental deposits, household necessities, or living expenses to help the individual 
transition smoothly to supported housing.   
Supported Employment 
 Georgia was required to provide supported employment services to 550 
individuals within 4.5 years and do so in accordance with an evidence-based supported 
employment model, such as that outlined by the SAMHSA Supported Employment 
toolkit.   
Family and Peer Supports 
 Within 3.5 years, Georgia was required to not only provide peer support services 
to individuals also receiving ACT and CST services, but to an additional 835 individuals 
as well.   
Transition Planning 
 Georgia was required to hire one case manager and one transition specialist per 
state psychiatric hospital within 1.5 years whose sole mission was to coordinate transfers 
of individuals out of the state psychiatric hospital into the community.  The services of 
these case managers and transition specialists were to be engaged particularly in cases 
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were the individual has a behavioral or medical history that indicated they may be more 
challenging than average to discharge, or if the treatment team either does not 
recommend discharge or cannot agree upon a discharge plan.  The transition specialist 
was also tasked with review of the transition plan for anyone who had been in the state 
psychiatric hospital for more than forty-five days.   
Improper Admissions  
 Under the settlement agreement, people cannot be transferred from the state 
psychiatric hospital to an assisted living facility or skilled nursing facility without 
informed consent or necessity due to a medical condition.   
Quality Assurance 
 Georgia was also tasked with developing a quality assurance system within 1.5 
years to conduct annual quality reviews of all community services provided in response 
to this Agreement.  The annual quality reviews were to include in-person interviews of 
clients and staff, review of treatment records, review of injury or incident reports, and 
review of outcome data.  Additionally, Georgia was to perform an annual network 
analysis of the system of qualified community providers developed and trained to provide 
the services required by the settlement agreement.  This network analysis should 
determine the availability of services and monitor costs to inform reimbursement rates.   
 
Delaware 
 Delaware was sued by the Department of Justice in early 2011, after an 
investigation in 2010.  The settlement agreement was reached by July 2011 and targeted 
people with SMI, prioritizing those who were currently hospitalized, in private 
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institutions, had high emergency room utilization rates, criminal justice involvement, or 
chronic homelessness.12  Those with SMI and forensic status were also included in the 
target population, with the Department of Justice going further than its stance in Georgia 
by stating that not only should they be included, but the state should strive to educate 
judges and advocate for community placement when the treatment team thinks the 
individual is appropriate for treatment in the community.  This settlement agreement also 
required more development overall than the settlement agreement with Georgia, with the 
only exception being the crisis services network.   
Crisis Services 
 Delaware was required by the settlement agreement to establish a number of 
“recovery-consistent” crisis services, including walk-in crisis centers, a short-term crisis 
stabilization unit, a crisis hotline, crisis apartments, and mobile crisis response teams.  
Within about a year, Delaware needed to add a physical location for crisis walk-in 
psychiatric and counseling services to its already existing crisis center, staff them both 
twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week, and ensure the staff were willing to take 
individuals brought there for services by the police.  Within about a year, Delaware was 
required to ensure that its short-term crisis stabilization unit, where an individual could 
stay up to fourteen days, had intensive support service providers meeting with the 
individuals within twenty-four hours of admittance to begin planning for discharge back 
to the community.  Interestingly, the settlement agreement also set goals for a reduction 
                                                 
12  Chronic homelessness was defined here as one full year or at least four episodes of 
homelessness in the last three years.   
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by one-third in inpatient days in the acute inpatient unit within three years of the 
settlement agreement, and by half within five years.   
Delaware was also to develop and maintain a toll-free crisis hotline to provide 
information about community resources within six months, along with four crisis 
apartments staffed constantly by peer specialists and with clinical mental health 
professionals on call within 2 years to accommodate those who might need respite for up 
to seven days.  Finally, Delaware was required to develop, within a year, adequate mobile 
crisis response teams to be able to respond to individuals experiencing a mental health 
crisis anywhere in the state within an hour.  The crisis teams could respond to a request 
from the police or the crisis hotline.  
Community Education 
 The Department of Justice required the state to publicize the crisis hotline through 
print materials to every hospital, police department, homeless shelter, and correctional 
facility within six months of it becoming operational.  Within a year of the new crisis 
walk-in center and the mobile crisis response team becoming operational, the state must 
train all law enforcement officers on the availability of those resources and to take people 
experiencing a mental health crisis to the crisis centers instead of local emergency rooms.  
Within a year of the execution of the settlement agreement, the state must have an 
education program for both judges and law enforcement officers describing services in 
the community for those with forensic status.   
ACT  
 Delaware was required to have 11 ACT teams within approximately 4 years that 
could include a psychiatrist, nurse, psychologist, social worker, substance abuse 
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specialist, vocational rehabilitation specialist, and peer specialist.  Each team can have 
between seven and ten of these professionals.  The team is to operate in fidelity with the 
Dartmouth model, be available 24/7 for crisis response to prevent hospitalization, and 
offer case management, assessment, psychiatric services, employment/housing 
assistance, family support and education, substance abuse treatment, along with crisis 
services.  Each team is to have no more than ten clients per ACT Team member.   
Case Management 
 Delaware also needed to develop four Intensive Case Management (ICM) teams 
within about 1.5 years.  ICM teams would each have ten full-time case managers per 
team to connect individuals to resources in the community to prevent hospitalization 
through service coordination.  These teams were to be supervised by a master’s level 
licensed mental health professional and serve no more than twenty clients per team 
member.  Finally, Georgia was also to hire twenty-five individual case managers within 
about 4 years to work with clients who needed less support than those on intensive case 
management.  Each case manager was to have no more than thirty-five clients, and each 
clinical supervisor was to have no more than fifteen case managers to supervise.   
Supported Housing 
 Within 5 years, Delaware was required to have the capacity to provide supported 
housing opportunities to the whole target population, using any government benefit 
programs, whether state or federal.  Delaware was to adjust the number of vouchers 
provided based on waiting lists, estimates of people with SMI who were homeless, and 
any individuals waiting on stable housing to be discharged from the state psychiatric 
hospital or any other IMD.  The Department of Justice described supported housing as 
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permanent housing with all the regular tenancy rights of rental properties but augmented 
by opportunities to voluntarily participate in flexible psychosocial support programs.  
Individuals could not be rejected based on medical need or substance use history.   
All of the supported housing units were required to be “scatter-site housing”: 
housing units in buildings where no more than twenty percent or two units, whichever is 
greater, are supported housing units, as opposed to grouping multiple units into one 
building.  The apartments could be one or two bedrooms, but no more than two people to 
an apartment and each much have their own bedroom.  Each person must be able to select 
their own roommate, if they have one.  Delaware was also required to provide bridge 
funding to support individuals who were eligible for other benefits to fund their 
supported housing.  The bridge funding could be used for rental deposits, household 
necessities, or living expenses to help the individual transition smoothly to supported 
housing.   
Supported Employment 
 Delaware was to provide supported employment to 1100 individuals within 4 
years, not including those receiving supported employment through their ACT teams, as 
well as general rehabilitative services to 1100 individuals within 4 years.  However, 
unlike Georgia, there was no mention of an evidence-based model for supported 
employment.  Rehabilitative services were described as including educational services, 
treatment for substance misuse, volunteer opportunities, recreational and leisure 
activities, or any activity to improve functional skills in a community setting.   
Family and Peer Supports 
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 Within in 4 years, Delaware was to provide family and peer support services to 
1000 individuals.   
Transition Planning 
 Delaware was also required to develop comprehensive transition planning 
services for those currently in the state psychiatric hospital or any institution considered 
an IMD.  The transition planning services were to be executed by a team, including 
clinical staff, peer specialists, and a community provider, and be based on the assumption 
the person can successfully live in the community.  Transition planning was to be person-
centered, with the hospitalized individual playing the primary role in planning and their 
ability to be self-determinant protected throughout the process.  Discharge planning was 
to begin immediately upon admission, with the team meeting within five days of 
admission to identify supportive services needed to return to the community, even if 
those services were not currently available.  The team should reassess every thirty days 
and be actually discharging people within thirty days of an appropriateness 
determination.  If someone is determined to not be eligible for discharge, the specialized 
transition team was to be consulted, and then the court monitor, to see if a resolution 
could be found.   
Quality Assurance 
 To ensure the quality of these developments, Delaware was required to take 
several steps.  First, if someone were to transition out of an institution and experience 
harm, a root cause analysis must be conducted within ten days and future preventative 
measures implemented.  Every contract with a community provider had to be 
performance based, with each provider being reviewed at least once every other year to 
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determine if they were providing the services and achieving the outcomes desired.  
Outcomes will be tracked by the state aggregating and analyzing several variables that 
community providers are required to track and report.  If the state determined that overall, 
there is not increased integration, access to stable housing, and decreased hospitalization, 
then the state must assemble a team with the court monitor and a representative from the 
Department of Justice to address any barriers.  The state must also annually publish a 
report documenting the number of people being served in each service category, gaps in 
services in the community, and a review of service quality.   
 
North Carolina 
 North Carolina was sued by the Department of Justice in 2012, and a settlement 
agreement was reached by August 2012.  While the two prior settlement agreements 
reviewed in this chapter were primarily targeting adults with SMI in the state psychiatric 
hospital, in North Carolina, the Department of Justice was focused on adults with SMI 
who were housed in adult care homes or other IMDs (Group 1), people with SMI who 
were homeless or with unstable housing (Group 2), or people with SMI who were not 
admitted to an adult care home as a result of this agreement (Group 2).  For some 
services, Group 1 had a higher quota or was otherwise prioritized over Group 2.  Overall, 
the target population was about 3000 adults with SMI who were either currently housed 
in an adult care home or at risk of admission to an adult care home.  While the state was 
required to provide services to any member of the target population for which they are 
eligible, services under this agreement for those outside the target population were 
limited to funding availability.   
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In this settlement agreement, the structure, rate of development, and exact 
numbers of several services were left open, unlike in Delaware and Georgia, where there 
was a high degree of specificity.  Conversely, this settlement agreement had increased 
specificity in regard to discharge planning.  There were increased requirements to 
document any disinclination to move from the adult care home into the community.  This 
may be due to an anticipated increase in reticence in clients and guardians for a client to 
leave an adult care home, as opposed to leaving the state psychiatric hospital.   
Crisis Service  
 North Carolina was required to develop and maintain a crisis hotline, walk-in 
clinics, short-term community hospital beds, and mobile response teams.  Unlike Georgia 
and Delaware, there are fewer specifics in this settlement agreement about timelines and 
actual number requirements.  The agreement stated the state should monitor its crisis 
services to identify and amend any gaps.   
Community Education 
 Similar to Delaware, printed materials in English and other common languages 
should be made available, along with training, to hospitals, community providers, police, 
homelessness service organizations, and correctional facilities to ensure public 
knowledge of the crisis response network.  
ACT  
 North Carolina was required to develop fifty ACT teams that operate with fidelity 
to the Dartmouth model or the TMACT model within seven years.   
Case Management 
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 North Carolina was required to develop community support teams and case 
management services.   
Supported Housing 
 North Carolina was required to provide at least 3000 supported housing slots 
within 8 years, 2750 of which must be scatter-site, with the remaining acceptable in 
“disability-neutral” buildings with up to sixteen units.  None of these housing slots can be 
in any building that requires a license to operate.  The Department of Justice described 
supported housing as permanent housing with all the regular tenancy rights of rental 
properties but augmented by opportunities to voluntarily participate in flexible 
psychosocial support programs.  The settlement agreement expressed a strong preference 
for single-occupant housing, but roommates were permissible as long as the individual 
was able to choose their own roommate and remained eligible for a single occupancy 
housing situation as soon as one became available.   
Supported Employment 
 Support employment services must be increased from 100 to 2500 recipients 
within seven years, using an evidence-based model with a fidelity measure such as the 
SAMHSA toolkit.   
Family and Peer Supports 
 North Carolina was to offer peer support services as well as psychosocial 
rehabilitation services.   
Transition Planning 
 Transition planning should be person-centered, with an emphasis on self-
determination, and based on the assumption the individual could be successful living in 
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the community with the appropriate supports.  For the first time among the settlement 
agreements reviewed in this chapter, psychiatric advance directives and crisis plans were 
mentioned as crucial elements of a comprehensive transition plan.  Every person in an 
adult care home or state psychiatric hospital should have a written discharge plan that 
was developed by their transition team.  Each transition team should have members who 
are familiar with local community services, experts in the treatment of people with SMI 
(“subject matter expertise”), linguistically and culturally competent members, and peer 
specialists. 
 An individual was to be assigned to a transition team immediately upon admission 
and discharge should be completed within ninety days of team assignment, provided a 
housing slot is available.  In addition to local transition teams, there should be a state 
level transition team to consult on challenging cases.  Overall, each hospitalized 
individual should have a written plan with individual strengths, preferences, goals, and 
needs that is reassessed at least every quarter for readiness for discharge.  The plan 
should also document any services that would benefit the individual, even if they are not 
currently available, factors that led to past readmissions, necessary steps for discharge 
and their timeframes, and any lingering barriers to discharge; a barrier cannot be simply 
the existence of a disability or its severity.   
Improper Admissions  
 The state was to also make arrangements that any person, prior to admittance to 
an adult care home, was screened for the presence of SMI by an independent screener, 
and subsequent eligibility for mental health services was determined.  Based on this 
information, a community integration plan was to be developed, with the person in the 
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primary planning role, as an alternative to admission to an adult care home.  This 
planning process should be analogous to the discharge planning process.  Should the 
person decline to go into the community and instead express a preference for an adult 
care home, after being informed of the community options, the state must extensively 
document how the person was informed, implement strategies to alleviate any concerns 
or objections to proceeding with the community integration plan, and continue to monitor 
the person in the adult care home while providing regular transition planning services.   
Client & Guardian Counseling 
 Transition planning should be pursued aggressively through counseling of clients 
and guardians on community integration options.  The stated goal in the settlement 
agreement was to ensure all are fully informed about services in the community.  North 
Carolina was required to provide at least quarterly “in-reach” to all those in adult care 
homes or state psychiatric hospitals – informative interactions with community providers 
about community mental health services, including interactions with those currently 
receiving the community services and visits to the sites of community service provisions.  
In-reach must start within 180 days of the settlement agreement and can only be 
suspended if the waiting list for community housing waivers more than doubles the 
number of available waivers for the current and next year.  Should an individual decline 
to go into the community and instead express a preference to stay in an adult care home, 
after being informed of the community options, the state must extensively document how 
the person was informed, implement strategies to alleviate any concerns or objections to 
proceeding with the community integration plan, and continue to monitor the person in 
the adult care home while providing regular transition planning services.   
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Quality Assurance 
 North Carolina was also required to develop an extensive quality assurance 
program.  The first requirement was to ensure there are enough community providers to 
manage all the services required under this settlement agreement for the entire target 
population.  A transition oversight committee was to be formed to evaluate the overall 
success of the settlement agreement terms by reviewing several outcome variables semi-
annually.  Quality of life surveys were also to be administered three times to every person 
making the transition from an adult care home or state psychiatric hospital to a more 
integrated setting – prior to transition, eleven months after transition, and twenty-four 
months after transition.  Finally, North Carolina was required to publish an annual report 
on its DHHS website, including several of the outcome variables.  If North Carolina 
seems to not be meeting the long-term goals of the settlement agreement, then the state 
must reassess and take remedial measures.   
 
New Hampshire 
 The Department of Justice sued New Hampshire and reached a settlement 
agreement in 2013.  The target population included those currently institutionalized at 
either the state psychiatric hospital or a large nursing home for people with SMI, and 
those at risk for being institutionalized in either location.  Those at risk of 
institutionalization were defined to include those who, within the last two years, had 
multiple admissions to the state psychiatric hospital, used mental health crisis or 
emergency services, were involved with the criminal justice system due to their mental 
health symptoms, or were otherwise unable to receive the mental health services they 
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need in the community.  The settlement agreement did prioritize those who were 
currently institutionalized over those who were at risk for institutionalization.   
Crisis Service  
 New Hampshire was required to develop a crisis services network to help prevent 
hospitalizations.  Three major regions were identified within New Hampshire, each 
centering around a large population area (Manchester, Concord, and Nashua).  For each 
region, a mobile crisis team was established that could respond within its region within 
one hour, available twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week.  The mobile crisis 
team consisted of at least one peer specialist and one clinician with a psychiatrist on-call.  
The team could respond to law enforcement calls as well as general calls, and the goal 
was to respond to the individual and keep them in their community, with up to seven days 
aftercare to help them connect to services.   
 Additionally, New Hampshire developed four community crisis apartments for 
respite care, with two beds each.  Clinical and peer specialist staff were to be available 
onsite at all times.  People requiring the crisis apartments could stay up to seven days, 
and transportation was to be provided.   
ACT  
 New Hampshire was required to develop ACT teams to offer case management, 
psychiatric services, employment/housing assistance, substance use treatment, and crisis 
intervention.  If an individual had an ACT team, the team responded to any crisis rather 
than the mobile crisis unit.  ACT teams should include a psychiatrist, nurse, masters level 
clinician, functional support worker, and a peer specialist.  ACT teams were permitted a 
ratio of ten clients per team member, not including the psychiatrist.  The immediate goal 
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for New Hampshire was to expand their current ACT teams to be able to provide services 
to 1500 people, with the intention to assess for future service needs so all eligible persons 
could have access to ACT services.   
Supported Housing 
 Supported housing was also a major component of New Hampshire’s settlement 
agreement.  The state was to begin with a goal of 600 supported housing slots, and then 
adjust to increasing with demand, such that a comprehensive waiting list is established 
and when twenty-five or more people have waited for two months, the state must add 
housing slots to avoid individuals experiencing a six month wait.  All housing must be 
scatter-site, and roommates were only acceptable if the individuals preferred to live with 
a roommate and they had separate bedrooms.  The Department of Justice modified their 
definition of scatter-site here to be even more restrictive – only 2 units in the building or 
10% of the building units, whichever is greater.  The settlement agreement also clearly 
stated these requirements only had to be met by future community placements; people 
currently living in community residences with more than four people could stay if they 
desired or move if they desired.   
 Individuals in the nursing home with medically complex healthcare needs could 
be cared for in a residential setting in the community if they could not be adequately 
served in a cost-effective manner in supported housing.  Each residential home was to 
provide housing and coordination of healthcare services for up to four individuals.  The 
state started with a goal of sixteen such housing slots initially, and then developed a 
waitlist and protocol similar to that for general supported housing.   
Supported Employment 
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 New Hampshire was also required to develop a working supported employment 
service model, using the Dartmouth evidence-based model.  While all people 
participating in ACT should be receiving supported employment services from their 
employment specialist team member, New Hampshire was to develop services for an 
additional 1000 people, then create a waitlist and plan to accommodate future demand 
reasonably.   
Family and Peer Supports 
 New Hampshire was to provide family support services, including education for 
family members on skills and strategies to support their loved one with SMI.  
Additionally, New Hampshire was to provide three peer support centers open forty-four 
hours a week in each of the mental health regions in the state.   
Transition Planning 
 Transition planning was to be person-centered and based on the assumption all 
can successfully live in the community with the proper supports.  The individual should 
be supported in transition planning by a team that included members with appropriate 
cultural competence, members with experience treating people in the community, and 
members with experience in removing barriers to discharge.  Each person’s transition 
planning process should produce a written document that identified all barriers to 
discharge, services needed to overcome those barriers regardless of current availability, 
and a timeframe for each step to discharge.  A new component of transition planning in 
New Hampshire was a schedule of post-transition visits by the community providers to 
the individual in their community housing to assess for adaptive adjustment.   
Improper Admissions  
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 The state was charged with no longer placing people in nursing homes unless 
unavoidable.  Every potential admission to a nursing home must be pre-screened.  In the 
event someone is still admitted, the state must document why they were not placed in the 
community as well as any barriers to community placement, and strategies to overcome 
those barriers.   
Client & Guardian Counseling 
 New Hampshire was required to arrange for “in-reach” for all currently in a 
nursing home, at least quarterly, including community visits, opportunities to mingle with 
those currently living in integrated settings, and information about community mental 
health services.  Individual meetings could be held for anyone expressing reticence to 
move into the community.  If a client or guardian continued to be hesitant to move into 
the community, the attempts and objections must be fully documented, strategies must be 
developed to address their concerns, and they should be re-contacted at least annually.   
Quality Assurance 
 A quality assurance system was also required to ensure community services were 
being offered with high quality and that the state was reaching its overarching goals of 
greater community integration and lower levels of hospitalization.  The first stage was to 
confirm there were enough qualified community providers to handle the influx of 
formerly institutionalized individuals into the community.  Each provider should be 
reviewed at least once every two years, and contracts renewals only given for those 
meeting performance-based standards congruent with the settlement agreement.  The 
settlement agreement also required regular quality service reviews to assess common 
barriers to transition as well as factors in both successful and unsuccessful transitions to 
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plan for future improvements.  Consumers, family members, and community providers 
should be regularly interviewed to identify gaps in services or where access is insufficient 
to meet demand.  Finally, all information should be given to the court monitor annually.   
 
CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON THE IMPACT OF OLMSTEAD ON MENTAL HEALTH 
SYSTEMS 
This chapter will review empirical literature related to Olmstead published in 
peer-reviewed journals.  Considering the ubiquity and depth of the Olmstead decision’s 
impact on the mental health system, there is relatively little germane empirical literature 
available currently.  To conduct this literature review, the author searched for “Olmstead” 
in any field except author name in PsycINFO, PsycCRITIQUES, and PsycARTICLES.  
Only 49 articles published in scholarly, peer-reviewed journals in 1999 or after were 
found.13  Among those, several addressed only people with developmental disabilities or 
only Olmstead’s implications in employment settings, both of which are beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.  Even more were commentaries wherein the authors described 
the implications of Olmstead for various mental health programs or policies.  Nine 
relevant articles with an empirical analysis were identified for inclusion in this chapter.  
Of the nine, most examined changes in service settings, perceptions of Olmstead or its 
success, or even how its litigation is typically settled.  
                                                 
13  The search initially returned 326 articles, but the author noted the majority of these 
were flagged due to authors with the last name “Olmstead.”  After adding a search 
parameter eliminating those red herrings, the number dropped to 49.  Even within the 49, 
there were several false alarms that could only be sorted out by hand, such as an article 
about autopsies in Olmstead County, Minnesota.   
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Overall, the literature seems to indicate the number of people receiving services in 
institutions is decreasing, although not necessarily at a faster pace than pre-Olmstead.  
Smith, Lakin, Larson, & Salmi (2011) found that while there was a 21% increase 
between 1999 and 2009 in the number of people receiving residential services, there was 
an overall 28% decrease in the people receiving services in an institution.  Salzer, 
Kaplan, & Atay (2006) found that while national rates of psychiatric hospitalizations 
continue to decrease overall, the years immediately following Olmstead actually showed 
a slower pace of deinstitutionalization as compared to the national rate in the 1990s.  
Similarly, Lakin, Prouty, Polister, & Coucouvanis (2004) noted that 2001 to 2003 saw the 
smallest reduction in state institutional populations in thirty years, both in absolute 
numbers and percentage decrease.   
Seekins et al. (2011) surveyed 165 centers for independent living to assess their 
efforts to aid nursing home patrons moving into the more integrated centers for 
independent living, a common initiative of disability advocacy groups following the 
Olmstead decision.  In a one-year time period, participants reported aiding nearly four 
thousand people in attempts to move into a more integrated setting, such as a center for 
independent living, and successfully moving over 60% of those patrons, with only 4% 
returning to a nursing home setting during the study period.  Authors did not provide 
information on the disability type of the patrons being transitioned.  Miller (2011) found 
that states with higher investment in home and community-based services had lower rates 
of use for nursing homes for people over 65, but that relationship did not hold for people 
aged 30-65.   
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Olmstead related litigation has been noted to be most commonly resolved by 
settlement (Ng, Wong, & Harrington, 2014).  Bartels, Miles, Dums, & Levine (2003) 
surveyed clinicians and older adults with SMI in nursing homes and compared their 
perceptions of whether consumers could be appropriately receiving services in a more 
integrated setting.  Consumers generally agreed with their clinicians at a rate no better 
than chance.   
Only two articles addressed policies in a multistate context, and they focus on 
perceptions and elements of Olmstead plans.  Zubritsky, Mullahy, Allen, & Alfano 
(2006) did a multistate survey and found that stakeholders from many states reported 
positive outcomes from Olmstead plan implementation, despite implementation 
limitations due to budget shortfalls.  Consumers concurrently identified different 
understandings of Olmstead goals, but similar positive perceptions of outcomes.  Both 
stakeholders and consumers agreed that more funding, housing options, and community 
support services were needed.  Christensen & Byrne (2014) conducted an analysis of 
multiple Olmstead plans to gage the appreciation of built environment’s role in 
community integration for people with all types of disabilities.  They found that most 
states addressed housing and transportation, but not to the extent needed.   
 
CHAPTER 7: THE PRESENT STUDY: HYPOTHESES AND METHODS 
Missing from the available literature currently is a multi-state survey assessing the 
types of policies implemented and their outcomes, particularly in the context of SMI.  As 
the courts are proving to be the primary battleground for determining Olmstead policy, an 
understanding of the legal framework’s connection to policy outcomes is imperative.  
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The objective of this dissertation is to evaluate the relationships upon which the courts 
rely, as well as potential unintended side effects, specifically within the context of SMI.  
Consistent with the author’s interdisciplinary training in clinical psychology and law, this 
dissertation empirically tests legal assumptions.  The overarching hypothesis is that while 
the state may achieve markers the court has identified as relevant (e.g., lower numbers in 
the state psychiatric hospital), there may be unintended collateral damage (e.g., increased 
rates of incarceration), similar to that seen during the deinstitutionalization movement of 
the mid-twentieth century.   
 
Olmstead Response Types  
The independent variable in this study is Olmstead Response Type – the way the 
court interpreted the application of Olmstead to the litigated mental health policies, either 
through court opinion or acceptance of a proposed settlement agreement (see Table 4 for 
a summary of the Olmstead response types).  To date, only two appellate courts have 
decided cases addressing the issues examined by this dissertation.  The Third Circuit’s 
requirements for a “good” Olmstead plan are simple but rigid: 1) written, with 2) set   
dates by which 3) an approximate number of people will be discharged from state 
hospitals, according to 4) explicit discharge criteria, and 5) “a general description of the 
collaboration required between the local authorities and the housing, transportation, care, 
and education agencies to effectuate integration into the community” (Frederick L. v. 
Dept. of Public Welfare, 2005, p. 160).  The theory behind these requirements is that the 
state can be held accountable to clear benchmarks, and therefore, is more likely to reach 
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the appellate court’s ultimate goal of fewer people in state hospitals.  This is the first 
Olmstead response type, and it is represented by Pennsylvania.  
Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit took a more nuanced view of Olmstead’s purpose.  
Rather than requiring written, specific discharge plans, the Ninth Circuit’s requirements 
for a “good” Olmstead plan are: 1) increases in funding for community-based services,  
including waiver programs, despite budget constraints, 2) regular, personalized 
evaluations assessing readiness for transition to the community as well as 3) support 
services needed in the community, and 4) a general trend towards fewer people in 
institutional settings.  The theory behind these requirements is that the state is actively 
working towards fewer people in institutional settings, showing success at decreasing the 
hospital population, and setting people up for success in the community through increases 
in funding and personalized assessments to connect people to necessary resources.  This 
is the second Olmstead response type, and it is represented by California, Washington, 
and Maryland.   
The Department of Justice took a different approach in its settlement agreement 
requirements, focusing on infrastructure development of crisis services, ACT teams, and 
other supportive services, along with process development for transition planning and 
quality assurance.  There were no requirements in the settlement agreements to show a 
reduction in the number of people in the state psychiatric hospitals, nursing homes, or 
assisted living facilities to a particular number or by a particular time.  Rather, the focus 
was on creating the services in the community and the process by which to move people.   
An overarching goal of decreased deinstitutionalization in favor of increased 
integration is stated, but with no specifics.  The processed developed to move people into 
  
 
90 
the community is more than assertive – its aggressive; after the first settlement agreement 
detailed in this dissertation, only scatter-site housing is available to people leaving the 
state psychiatric hospital or assisted living facility, and people who decline to move into 
such housing are relentlessly pursued.  The theory behind these requirements could be 
described as extreme integration, based on the belief it is best for all people to be 
scattered throughout the community, while provided with supportive services and 
treatment.  This is the third Olmstead response type and it is represented by Georgia, 
Delaware, New Hampshire, and North Carolina.   
Minnesota took its own approach.  Now only was there intensive development 
that could rival a Department of Justice settlement, but there was also an emphasis on a 
trend of deinstitutionalization, consumer involvement in development of services, and 
consumer choice among services in each domain.  The theory behind these requirements 
was that to access to services and choice for consumers was the best method for 
integration.  This is the fourth Olmstead response type, represented by Minnesota only.   
Florida was the only state to ultimately not be held as having violated the ADA, 
and therefore no requirements for a state plan adequately to supply a defense were 
outlined by the court.  Their state psychiatric hospital was described as initiating 
discharge planning upon admission, coordinating with community care providers, and 
discharging people within thirty to sixty days of the treatment team determining they 
were eligible for community treatment.  This is the fifth Olmstead response type, 
represented by Florida only. 
 
Hypotheses 
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 There are 5 major hypotheses for this dissertation, some broken into smaller, more 
specific hypotheses.  
1) Most states, regardless of plan type, will be successful in reducing the 
institutionalized population in their state.   
2) Olmstead plans will differ in their effects on budgets for community providers 
and state psychiatric hospitals. 
a) Unless an Olmstead plan includes specific requirements for increasing 
community-based treatment financial resources, such as required by the 
Ninth Circuit, community-based services will be funded the same or less, 
despite expected increases in their service population due to 
deinstitutionalization.   
b) On average, states will decrease funding for state psychiatric hospitals 
over time.   
3) The numbers served in the community will not show a significant increase, 
despite a significant deinstitutionalization trend (Hypothesis 1), leaving open the 
possibility of transinstitutionalization or people with SMI otherwise not being 
adequately treated in the community.   
4) The Third Circuit plan, as it only requires continued deinstitutionalization, will be 
associated with more negative outcomes than other plans, like the Ninth Circuit or 
Minnesota, which required substantial funding and development of community 
resources that promote consumer choice and engagement.  DOJ states, which 
limit consumer choice to a narrow, proscribed model of community treatment, 
will also be associated with some negative outcomes, such as increased suicide 
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rates and rehospitalization rates, while not showing an increase in employment 
rates.  The following variables will be examined: 
a) Disability benefits, including percentage of the general population 
receiving disability benefits, the application rate for disability benefits, 
and the approval rate for disability benefits.   
b) Suicide rates 
c) Readmission rate after discharge from the state psychiatric hospital to any 
psychiatric hospital within thirty days   
d) Employment rate for mental health clients, out of those who are employed, 
unemployed, or not in the workforce, (e.g., receiving disability benefits) 
e) The state budget for the judiciary, police, and corrections 
f) Incarceration Rate 
5) Many states will fail to collect data on outcomes other than the institutionalized 
population in their state, especially if that is the only/primary outcome required by 
their court or noted in their Olmstead plan.  
 
Data Sources 
 The dependent variables for this study are outcome measures either explicitly 
related to court goals for Olmstead policies (e.g., fewer people in the state psychiatric 
hospital over time, greater funding for community services, etc.) or possible collateral 
effects of Olmstead policies (e.g., employment rates among mental health consumers, 
suicide rates, etc.).  All data were gathered from publicly available sources.14   
                                                 
14  A spreadsheet documenting each piece of data used for these analyses and their sources, 
including individual URLs, is available from the author.   
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 Uniform Reporting System.  State mental health agencies must annually report 
multiple variables to SAMHSA’s Center for Mental Health Services, as a requirement of 
the Community Mental Health Block Grant.  NRI, Inc., the Research Institute for the 
National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors, collaborates with 
SAMHSA to analyze this data, along with some of SAMHSA’s other public data sets.  
From 2007 to 2017, these data are available on SAMHSA’s public data website as 
Uniform Reporting System PDFs for each state, each year.  Prior to 2007, some of these 
variables are available in spreadsheets on NRI’s public data website, also organized by 
state and year.  Variables include numbers, rates, and demographics of those served in the 
state psychiatric hospital and in the community, use of evidence-based practices, 
insurance use, rehospitalization rates for the state psychiatric hospital or any hospital, 
employment and housing status, expenditures on services, and some diagnostic 
information.  For this study, data on the following variables were collected: annual state 
budget for community mental health resources, annual state budget for state psychiatric 
hospitals, employment rate among mental health consumers accessing state mental health 
agency services, people served by the state psychiatric hospital, people served by 
community mental health resources, and the readmission rate after discharge from the 
state psychiatric hospital to any psychiatric hospital within thirty days.  These data are 
used in testing hypothesis one, two, three, and four.   
 SSA Disability Claims.  The federal government maintains a website dedicated to 
increasing public access to a plethora of municipal, county, state, and federal databases: 
data.gov.  One of the datasets available on this website contains information about SSA 
Disability claims from 2001 to 2015.  For this study, data on the annual rate of people 
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receiving disability benefits, the annual filing rate, and the annual approval rate were 
collected.  These data are used in testing hypothesis four.   
 CDC National Vital Statistics System.  The Center for Disease Control (CDC) has 
several public datasets available on its website, including the National Vital Statistics 
System (NVSS).  The NVSS is maintained by communications between the CDC’s 
National Center for Health Statistics and individual municipal, county, or state agencies 
that track events such as births, marriages, divorces, and deaths.  Information gathered 
includes cause of death.  Data on suicide rates were gathered from this data source, 
including all available years (1999 to 2016).  These data are used in testing hypothesis 
four.   
 Bureau of Justice Statistics.  The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), a subdivision 
of the Department of Justice, puts out multiple publications series, reports, and datasets 
on issues such as corrections, law enforcement, and the court system.  This study used 
two particular BJS datasets: the Justice Expenditure and Employment publication series 
(JEE) and the National Prisoner Statistics Program (NPSP).  These two datasets had data 
available for decades, but 1996 was chosen as the starting point for two reasons – 1996 
was at least five years prior to the earliest Olmstead litigation for the states in this study 
and starting at 1996 provided at least twenty years of information for the study (JEE’s 
most recent available year was 2015 and NPSP’s most recent available year was 2016).  
For this study, data were collected on the following variables: total annual state budget, 
annual state budget for the judiciary, annual state budget for the police, annual state 
budget for corrections, and incarceration rate.  These data are used in testing hypothesis 
two and four.   
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 U.S. Census Bureau.  Annual population estimates for each state were gathered 
from the U.S. Census Bureau to calculate per capita spending or instances of an 
occurrence of interest (e.g., suicide or incarceration) per a set number of members of the 
general public.  Some JEE reports included population from the U.S. Census Bureau; 
similarly, the CDC calculated suicide rates using information from the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  Otherwise, the information was gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau’s website 
directly.  These data are used in testing hypothesis one, two, three, and four.   
 
Dependent Variables 
 When appropriate, per capita rates, instances per 1,000 or 100,000 members of the 
general population, or percentage of the population rates were chosen over absolute 
numbers to improve interpretability of statistical tests; this method minimizes the 
limitations of comparing states of significantly different size (e.g., California and New 
Hampshire) while still allowing for examination of variation over time.  See Table 5 for a 
summary of dependent variables, their corresponding model (organized by hypothesis 
number), and information about the data source.   
Hypothesis 1 - The dependent variable for this hypothesis was the number of 
persons served in the state psychiatric hospital in the past year per 1000 people in the 
general population, as reported in the NRI/SAMHSA data.  Data were available for 2001-
2017.   
 Hypothesis 2 - The dependent variables for Hypothesis 2 are per capita 
expenditures for state psychiatric hospitals and community mental health services for 
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each of the relevant ten states in 1990, 1997, and 2001-2016, except for 2008.  Per capita 
expenditures were typically available in the NRI/SAMHSA data, but when they were not,  
they were calculated using either the population estimate used in the NRI/SAMHSA 
databases to calculate other per capita rates for that state and year, or the population 
estimate for that state and year available on the U.S. Census website.   
Hypothesis 3 - The dependent variable for this hypothesis was the number of 
persons served by community mental health providers in the past year per 1000 people in 
the general population, as reported in the NRI/SAMHSA data.  Data were available for 
2001-2017.   
Hypothesis 4 - Model 4Ai had as its dependent variable the percentage of the 
general population receiving SSA disability benefits in a given fiscal year.  Model 4Aii 
had as its dependent variable the percentage of individuals who filed for disability 
benefits in a given fiscal year.  Model 4Aiii had as its dependent variable the percentage 
of received applications that were approved in a given fiscal year.  Data were available 
for 2001-2015.   
Model 4B had as its dependent variable the annual suicide rate per 100,000 
members of the state general population, 1999-2016.  Model 4C had as its dependent 
variable the readmission rate within thirty days to any psychiatric hospital after discharge 
from the state psychiatric hospital.  Model 4D had as its dependent variable the state’s 
employment rate for mental health clients, out of those who are employed, unemployed, 
or not in the workforce, (e.g., receiving disability benefits).  For models 4C and 4D, data 
were available from 2007-2017.   
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Model 4Ei had as its dependent variable the per capita rate of total state 
expenditures for the judicial system from 1996-2015, whether originating in the state 
budget, county budget, or city budget.  Model 4Eii was the same, but for law enforcement 
spending.  Similarly, Model 4Eiii looked at correctional spending.  The per capita rate 
was calculated using annual general state population census from the U.S. Census Bureau 
via BJS Justice Expenditure and Employment publication series, except 1999-2001, 
which is from the U.S. Census Bureau directly.   
The dependent variable for Model 4F is the annual state prison incarceration rate, 
1996-2016, calculated as the number of prisoners per state with a sentence of more than 1 
year per 1,000 residents of that state.  The annual end-of-year inmate census numbers are 
from the BJS National Prisoner Statistics Program, while the annual general state 
population census is from the U.S. Census Bureau via BJS Justice Expenditure and 
Employment publication series, except 1999-2001 and 2016, which is from the U.S. 
Census Bureau directly.  The California count includes all inmates in their custody, not 
jurisdiction.  The Delaware count includes those incarcerated in local jails, as they have 
an integrated system.  All counts include those housed in private facilities.  In Florida, 
administrators modified the methods by which they counted inmates between 2006 and 
2007.15  Georgia numbers in 1999 and 2005-2010 are underestimates because they 
exclude a number of individuals committed to the state correctional system waiting for 
transfer in the local jails.  In Washington, numbers are overestimates because a state law 
                                                 
15  Florida did have a significant jump between 2006 and 2007 that is not accounted for 
by the linear slope of time (𝛽21 = .631, t(8) = 2.711, p = .027).  The jump was present 
only for Florida, not for any other states or on average across states (𝛽20 = .006, t(8) = 
.35, p = .735).  Results for Florida on this variable should be interpreted cautiously, with 
this limitation in mind.   
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made effective in 1999 allowed some individuals with a sentence of less than a year to be 
housed in the state correctional system.   
Hypothesis 5 - The dependent variable for Hypothesis 5 was the rate of missing 
data for the other four hypotheses.   
 
Data Analysis Strategy 
For Hypotheses 1-4, data were analyzed using piecewise growth curve modeling 
(GCM) techniques in HLM 7.0 software (Bryk & Raudenbush, 2002).  GCM is 
advantageous for examining changes in trends over time because it accounts for the 
interdependence of repeated measures, which are nested within states.  A piecewise GCM 
with a deviation slope was chosen for these analyses as it allows for a comparison of 
distinct time periods within the overall model, such as pre- and post-litigation.  Time was 
measured in years and coded so the intercept is the most recent year for which there are 
data available at the time of these analyses.  The primary slope was defined by the time 
variable, which when modeled alone shows the average change over all years (Hoffman, 
2015).  However, when the time variable is modeled with the deviation slope (defined as 
the period post-litigation for each state), time becomes the pre-litigation slope (Hoffman, 
2015, p. 238).  All models were also tested for a potential “jump” (variation in linear 
change not adequately accounted for by the slope in the pre- or post-litigation phase) in 
the dependent variable the year after litigation.   
The final model to be tested for each dependent variable (outcome), except the 
budget variables, is:  
Level-1 Model 
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    OUTCOMEti = π0i + π1i*(TIMEti) + π2i*(POSTLITSti) + π3i*(JUMPti) + eti 
Level-2 Model 
    π0i = β00 + r0i 
    π1i = β10 + r1i 
    π2i = β20 + β21*(RESPONSEi) + r2i 
    π3i = β30 + β31*(RESPONSEi) + r3i 
 
The final model to be tested for each budget dependent variable is (TOTSTPC = 
total state budget per capita):  
Level-1 Model 
    OUTCOMEti = π0i + π1i*(TIMEti) + π2i*(POSTLITSti) + π3i*(JUMPti) + 
π4i*(TOTSTPCti) + eti 
Level-2 Model 
    π0i = β00 + r0i 
    π1i = β10 + r1i 
    π2i = β20 + β21*(RESPONSEi) + r2i 
    π3i = β30 + β31*(RESPONSEi) + r3i 
    π4i = β40  
 
There are no missing data at Level 2 (state level) for any analyses.  Membership 
in each of the 5 Olmstead response types was individually coded as a binary Level 2 
variable.  Level 1 (repeated measures) had multiple missing data points.  For Hypothesis 
1, no data were available for 2003 on any states, along with eight additional missing data 
points, for a total of 10.5% missing data (152/170).  For each model in Hypothesis 2, 
3.5% (6/170) of data at Level 1 are missing.  In Hypothesis 3, a total of 16% of the data 
are missing (143/170).  For Hypothesis 4, only Models 4C, 4D, and 4Ei-4Eiii were 
missing data at Level 1; for 4C, 50% of the data were missing (55/110).  For Model 4D, 
only three data points were missing for a total of 2.73% (3/110).  For Models 4Ei-4Eiii, 
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BJS reports for 2001 and 2003 were inexplicably missing the variables used for this 
analysis in both the PDFs and the spreadsheets, so two of the twenty years were missing 
(10%).  For more information on missing data, please see the results of Hypothesis 5.   
Data analysis was conducted in two phases.  First, descriptive statistics (see Table 
6) and basic analyses were conducted to screen for problematic data patterns or 
contraindications to proceeding with the planned analyses.  Second, a step-by-step 
modeling building approach was used to create each model, and each step in the 
modeling building process is reported in the results section.  As the model building 
approach involved comparing nested models that varied on fixed effects, full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation was used, until the final model was reached.  For 
the final model, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used 
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010).  Due to the small 
number of Level 2 units (N = 10), robust standard error estimates for fixed effects were 
not available.  However, the dependent variables’ distributions did not deviate so far from 
normality as to require a transformation (see Table 6).   
For Hypothesis 5, rates of missing data from the other four hypotheses’ dependent 
variables will be examined.  There were no missing data for Hypothesis 5.   
 
CHAPTER 8: THE PRESENT STUDY: RESULTS 
For descriptive statistics for Hypotheses 1-4, see Table 6.   
 
Hypothesis 1 
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model (no 
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predictors) of the hospitalization rate for the state psychiatric hospital provided statistical 
support for using GCM.  Specifically, there was significant variation by state (Level 2) in 
the mean hospitalization rate over time (χ2(9) = 121.699, p < .001), which was .533 
instances per 1000 people in the state.  Additionally, the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for 
Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in per capita spending rates attributable to 
between state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was .423 (Davis & 
Scott, 1995).   
Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model.  Time was added 
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2017.  Time was a significant predictor 
of change in hospitalization rates, such that on average across states, each year brought a 
decrease of .032 instances per 1000 people (t(142) = -7.285, p < .001), with the average 
in 2017 being .276.  In the random intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ2) was 
.09382, which was reduced to 0.06831 (residual variance) by the addition of time to the 
model, indicating time explains 27% of the variance at Level 1.  Additionally, a nested 
model comparison supported the inclusion of time, (χ2(2) = 45.048, p < .001).   
When the effect of time was allowed to vary randomly across the states, there was 
significant variation (χ2(9) = 276.179, p < .001), indicating states did not change their 
hospitalization rates over time at the same pace.  A nested model comparison also 
supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states (χ2(2) = 120.694, p < 
.001).  The residual variance was reduced by an additional 47% (σ2 = 0.02388).   
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type 
(Level 2 predictor), each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and 
slope across all years.  Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and 
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examined individually in its own model; they were coded so a value of 1 indicated 
engagement in that response type.  None of the results were significant, although the DOJ 
states approached significance for a faster rate of decline over time (the nested model 
comparison was significant (χ2(2) = 23.742, p < .001).  See Table 7 for additional details 
on these analyses.  State psychiatric hospitalization rates over time are shown graphically 
in Figure 3.   
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the 
model.  The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it 
now no longer represents the rate of change across all years in the model, but only up to 
the break point, which was coded separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead 
litigation.  The new variable of the post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the 
pre-litigation slope.  In the new model, on average across all ten states, every year prior 
to litigation brought a decrease of .054 hospitalizations per 1000 people (t(9) = -3.438, p 
= .007), but post-litigation, this rate of deinstitutionalization slowed significantly (𝛽20 = 
.032, t(132) = 2.396, p = .018), for an average in 2017 of .297.  The residual Level 1 
variance was only slightly reduced to 0.02349, but a nested model comparison did show 
significant improvement (χ2(1) = 5.075, p = .023).  This indicates that on average, states 
changed their trajectory of deinstitutionalization after litigation.   
When the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, it became 
insignificant (t(9) = 1.296, p = .227).  However, there was significant between state 
variation (χ2(6) = 36.396, p < .001), indicating states vary in the degree to which 
litigation impacted their deinstitutionalization rate.  A nested model comparison was also 
  
 
103 
significant (χ2(3) = 31.447, p < .001).  The Level 1 residual variance was reduced by an 
additional 5% (σ2 = 0.01876).  The potential for a “jump” (variation in linear change not  
adequately accounted for by the slope in the pre- or post-litigation phase) in 
hospitalization rates the year after litigation was tested, but not supported when fixed (𝛽30 
= -.044, t(122) = -0.981, p = .329) or allowed to vary (χ2(6) = 26.305, p > .5; nested 
model comparison: χ2(5) = 2.029, p > .5), so the more parsimonious model with only two 
slopes was retained.  
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a 
state’s deinstitutionalization trajectory by Olmstead response type, each approach was 
tested for a significant impact on the post-litigation deviation.  Each response type binary 
variable was entered uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were 
coded so a value of 1 indicated engagement in that response type.  Only the DOJ states 
had significant results, such that, on average, the DOJ states had a faster rate of 
deinstitutionalization after litigation than the other states (nested model comparison: χ2(1) 
= 7.723, p = .006).  See Table 8 for additional details on these analyses.   
For the final model, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood 
was used because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010).  The average 
pre-litigation slope showed significant decline over time of approximately .07 instances 
per 1000 people per year.  Non-DOJ states slowed, almost significantly, from this pace 
after litigation; however, DOJ states, did not slow their rate of deinstitutionalization.  
There remained significant variation between states in the average rate of hospitalization 
in 2017 (χ2(6) = 32.934, p < .001), average rate of change pre-litigation (χ2(6) = 186.898, 
p < .001), and average rate of change post-litigation (χ2(5) = 58.194, p < .001), 
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encouraging consideration of additional factors.  A total of 80% of the Level 1 variance 
was explained by the final model (σ2 = 0.01958).  See Table 9 for more details on the 
final model.   
 
Hypothesis 2 
General descriptive statistics for covariates and dependent variables are available 
in Table 6.  Table 10 shows correlations between per capita spending on community 
mental health, state psychiatric hospitals, and the total state budget.   
 
Model 2A 
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model (no 
predictors) of the per capita spending rate for community mental health services provided 
statistical support for using GCM.  Specifically, there was significant variation by state 
(Level 2) in the mean amount of spending on community mental health services over 
time (χ2(9) = 255.922, p < .001), which was $82.22.  Additionally, the Intraclass 
Correlation (ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in per capita spending rates 
attributable to between state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was .605 
(Davis & Scott, 1995).   
Before adding the fixed effect of time, the per capita spending rate of the entire 
state budget was added into the model as a covariate.  Variations like inflation, state 
budget shortfalls, or the general health of the state’s economy will have a less misleading 
impact on the interpretation of the dependent variable if the model accounts for the 
overall state budget.  The state budget was entered group-mean centered, to reduce issues 
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with multicollinearity and model convergence.  The overall state budget per capita rate 
was a significant predictor of the state community treatment per capita rate, so that, on 
average across all states and years, for every dollar increase in the state budget, the 
community mental health treatment budget increased 1.5 cents (t(118) = 11.501, p < 
.001).  For comparison, a separate model estimated with FIML examining only the fixed 
effect of time on the total state budget showed that on average across states, the total state 
budget per capita rate grew by $292.79 per year (t(169) = 43.13, p < .001) for a total of 
$10,729.29 in 2015.   
The Level 1 variance (random intercept only model: σ2 = 1342.44648) was 
reduced by 66% (residual variance: σ2 = 449.99744) by the addition of the state budget to 
the model, indicating the total state budget explains 66% of the variance in the 
community treatment budget (Level 1 dependent variable).  Additionally, a nested model 
comparison supported the inclusion of the state budget, (χ2(1) = 483.708, p < .001).   
The research question for this hypothesis primarily centers on examining variance 
in the rate of correctional spending as compared to the total state budget (i.e., does it 
grow at the same rate?), as opposed to variance in the relationship between spending on 
community treatment and the total state budget (i.e., for every dollar increase in the state 
budget, how much does community treatment spending change?); therefore, the slope for 
the total state budget was modeled only as a fixed effect to preserve parsimony and avoid 
model convergence issues.   
Prior to looking at the effect of time on community mental health spending while 
controlling for the total state budget, the fixed effect of time alone was examined.  Time 
was added uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2016.  Time was a significant 
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predictor of change in spending trends, such that on average across states, each year 
brought an increase of $3.93 per capita spending on community mental health services 
(t(153) = 13.213, p < .001), with the average in 2016 being $119.78.  In the random 
intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ2) was 1342.44648, which was reduced to 
629.23558 by the addition of time to the model, indicating time explains 53% of the 
variance at Level 1.  Additionally, a nested model comparison supported the inclusion of 
time, (χ2(1) = 116.73623, p < .001).  
Next, the fixed effect of time while controlling for total state budget was 
examined.  As the state budget is now in the model again, the interpretation of the time 
coefficient is not just general change over time, but the unique pattern of change over 
time of the community mental health budget, after accounting for the total state budget.  
On average across states over time, for every dollar increase in the total state budget, the 
community mental health budget increased only 1.6 cents (t(117) = 4.393, p < .001).  
After controlling for the total state budget, the community mental health budget did not 
have significant change over time, indicating it grew at the same pace as the total state 
budget (β10 = -0.48, t(117) = -0.446, p = .657).  The residual variance was reduced to 34% 
(𝜎2 = 449.28481), and a nested model comparison supported the inclusion of both time 
and the total state budget covariate, (χ2(1) = 368.585, p < .001).   
When the effect of time was allowed to vary randomly across the states, there was 
significant variation (χ2(9) = 99.837, p < .001), indicating states did not change their 
community mental health budgets over time at the same rates.  A nested model 
comparison also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states 
(χ2(2) = 61.96, p < .001).  The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 15% (σ2 = 
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264.15187).   
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type 
(Level 2 predictor), each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and 
slope for time.  Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined 
individually in its own model; they were coded so a value of 1 indicated engagement in 
that response type.  Only the Third Circuit, as represented by Pennsylvania had 
significant results, such that Pennsylvania, was spending $188.57 more than other states 
on average in 2016.  On average across states over time, for every dollar increase in the 
total state budget, the community mental health budget increased only .8 cents (t(108) = 
2.508, p = .014).  While the other states did not show change over time after accounting 
for the total state budget (β10 = 1.013, t(8) = .952, p = .369), Pennsylvania’s community 
mental health budget grew at a rate faster than the other states (β11 = 7.353, t(8) = 3.797, p 
= .005).  See Table 11 for additional detail on these analyses.  Community mental health 
treatment budget per capita rates over time are shown graphically in Figure 4 and total 
state budget per capita rates over time are shown graphically in Figure 5.   
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the 
model.  The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it 
now no longer represents the unique rate of change for the community mental health 
budget across all years in the model, but only up to the break point, which was coded 
separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead litigation.  The new variable of the 
post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the pre-litigation slope, again, only for 
the community mental health budget’s unique effect after controlling for the total state 
budget.   
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In the new model, on average across all ten states, for every dollar increase in the 
total state budget, the community mental health budget increased .8 cents (t(107) = 2.223, 
p = .028).  The pre-litigation community mental health budget did not significantly 
change over time after accounting for the total state budget (𝛽10= 1.78, t(9) = 1.302, p = 
.225), and the post-litigation period continued that trend (𝛽20= .213, t(107) = .334, p =  
.739).  The Level 1 variance was not reduced.  This indicates that on average, states grew 
their community mental health budget at the same rate as their general budget, and this 
did not vary significantly after litigation.   
When the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, it remained 
insignificant (t(9) = .182, p = .86).  While there was significant variation in the post-
litigation slope (χ2(9) = 41.1, p < .001), a nested model comparison was not significant 
(χ2(3) = 0.033, p > .5).  When the chi-square statistics conflict, it is best practice to defer 
to the results of the chi-square difference test contained in the nested model comparison 
(Singer & Willett, 2003); therefore, the post-litigation slope will not be allowed to vary.  
Similarly, the jump was not significant on average (t(97) = -1.306, p = .195); however, it 
showed significant variation between states (χ2(6) = 12.567, p = .050).  A nested model 
comparison indicates the jump is statistically significant, so it will be allowed to vary 
randomly (χ2(4) = 25.539, p < .001).   
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a 
state’s community mental health spending growth trajectory by Olmstead response type, 
both immediately and over time after litigation, each approach was tested for a significant 
impact on the post-litigation jump and deviation.  Each response type binary variable was 
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entered uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so 
value of 1 indicated engagement in that response type.   
Statistically significant increases in mental health budget occurred only in the 
states where there had been a DOJ intervention.  On average across states over time, for 
every dollar increase in the total state budget, the community mental health budget 
increased only .8 cents (t(96) = 2.553, p = .012).  Prior to litigation, states on average did 
not change their community mental health budget over time significantly, after 
controlling for the total state budget (β10 = 1.526, t(9) = 1.039, p = .326).  This trend did 
not change after litigation for states other than DOJ states (β20 = 0.557, t(96) = .701, p = 
.485).  However, DOJ states differed significantly from other states after litigation by 
spending more (β21 = 4.035, t(96) = 2.172, p = .032).  DOJ states also approached 
significance for a decrease immediately after litigation that is beyond what would be 
expected given the slopes of pre- and post-litigation change.  See Table 12 for additional 
detail on these analyses.   
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used 
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010).  On average across 
states over time, for every dollar increase in the total state budget, the community mental  
health budget increased only .8 cents (t(96) = 2.514, p = .014).  Prior to litigation, states 
on average did not change their community mental health budget over time significantly, 
after controlling for the total state budget (β10 = 1.523, t(9) = .995, p = .346).  This trend 
did not change after litigation for states other than DOJ states (β20 = 0.514, t(96) = .622, p 
= .535).  However, DOJ states differed significantly from other states after litigation by 
spending more (β21 = 4.04, t(96) = 2.078, p = .04).  DOJ states also approached 
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significance for a decrease immediately after litigation that is beyond what would be 
expected given the slopes of pre- and post-litigation change.   
There remained significant variation between states in their community mental 
health budget per capita rate in 2016 (χ2(9) = 137.919, p < .001), average rate of increase 
pre-litigation (χ2(9) = 90.159, p < .001), and in the average sharp change immediately 
post-litigation (χ2(8) = 49.319, p < .001), encouraging consideration of additional factors.  
A total of 86% of the Level 1 variance was explained by the final model (σ2 = 192.5717).  
See Table 13 for more details. 
 
Model 2B 
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model (no 
predictors) of the per capita spending rate for state psychiatric hospitals provided 
statistical support for using GCM.  Specifically, there was significant variation by state 
(Level 2) in the mean amount of spending on state psychiatric hospitals over time (χ2(9) = 
344.222, p < .001), which was $33.18.  Additionally, the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for 
Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in per capita spending rates attributable to 
between state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was .676 (Davis & 
Scott, 1995).   
Before adding the fixed effect of time, the per capita spending rate of the entire 
state budget was added into the model as a covariate.  Variations like inflation, state 
budget shortfalls, or the general health of the state’s economy will have a less misleading 
impact on the interpretation of the dependent variable if the model accounts for the 
overall state budget.  The state budget was entered group-mean centered, to reduce issues 
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with multicollinearity and model convergence.  The overall state budget per capita rate 
was a significant predictor of the state psychiatric hospital per capita rate, so that, on 
average across all states and years, for every dollar increase in the state budget, the state 
psychiatric hospital budget increased .07 cents (t(118) = 2.217, p = .029).  For 
comparison, a separate model estimated with FIML examining only the fixed effect of 
time on the total state budget showed that on average across states, the total state budget 
per capita rate grew by $292.79 per year (t(169) = 43.13, p < .001) for a total of 
$10,729.29 in 2015.   
The Level 1 variance (random intercept only model: σ2 = 41.88091) was reduced 
by 30% (residual variance: σ2 = 29.48985) by the addition of the state budget to the 
model, indicating the total state budget explains 30% of the variance in the state 
psychiatric hospital budget (Level 1 dependent variable).  Additionally, a nested model 
comparison supported the inclusion of the state budget, (χ2(1) = 274.98, p < .001).   
The research question for this hypothesis primarily centers on examining variance 
in the rate of spending on the state psychiatric hospital as compared to the total state 
budget (i.e., does it grow at the same rate?), as opposed to variance in the relationship 
between state psychiatric hospital spending and the total state budget (i.e., for every 
dollar increase in the state budget, how much does state psychiatric hospital spending 
change?); therefore, the slope for the total state budget was modeled only as a fixed effect 
to preserve parsimony and avoid model convergence issues.   
Prior to looking at the effect of time on state psychiatric hospital spending while 
controlling for the total state budget, the fixed effect of time alone was examined.  Time 
was added uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2016.  Time was a significant 
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predictor of change in spending trends, such that on average across states, each year 
brought an increase of 28 cents per capita spending (t(153) = 3.826, p < .001), with the 
average in 2016 being $35.86.  In the random intercept only model, the Level 1 variance 
(σ2) was 41.88091, which was reduced to 38.25225 by the addition of time to the model, 
indicating time explains 9% of the variance at Level 1.  Additionally, a nested model 
comparison supported the inclusion of time, (χ2(1) = 13.986, p < .001).  
Next, the fixed effect of time while controlling for total state budget was 
examined.  As the state budget is now in the model again, the interpretation of the time 
coefficient is not just general change over time, but the unique pattern of change over 
time of the state psychiatric hospital budget, after accounting for the total state budget.  
Neither the total state budget (β20 = .0014, t(117) = 1.494, p = .138) nor time (β10 = -
0.207, t(117) = -.760, p = .449) were significant predictors of state psychiatric hospital 
spending when included in a model together.  The residual variance was reduced to 70% 
(𝜎2 = 29.33223), and a nested model comparison of the model with both showed 
improvement when compared to time only (χ2(1) = 261.659, p < .001), but not when 
compared to the total state budget only (χ2(1) = .664, p > .5).   
When the effect of time was allowed to vary randomly across the states, there was 
significant variation (χ2(9) = 111.066, p < .001), indicating states did not change their 
state psychiatric hospital budgets over time at the same rates.  A nested model 
comparison also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states 
(χ2(2) = 49.472, p < .001).  The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 32% (σ2 = 
15.86467).   
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type 
  
 
113 
(Level 2 predictor), each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and 
slope for time.  Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined 
individually in its own model; they were coded so a value of 1 indicated engagement in 
that response type.  There were no significant results.  See Table 14 for additional detail 
on these analyses and state psychiatric hospital budget per capita rates over time are 
shown graphically in Figure 6.   
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the 
model.  The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it 
now no longer represents the unique rate of change for the state psychiatric hospital 
budget across all years in the model, but only up to the break point, which was coded 
separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead litigation.  The new variable of the 
post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the pre-litigation slope, again, only for 
the state psychiatric hospital budget’s unique effect after controlling for the total state 
budget.   
In the new model, neither the total state budget (β30 = .001, t(107) = 1.105, p = 
.272) nor time (β10 = .012, t(9) = .029, p = .977) were significant predictors of state 
psychiatric hospital spending.  Additionally, the post-litigation slope did not deviate from 
the pre-litigation slope (β20 = -.264, t(107) = -.808, p = .421).  The residual variance was 
not reduced and a nested model comparison did not show significant improvement (χ2(1) 
= .618, p > .5).   
When the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, it remained 
insignificant (t(9) = -.98, p = .353).  There was not significant variation in the post-
litigation slope (χ2(9) = 11.09, p = .269) and a nested model comparison was not 
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significant (χ2(3) = 6.361, p = .094); therefore, the post-litigation slope will not be 
allowed to vary.  Similarly, the jump was not significant on average (t(106) = -1.103, p = 
.383); however, it showed significant variation between states (χ2(9) = 18.274, p = .032) 
and a nested model comparison was significant, so it will be allowed to vary randomly 
(χ2(3) = 8.568, p = .035).   
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a 
state’s spending growth trajectory by Olmstead response type, both immediately and over 
time after litigation, each approach was tested for a significant impact on the post-
litigation jump and deviation.  Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered 
and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated 
engagement in that response type.  The Ninth Circuit and Minnesota had significant 
results.  In both models, neither the total state budget (Ninth: β40 = -.0004, t(96) = -0.455, 
p = .65; Minnesota: β40 = -.0004, t(96) = .561, p = .576) nor pre-litigation time (Ninth: β10 
= .392, t(9) = 1.036, p = .327; Minnesota: β10 = .198, t(9) = .517, p = .618) were 
significant predictors of state psychiatric hospital spending.  In neither model did post-
litigation spending deviate from the pre-litigation trajectory (Ninth: β20 = -.379, t(96) = -
1.035, p = .303; Minnesota: β20 = -.303, t(96) = -1.080, p = .283).  The Ninth circuit did 
have an immediate increase in spending the year after litigation, while Minnesota had an 
immediate decrease the year after litigation, but then continued to annually increase its 
funding after litigation more than other states.  See Table 15 for additional detail on these 
analyses.   
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used 
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010).  Neither the total state 
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budget (β40 = -.00014, t(96) = -0.167, p = .868) nor pre-litigation time (β10 = .306, t(9) = 
.767, p = .463) were significant predictors of state psychiatric hospital spending.  The 
post-litigation spending did not deviate from the pre-litigation trajectory (β20 = -.191, 
t(96) = -.623, p = .535).  The Ninth circuit did have an immediate increase in spending 
the year after litigation, while Minnesota had an immediate decrease the year after 
litigation.  Minnesota then continued to annually increase its funding after litigation more 
than other states, although this difference was just shy of significance.   
There remained significant variation between states in their state psychiatric 
hospital budget per capita rate in 2016 (χ2(9) = 212.11, p < .001), average rate of change 
pre-litigation (χ2(9) = 70.122, p < .001), but not in the average sharp change immediately 
post-litigation (χ2(7) = 12.344, p = .089), encouraging consideration of additional factors 
for all but the latter.  A total of 68% of the Level 1 variance was explained by the final 
model (σ2 = 13.53483).  See Table 16 for more details. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
 General descriptive statistics for dependent variables are available in Table 6.  For 
the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model (no predictors) of the 
rate of people receiving mental health services in the community provided statistical 
support for using GCM.  Specifically, there was significant variation by state (Level 2) in 
the mean rate of people receiving mental health services in the community over time 
(χ2(9) = 207.868, p < .001), which was 14.86 instances per 1000 people in the state.  
Additionally, the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance 
in per capita spending rates attributable to between state differences, as opposed to within 
  
 
116 
state differences) was .592 (Davis & Scott, 1995).   
Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model.  Time was added 
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2017.  Time was a significant predictor 
of change in community mental health service rates, such that on average across states, 
each year brought an increase of .436 instances per 1000 people (t(133) = 5.762, p < 
.001), with the average in 2017 being 18.142.  In the random intercept only model, the 
Level 1 variance (σ2) was 887.018161, which was reduced to 17.92177 by the addition of 
time to the model, indicating time explains 20% of the variance at Level 1.  Additionally, 
a nested model comparison supported the inclusion of time, (χ2(1) = 29.649, p < .001).  
There still remains significant between state variation in community mental health 
service rates in 2017, encouraging consideration of additional factors to further explain 
the variation  (χ2(9) = 262.367, p < .001).  
The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the 
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 166.397, p < .001), indicating states did 
not change their community treatment rates over time at the same pace.  A nested model 
comparison also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states 
(χ2(2) = 81.781, p < .001).  The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 43% (σ2 = 
8.26586).   
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type, 
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all 
years.  Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined 
individually in its own model; they were coded so a value of 1 indicated engagement in 
that response type.  Minnesota grew its community treatment numbers at a significantly 
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faster rate (𝛽 = 1.311, t(8) = 2.399, p = .043) than the other states on average (𝛽 = .298, 
t(8) = 1.715, p = .125) from 2001 to 2017, with the average in 2017 being 16.32.  See 
Table 17 for additional details on these analyses.  Community mental health treatment 
rates over time are shown graphically in Figure 7.   
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the 
model.  The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it 
now no longer represents the rate of change across all years in the model, but only up to 
the break point, which was coded separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead 
litigation.  The new variable of the post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the 
pre-litigation slope.  In the new model, on average across all ten states, every year prior 
to litigation brought an increase of .633 people served in the community per 1000 people 
(t(9) = 2.44, p = .037), and post-litigation, this rate slowed, but not significantly (𝛽20 = -
.312, t(123) = -1.335, p = .184), for an average in 2017 of 17.879.  The Level 1 variance 
was only slightly reduced by 1% to 8.02297, and a nested model comparison did not 
show significant improvement (χ2(1) = 1.473, p = .223).  This indicates that on average, 
states did not change their growth rate of community treatment after litigation.  
When the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, it remained 
insignificant (t(9) = -0.935, p = .374).  However, there was significant between state 
variation (χ2(6) = 31.86, p < .001), indicating states vary in the degree to which litigation 
impacted their community treatment growth rate.  A nested model comparison was also 
significant (χ2(3) = 10.38, p = .015).  The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 
5% (σ2 = 6.82248).  The potential for a “jump” (variation in linear change not adequately 
accounted for by the slope in the pre- or post-litigation phase) in community treatment 
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rates the year after litigation was tested.  The effect was significant when fixed (𝛽30 = -
2.576, t(113) = -3.113, p = .002) but not when allowed to vary (𝛽30 = -2.52, t(9) = -2.05, 
p = .071; χ2(6) = 8.047, p = .234; nested model comparison: χ2(4) = 8.977, p = .061), so 
the more parsimonious model with two slopes randomly varying and a fixed effect for the 
jump was retained.   
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a 
state’s spending growth trajectory by Olmstead response type, both immediately and over 
time after litigation, each approach was tested for a significant impact on the post-
litigation jump and deviation.  Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered 
and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated 
engagement in that response type.  There were no significant results.  See Table 18 for 
additional details on these analyses.   
For the final model, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood 
was used because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010).  The average 
pre-litigation slope was not significant, indicating states were not modifying their 
community treatment rates on average prior to their litigation.  The exception was 
Minnesota, which was growing their community treatment each year by 2.64 people per 
1000 members of the general population.  The post-litigation slope did not show 
significant deviation from the pre-litigation slope; however, there was an average a jump 
down in the rate of people seeking mental health treatment services in the community in 
the year after litigation.   
Overall, on average across states in 2017, almost 20 people out of every 1000 
were receiving mental health services in the community.  There remained significant 
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variation between states in the community treatment rate in 2017 (χ2(6) = 167.123, p < 
.001), average rate of change pre-litigation (χ2(5) = 84.989, p < .001), and average rate of 
change post-litigation (χ2(5) = 34.143, p < .001), encouraging consideration of additional 
factors.  A total of 70% of the Level 1 variance was explained by the final model (σ2 = 
6.77543).  See the Table 19 for more details.   
 
Hypothesis 4 
 The fourth hypothesis look at potential side effects of Olmstead policies.  See 
table 6 for descriptive statistics on all covariates and dependent variables in Hypothesis 4.   
 
Models 4Ai-4Aiii 
Models 4Ai, 4Aii, and 4Aiii all looked at variables related to disability benefits – 
disability benefit recipient rates, disability benefit application rates, and disability benefit 
application approval rates, respectively.  Across all states and years, the variables were 
significantly correlated with each other, although the rate at which applications were 
approved was negatively associated with both the percentage of people receiving benefits 
and the percentage of people filing applications (p < .001 for all; see Table 20).   
 
Model 4Ai 
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of the 
percentage of the general population receiving SSA disability benefits provided statistical 
support for using GCM.  Specifically, there was significant variation by state (Level 2) in 
the mean percentage of people receiving SSA disability benefits over time (χ2(9) = 
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231.98, p < .001), which was 5.41%.  Additionally, the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for 
Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in disability benefit rates attributable to between 
state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was .623 (Davis & Scott, 1995).   
 Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model.  Time was added 
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2015 (most recent year data are 
available).  Time was a significant predictor of change in disability benefit rates, such 
that on average across states, each year brought an increase of .13% of the general 
population receiving disability benefits (t(139) = 30.511, p < .001), with the average in 
2015 being 6.32%.  In the random intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ2) was 
0.38928, which was reduced to .05089 by the addition of time to the model, indicating 
time explains 87% of the variance at Level 1.  Additionally, a nested model comparison 
supported the inclusion of time, (χ2(1) = 284.851, p < .001).   
 The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the 
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 376.479, p < .001), indicating states did 
not change their disability benefits percentage over time at the same rates.  A nested 
model comparison also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across 
states (χ2(2) = 145.72, p < .001).  The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 9% 
(σ2 = .01407).   
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type, 
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all 
years.  Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined 
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in 
that response type.  The Ninth Circuit had the only significant result, with their disability 
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benefit rates in 2015 being significantly lower than the other states, by 1.39%.  The DOJ 
and Third Circuit trended towards significance, both in being higher than other states in 
their disability rates in 2015.  See table 21 for additional details on these analyses.  
Percentage of people receiving disability benefits over time are shown graphically in 
Figure 8.   
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the 
model.  The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it 
now no longer represents the rate of change across all years in the model, but only up to 
the break point, which was coded separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead 
litigation.  The new variable of the post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the 
pre-litigation slope.  In the new model, on average across all ten states, every year prior  
to litigation brought an increase of .14% in the percentage of people receiving disability 
benefits (t(9) = 9.142, p < .001), and the post-litigation time period was not associated 
with a significant difference in that trend (t(129) = -1.063, p = .29), for an average in 
2015 of 6.31%.  The Level 1 variance was only slightly reduced to .01402, and a nested 
model comparison did not show significant improvement (χ2(1) = 1.094, p = .296).  This 
indicates that on average, states did not change their trajectory of disability benefits 
growth after litigation.   
 However, when the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, 
while the post-litigation deviation in slope remained insignificant (t(9) = -0.852, p = 
.416), there was significant variation (χ2(6) = 59.627, p < .001), indicating states vary in 
the degree to which litigation impacted their disability benefits growth trajectory.  A  
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nested model comparison was significant (χ2(3) = 30.672, p < .001).  The Level 1 
variance was reduced by an additional 1% (σ2 = .01001).  Similarly, the “jump” 
(variation in linear change not adequately accounted for by the slope in the pre- or post-
litigation phase) in disability benefit rates the year after litigation was not significant on 
average (t(119) = 1.224, p = .224), but it did show significant variation by state (χ2(6) = 
32.371, p < .001) with a significant nested model comparison (χ2(5) = 20.079, p = .002).   
 To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a 
state’s disability benefits growth trajectory by Olmstead response type, both immediately 
and for subsequent years after litigation, each approach was tested for a significant 
impact on the post-litigation jump and deviation.  Each response type binary variable was 
entered uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so 
value of 1 indicated engagement in that response type.   
 The Ninth Circuit as well as the DOJ had significant results, but each only for the 
jump.  In the model for the Ninth Circuit, the pre-litigation slope was 0.15 (t(9) = 7.772, 
p < .001), meaning that prior to litigation, all states on average were increasing the 
percentage of people receiving disability benefits by .15% per year.  After litigation, 
states outside the Ninth Circuit significantly deviated from this trajectory by slowing their 
rate of increase (𝛽20= -0.063, t(8) = -2.653, p = .029), while the Ninth Circuit states did 
not significantly deviate from their pre-litigation trajectory.  However, the Ninth Circuit 
did experience a jump down in their disability benefit recipient rate in the year 
immediately following litigation, by .278%.  On average, the other states did not have a 
jump (𝛽30= 0.131, t(8) = 1.677, p = .132).   
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In the model for the DOJ, the pre-litigation slope was 0.14 (t(9) = 7.569, p < 
.001), meaning that prior to litigation, all states on average were increasing the 
percentage of people receiving disability benefits by .14% per year.  After litigation, 
states with a DOJ settlement agreement deviated from this trajectory by slowing their rate 
of increase, almost significantly.  The other states, on average, did not have a change in 
slope (t(8) = -0.819, p =.437).  However, DOJ states did experience a jump up in their 
disability benefit recipient rate in the year immediately following litigation, by .26%.  On 
average, the other states did not have a jump (𝛽30= -0.048, t(8) = -0.705, p = .501).   
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used 
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010).  Interestingly, when 
controlling for the Ninth Circuit’s immediate decrease in disability benefits recipients, the 
DOJ’s immediate increase became insignificant (t(7) = 1.218, p =.263), indicating that 
while the DOJ may have had a significant effect on the outcome in its own model, its 
independent contribution was no longer significant when controlling for the changes in 
the Ninth Circuit.  Therefore, the DOJ jump was eliminated from the model for 
parsimony.  There remained significant variation between states in their disability rates in 
2015 (χ2(6) = 223.633, p < .001), average rate of increase pre-litigation (χ2(6) = 311.813, 
p < .001), average rate of increase post-litigation (χ2(6) = 20.151, p = .003), and average 
sharp change immediately post-litigation (χ2(5) = 25.993, p < .001), encouraging 
consideration of additional factors.  A total of 98% of the Level 1 variance was explained 
by the final model (σ2 = .00783).  See Table 23 for more details.  
 
Model 4Aii 
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 For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of the filing 
rate for SSA disability benefits provided statistical support for using GCM.  Specifically, 
there was significant variation by state (Level 2) in the mean rate of people filing for 
disability benefits over time (χ2(9) = 20.648, p < .001), which was 1.19.  Additionally, the 
Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in disability filing 
rates attributable to between state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was 
.621 (Davis & Scott, 1995).   
 Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model.  Time was added 
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2015 (most recent year data are 
available).  Time was a significant predictor of change in disability benefit rates, such 
that on average across states, each year brought an increase in filing rate for disability 
benefits of .015 (t(139) = 6.727, p < .001), with the average in 2015 being 1.299.  In the 
random intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ2) was 0.01952, which was reduced 
to .01475 by the addition of time to the model, indicating time explains 24% of the 
variance at Level 1.  Additionally, a nested model comparison supported the inclusion of 
time, (χ2(1) = 39.212, p < .001).   
 The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the 
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 41.1, p < .001), indicating states did 
not experience a change in filing rates for disability benefits over time at the same rates.  
A nested model comparison also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly 
across states (χ2(2) = 14.923, p < .001).  The Level 1 variance was reduced by an 
additional 14% (σ2 = .01207).   
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type, 
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each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all 
years.  Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined 
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in 
that response type.  There were no significant results, although the Ninth Circuit and the 
Third Circuit approached significant differences in the filing rates of their respective 
states in 2015.  See table 24 for additional details on these analyses.  Disability benefits 
filing rate over time is shown graphically in Figure 9.   
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the 
model.  The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it 
now no longer represents the rate of change across all years in the model, but only up to  
the break point, which was coded separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead 
litigation.  The new variable of the post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the 
pre-litigation slope.  In the new model, on average across all ten states, every year prior 
to litigation brought an increase of .025 in the disability benefits filing rate (t(9) = 3.845, 
p = .004), and the post-litigation time period did significantly slow from that pace by 
.0167 units (t(129) = -2.087, p = .039), for an average in 2015 of 1.28.  The Level 1 
variance was reduced by an additional 3% (σ2 = .01152), and a nested model comparison 
did show significant improvement (χ2(1) = 3.997, p = .043).   
 However, when the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, it 
became insignificant (t(9) = -1.343, p = .212).  While there was significant variation in 
the post-litigation slope (χ2(6) = 15.681, p = .016), a nested model comparison was not 
significant (χ2(3) = 3.876, p = .274).  When the chi-square statistics conflict, it is best 
practice to defer to the results of the chi-square difference test contained in the nested 
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model comparison (Singer & Willett, 2003); therefore, the post-litigation slope will not 
be allowed to vary.  Similarly, the jump was significant on average (t(128) = -2.291, p = 
.024), and showed significant variation (χ2(9) = 17.005, p = .048), but a nested model 
comparison was not significant (χ2(3) = 1.815, p > .500).   
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a 
state’s filing rate for disability benefits by Olmstead response type, both immediately and  
for subsequent years after litigation, each approach was tested for a significant impact on 
the post-litigation jump and deviation.  Each response type binary variable was entered 
uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 
indicated engagement in that response type.   
The Third Circuit had significant results, but only for the jump.  The pre-litigation 
slope was 0.028 (t(9) = 4.912, p < .001), meaning that prior to litigation, all states on 
average saw increases in people filing for disability benefits by .028% per year.  After 
litigation, states outside the Third Circuit slowed from this pace to .014% increases each 
year, a change that was almost significant (t(126) = -1.9, p = .06), while the Third Circuit 
slowed less than the other states, to a pace of .02% increases each year.  Additionally, 
while most states also experienced a jump down in disability filing rates (𝛽30= -0.091, 
t(126) = -2.794, p = .006), the Third Circuit actually had a significant jump up (𝛽31= 
0.249, t(126) = 2.376, p = .019).  See table 25 for additional details on these analyses.   
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used 
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010).  The results remained 
substantially the same: while the majority of states slowed their rate of increase after 
litigation, the Third Circuit had a significant increase immediately after litigation.  There 
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remained significant variation between states in their disability rates in 2015 (χ2(9) = 
141.216, p < .001) and average rate of change over time (χ2(9) = 34.011, p < .001), 
encouraging consideration of additional factors.  A total of 42% of the Level 1 variance 
was explained by the final model (σ2 = 0.01138).  See Table 26 for more details.  
 
Model 4Aiii 
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of the 
percentage of the approval rate of SSA disability benefits applications provided statistical 
support for using GCM.  Specifically, there was significant variation by state (Level 2) in 
the mean percentage of people being approved for SSA disability benefits over time 
(χ2(9) = 391.357, p < .001), which was 36.55%.  Additionally, the Intraclass Correlation 
(ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in disability approval rates attributable 
to between state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was .718 (Davis & 
Scott, 1995).   
Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model.  Time was added 
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2015 (most recent year data are 
available).  Time was a significant predictor of change in disability benefits approval 
rates, such that on average across states, each year brought a decrease of .82% of 
disability applicants being approved (t(139) = -15.22, p < .001), with the average in 2015 
being 30.84%.  In the random intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ2) was 
21.37287, which was reduced to 8.05132 by the addition of time to the model, indicating 
time explains 62% of the variance at Level 1.  Additionally, a nested model comparison 
supported the inclusion of time, (χ2(1) = 136.68, p < .001).   
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The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the 
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 146.862, p < .001), indicating states did 
not experience a change in approval rates for disability benefits over time at the same 
rates.  A nested model comparison also supported allowing the slope of time to vary 
randomly across states (χ2(2) = 75.478, p < .001).  The Level 1 variance was reduced by 
an additional 19% (σ2 = .01407).   
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type, 
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all 
years.  Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined 
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in 
that response type.  There were no significant results.  See table 27 for additional details.  
Disability benefits application approval rates over time are shown in Figure 10.   
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the 
model.  The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it 
now no longer represents the rate of change across all years in the model, but only up to 
the break point, which was coded separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead 
litigation.  The new variable of the post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the 
pre-litigation slope.  In the new model, on average across all ten states, every year prior 
to litigation brought an decrease of .985% in the percentage of approved disability 
benefits applications (t(9) = -5.429, p < .001), and the post-litigation time period was not 
associated with a significant difference in that trend (t(129) = 1.518, p = .131), for an 
average in 2015 of 31.15%.  The Level 1 variance was only slightly reduced to .3.995 
(less than 1% change), and a nested model comparison did not show significant 
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improvement (χ2(1) = 2.199, p = .134).  This indicates that on average, states did not 
change their trajectory of disability benefits approval rates after litigation.   
When the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, it not only 
remained insignificant (t(9) = -0.852, p = .416), but did not show significant variation 
(χ2(6) = 10.962, p < .089), or survive a nested model comparison (χ2(3) = 4.8, p = 
.186).  Therefore, the post-litigation slope will not be allowed to vary.  
The jump was a non-significant addition to the model, on average (t(128) = -
0.747, p = .456), and when allowed to vary randomly it remained insignificant (𝛽30= -
.731, t(9) = -8.23, p = .432); however, the jump did show significant variation by state 
(χ2(9) = 21.774, p = .01) and a significant nested model comparison to the model with a 
fixed effect for jump (χ2(3) = 9.319, p = .025).  Additionally, the addition of the jump 
changed the fixed effects for the other parameters such that, on average across states, the 
pre-litigation slope was now an annual decrease of -1.028 (t(9) = -7.722, p < .001), the 
post-litigation slope was an annual increase of .431 (t(119) = 2.767, p = .007), for an 
approval rating of 32.1% in 2015.  
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a 
state’s approval rate for disability benefits by Olmstead response type, both immediately 
and for subsequent years after litigation, each approach was tested for a significant 
impact on the post-litigation jump and deviation.  Each response type binary variable was 
entered uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so 
value of 1 indicated engagement in that response type.  There were no significant results 
although the Third Circuit approached a significant immediate decrease in disability 
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application approval rates immediately after litigation (𝛽31= -5.46, t(8) = -7.183, p < 
.001).  See Table 28 for more details.   
The final model was ultimately the one described above, although it was run again 
with restricted maximum likelihood because it is the better estimator for small samples 
(Peugh, 2010).  There remained significant variation between states in their disability 
application approval rates in 2015 (χ2(9) = 162.824, p < .001), average rate of change pre-
litigation (χ2(9) = 55.972, p < .001), and average sharp change immediately post-
litigation (χ2(9) = 21.759, p = .01), encouraging consideration of additional factors.  A 
total of 83% of the Level 1 variance was explained by the final model (σ2 = 
3.67375).  See Table 29 for more details.  
 
Model 4B 
 For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of the 
suicide rate (occurrences per 100,000 members of the state population) provided 
statistical support for using GCM.  Specifically, there was significant variation by state 
(Level 2) in the mean suicide rate over time (χ2(9) = 258.34, p < .001), which was 
12.03.  Additionally, the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the 
variance in suicide rates attributable to between state differences, as opposed to change 
within states) was .58 (Davis & Scott, 1995).   
Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model.  Time was added 
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2016 (most recent year data are 
available).  Time was a significant predictor of change in the suicide rate, such that on 
average across states, each year brought an increase of .19 in the suicide rate (t(169) = 
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15.215, p < .001), with the rate in 2016 being 13.65.  In the random intercept only model, 
the Level 1 variance (σ2) was 1.80092, which was reduced to 0.76254 by the addition of 
time to the model, indicating time explains 58% of the variance at Level 1.  Additionally, 
a nested model comparison supported the inclusion of time, (χ2(1) = 146.096, p < .001).   
The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the 
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 76.592, p < .001), indicating state 
suicide rates did not change over time at the same rates.  A nested model comparison also 
supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states (χ2(2) = 37.067, p < 
.001).  The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 12% (σ2 = .01407).   
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type, 
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all 
years.  Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined 
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in 
that response type.  There were no significant results. See Table 30 for additional details 
on these analyses.  Suicide rates over time are shown graphically in Figure 11.   
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the 
model.  The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it 
now no longer represents the rate of change across all years in the model, but only up to 
the break point, which was coded separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead 
litigation.  The new variable of the post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the 
pre-litigation slope.   
In the new model, on average across all ten states, the pre-litigation slope was no 
longer significant (𝛽10= .079, t(9) = 1.56, p = .153), but the post litigation slope was (𝛽20= 
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.214, t(159) = 4.142, p < .001), resulting in a 2016 average of 13.96.  The Level 1 
variance was reduced by 3% to 0.47972, and a nested model comparison showed 
significant improvement (χ2(1) = 12.51, p < .001).  This indicates that on average, states 
did not have a significant rate of change prior to litigation, but there was a significant 
increase each year after litigation.  
The post-litigation slope did not vary randomly by state (χ2(9) = 15.061, p = .089), 
or significantly improve the fit of the model when allowed to vary (χ2(3) = 0.941, p > 
.5).  However, the jump, while insignificant on average (𝛽30= .239, t(158) = .825, p = 
.411), did vary significantly (χ2(9) = 32.516, p < .001).  A nested comparison test also 
supported allowing the jump to vary (χ2(3) = 12.036, p = .008).  Therefore, the post-
litigation slope will be modeled as fixed while the jump will be modeled as varying 
randomly.   
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a 
state’s suicide rate by Olmstead response type, both immediately and for subsequent 
years after litigation, each approach was tested for a significant impact on the post-
litigation jump.  Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and 
examined individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated 
engagement in that response type.  Florida, DOJ, and Minnesota had significant results.   
In the model for the DOJ, the pre-litigation slope was 0.118 (t(9) = 20.546, p < 
.001), meaning that prior to litigation, all states on average were increasing in their 
suicide rate by .118 instances per year per 100,000 members of their population.  After 
litigation, this rate of increase was hastened by .103, for an annual increase of .221 each 
year (t(149) = 2.339, p = .021).  While there was not a change immediately after litigation 
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on average for states (𝛽30= -0.387, t(8) = -1.495, p = .173), there was a significant jump 
for DOJ states (See Table 31).  Minnesota had the opposite pattern of results. The pre-
litigation slope was not significant (𝛽10= 0.074, t(9) = 1.807, p = .104).  After litigation, 
there was a significant increase of .196 on average annually for states (t(149) = 5.128, p < 
.001).  While there was not an increase immediately after litigation on average for states 
(𝛽30= 0.433, t(8) = 1.397, p = .200), there was a significant jump down for Minnesota.  
Florida’s slope also showed a significant slowing of the suicide rate growth.  See table 31 
for additional details.   
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used 
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010).  Interestingly, when 
controlling for the DOJ’s immediate increase in the suicide rate, Minnesota’s immediate 
increase became insignificant (t(7) = -.826, p =.436), indicating that while Minnesota 
may have had a significant effect on the outcome in its own model, its independent 
contribution was no longer significant when controlling for the changes in the DOJ 
states.   
States on average, prior to litigation, had an increase each year of .126 (t(7) = -
.352, p =.662).  After litigation, for states other than Florida, this annual rate of change 
more than doubled, to .257 (𝛽 = 0.131, t(148) = 2.862, p = .005).  In Florida, however, 
the annual rate of increase slowed to .07 (𝛽 = -.187, t(148) = -3.528, p < .001).  On 
average, non-DOJ states did not have an immediate change after litigation significantly 
above and beyond what would be expected given the average annual increases (𝛽 = -.341, 
t(7) = -0.979, p = .36).  DOJ states, on the other hand, had an immediate increase of 
1.639, beyond their average annual increase (t(7) = 2.966, p = .021), which is a truly 
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remarkable jump given that most of the annual variations are less than a tenth of that 
jump.  The average annual suicide rate in 2015 was 13.778 (t(9) = 18.967, p < .001).   
There remained significant variation between states in their suicide rates in 2015 (χ2(9) = 
106.756, p < .001) and average rate of increase pre-litigation (χ2(9) = 61.106, p < .001), 
but not in the average change immediately post-litigation (χ2(7) = 12.697, p = .079), 
encouraging consideration of additional factors for all but the latter.  A total of 77% of 
the Level 1 variance was explained by the final model (σ2 = 0.41965).  See Table 32 for 
more details. 
 
Model 4C 
 Model 4C’s dependent variable, readmission to any psychiatric hospital within 
thirty days of discharge from the state hospital, was missing 50% of its data.  The model 
was not estimated.   
 
Model 4D 
 For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of the 
percentage of employed SMHA clients provided statistical support for using 
GCM.  Specifically, there was significant variation by state (Level 2) in the mean 
employment rate over time (χ2(9) = 250.157, p < .001), which was 18.41.  Additionally, 
the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in disability 
benefit rates attributable to between state differences, as opposed to within state 
differences) was .69 (Davis & Scott, 1995).   
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Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model.  Time was added 
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2017 (most recent year data are 
available).  Time was a significant predictor of change in employment rates, such that on 
average across states, each year brought an increase of .295% in the employment rate on 
average across states (t(169) = 15.215, p < .001), with the rate in 2017 being 20.05%.  In 
the random intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ2) was 22.00469, which was 
reduced to 21.07152 by the addition of time to the model, indicating time explains 4% of 
the variance at Level 1.  Additionally, a nested model comparison supported the inclusion 
of time, (χ2(1) = 4.259, p = .037).   
The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the 
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 38.53, p < .001), indicating state 
employment rates did not change over time at the same pace.  A nested model 
comparison also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states 
(χ2(2) = 11.731, p = .003).  The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 22% (σ2 = 
16.27390).   
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type, 
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all 
years.  Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined 
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in 
that response type.  Minnesota and the DOJ both had significantly different slopes from 
the other states. In the model for the DOJ states, while on average other states’ 
employment rates grew slowly over time (𝛽10= .756, t(8) = 3.617, p = .007), the DOJ 
states’ employment rate actually declined.  In the model for Minnesota, the other states 
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on average had no significant change (𝛽10= .116, t(8) = .624, p = .55) while Minnesota’s 
employment rate grew quickly.  See table 33 for additional details on these analyses.  
Employment rates over time are shown graphically in Figure 12.   
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the 
model.  The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it 
now no longer represents the rate of change across all years in the model, but only up to 
the break point, which was coded separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead 
litigation.  The new variable of the post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the 
pre-litigation slope.   
In the new model, on average across all ten states, the pre-litigation slope was no 
longer significant (𝛽10= .319, t(9) = 1.192, p = .264), and neither was the post litigation 
slope (𝛽20= -.35, t(86) = -0.195, p = .846), resulting in a 2017 average of 20.54%.  The 
Level 1 variance was not reduced, and a nested model comparison did not show 
significant improvement (χ2(1) = .02783, p > .5).  This indicates that on average, states 
did not have a significant rate of change prior to litigation, and litigation did not 
significantly change the trajectory of states on average.   
When the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, it remained 
insignificant (t(9) = -0.685, p = .511).  While there was significant variation in the post-
litigation slope (χ2(4) = 10.789, p = .029), a nested model comparison was not significant 
(χ2(3) = 3.876, p = .274).  When the chi-square statistics conflict, it is best practice to 
defer to the results of the chi-square difference test contained in the nested model 
comparison (Singer & Willett, 2003); therefore, the post-litigation slope will not be 
allowed to vary.   
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However, the jump was significant on average, (𝛽20= 2.632, t(76) = 5.014, p < 
.001), showed significant variation by state (χ2(4) = 28.425, p < .0001), and had a 
significant nested model comparison (χ2(4) = 619.236, p = .031).  To examine potential 
differences in the degree to which litigation immediately impacted a state’s employment 
rate by Olmstead response type, each approach was tested for a significant impact on the 
post-litigation slope and jump.  Each response type binary variable was entered 
uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 
indicated engagement in that response type.   
In the model for the DOJ, the pre-litigation slope was -1.392 (t(9) = -2.664, p = 
.026), meaning that prior to litigation, all states on average were decreasing in their 
employment rate by 1.39% per year.  After litigation, this rate of decrease was not 
significantly changed (𝛽30= 2.402, t(75) = 1.061, p = .292).  There was an immediate 
increase after litigation on average for states (𝛽20= -2.452, t(8) = 3.72, p = .006); 
however, this jump was significantly smaller for DOJ states (See Table 34).  Minnesota 
had the opposite results. The pre-litigation slope was still significantly decreasing (𝛽10= -
1.687, t(9) = 1.807, p = .104).  After litigation, there was an immediate significant 
increase of 2.318 on average for states (t(8) = 4.091, p = .003), which was even larger in 
Minnesota (See Table 34).  The post-litigation slope did not significantly deviate from the 
pre-litigation slope (𝛽30 = -.219, t(75) = -.141, p = .888).   
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used 
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010).  Interestingly, when 
controlling for Minnesota’s immediate increase in the employment rate, DOJ’s states 
immediate decrease fell just shy of significance, indicating that while DOJ may have had 
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a significant effect on the outcome in its own model, its unique contribution not 
significant after accounting for the changes in Minnesota.  There remained significant 
variation between states in their employment rates in 2017 (χ2(4) = 124.337, p < .001), 
average rate of change pre-litigation (χ2(4) = 12.404, p = .015), as well as in the average 
change immediately post-litigation (χ2(2) = 13.3, p = .002), encouraging consideration of 
additional factors.  A total of 46% of the Level 1 variance was explained by the final 
model (σ2 = 11.92855).  See Table 35 for more details.  
 
Models 4Ei-4Eiii 
Models 4Ei, 4Eii, and 4Eiii all looked at components of state budgets, 
specifically, the per capita spending rates for the judiciary, law enforcement, and 
corrections.  Across all states and years, the dependent variables were significantly 
correlated with each other (p < .001 for all; see Table 36).   
 
Model 4Ei 
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of judicial 
spending trends provided statistical support for using GCM.  Specifically, there was 
significant variation by state (Level 2) in the mean per capita rate of judicial spending 
over time (χ2(9) = 395.221, p < .001), which was $115.96.  Additionally, the Intraclass 
Correlation (ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in judicial spending trends 
attributable to between state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was .682 
(Davis & Scott, 1995).   
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Before adding the fixed effect of time, the per capita spending rate of the entire 
state budget will be added into the model.  Variations like inflation, state budget 
shortfalls, or the general health of the state’s economy will have a less misleading impact 
on the interpretation of the dependent variable if the model accounts for the overall state 
budget.  For reference, on average across states, the total state budget per capita rate grew 
by $292.79 per year (t(169) = 43.006, p < .001) for a total of $10729.29 in 2015.  The 
state budget was entered group-mean centered, to reduce issues with multicollinearity and 
model convergence.  The overall state budget per capita rate was a significant predictor 
of the state judicial budget per capita rate, so that for every dollar increase in the state 
budget, the judicial budget increased 1.2 cents (t(169) = 27.033, p < .001).  In the random 
intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ2) was 635.75607, which was reduced to 
119.98522 by the addition of the state budget to the model, indicating the variation in the 
state budget explains 81% of the variance at Level 1.  Additionally, a nested model 
comparison supported the inclusion of the state budget, (χ2(1) = 283.466, p < .001).  The 
research question primarily centers on examining variance in the rate of judicial spending 
as compared to the total state budget (i.e., does it grow at the same rate?), as opposed to 
variance in the relationship between judicial spending and the total state budget (i.e., for 
every dollar increase in the state budget, how much does judicial spending change?); 
therefore, the slope for the total state budget was modeled only as a fixed effect to 
preserve parsimony and avoid model convergence issues.   
Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model.  Time was added 
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2015 (most recent year data are 
available).  As the state budget is already in the model, the interpretation of the time 
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coefficient changes from change over time to the unique pattern of change over time of 
the judicial state budget, after controlling for the total state budget.  In 2015, for every 
dollar increase in the total state budget, the judicial budget increased only 1.6 cents 
(t(168) = 10.377, p < .001).  On average, the judicial budget grew at a significantly 
slower rate than the state total budget (𝜷10 = -1.17, t(168) = -2.519, p = .013).  The Level 
1 variance was only slightly reduced to 115.66921, and a nested model comparison 
supported the inclusion of time, (χ2(1) = 6.228, p = .012).   
The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the 
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 92.211, p < .001), indicating states did 
not change their judicial budgets over time at the same rates.  A nested model comparison 
also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states (χ2(2) = 43.304, 
p < .001).  The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 6% (σ2 = .01407).   
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type, 
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all 
years.  Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined 
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in 
that response type.  There were no significant results.  See table 37 for additional details 
on these analyses.  The state judicial budget over time is shown graphically in Figure 13.   
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the 
model.  The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it 
now no longer represents the unique rate of change for the judicial budget across all years 
in the model, but only up to the break point, which was coded separately for each state as 
the year of their Olmstead litigation.  The new variable of the post-litigation slope 
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represents any deviation from the pre-litigation slope, again, only for the judicial budget’s 
unique effect after controlling for the total state budget.  In the new model, on average 
across all ten states, for every dollar increase in the total state budget, the judicial budget 
increased 1 cent.  Controlling for the post-litigation period, the pre-litigation judicial 
budget did not grow at a rate significantly different from the total state budget (𝛽10= 1.26, 
t(9) = 1.757, p = .113). However, the post-litigation period showed a significant slowing 
of growth in the judicial state budget (𝛽20= -1.985, t(158) = -3.755, p < .001).  The Level 
1 variance was only slightly reduced by 1% to 73.46324, and a nested model comparison 
showed significant improvement (χ2(1) = 12.58, p < .001).  This indicates that on 
average, states grew their judicial state budget at the same rate as their general budget, 
until litigation, at which point it significantly slowed.   
When the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, the post-
litigation slope became insignificant (t(9) = -1.394, p = .197), but there was significant 
variation (χ2(9) = 80.856, p < .001), indicating states vary in the degree to which 
litigation impacted their judiciary budget growth trajectory.  A nested model comparison 
was significant (χ2(3) = 49.358, p < .001).  The Level 1 variance was reduced by an 
additional 3% (σ2 = 51.72998).  Similarly, the “jump” (variation in linear change not 
adequately accounted for by the slope in the pre- or post-litigation phase) in judicial 
budget the year after litigation was significant on average (t(148) = 2.5, p = .014), not 
significant when allowed to vary randomly,  (t(9) = .914, p = .384), but showed 
significant variation by state (χ2(9) = 25.836, p = .003) with a significant nested model 
comparison for adding both the jump fixed effect (χ2(1) = 5.992, p = .014) and variance 
component (χ2(4) = 23.672, p < .001).   
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To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a 
state’s judicial budget growth trajectory by Olmstead response type, both immediately 
and for subsequent years after litigation, each approach was tested for a significant 
impact on the post-litigation jump and deviation.  Each response type binary variable was 
entered uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so 
value of 1 indicated engagement in that response type.  There were no significant results, 
although Florida and Minnesota trended towards significance on their post-litigation 
deviation and jump, respectively.   
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used 
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010).  There remained 
significant variation between states in their judicial budget per capita rate in 2015 (χ2(9) = 
78.653, p < .001), average rate of increase pre-litigation (χ2(9) = 137.133, p < .001), 
average rate of increase post-litigation (χ2(9) = 93.928, p < .001), and average sharp 
change immediately post-litigation (χ2(9) = 25.813, p = .003), encouraging consideration 
of additional factors.  A total of 93% of the Level 1 variance was explained by the final 
model (σ2 = 44.04746).  See Table 39 for more details.  
 
Model 4Eii 
For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of police 
spending trends provided statistical support for using GCM.  Specifically, there was 
significant variation by state (Level 2) in the mean per capita rate of police spending over 
time (χ2(9) = 110.404, p < .001), which was $253.95.  Additionally, the Intraclass 
Correlation (ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in police spending trends 
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attributable to between state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was .358 
(Davis & Scott, 1995).   
Before adding the fixed effect of time, the per capita spending rate of the entire 
state budget will be added into the model.  Variations like inflation, state budget 
shortfalls, or the general health of the state’s economy will have a less misleading impact 
on the interpretation of the dependent variable if the model accounts for the overall state 
budget.  For reference, on average across states, the total state budget per capita rate grew 
by $292.79 per year (t(169) = 43.006, p < .001) for a total of $10729.29 in 2015.  The 
state budget was entered group-mean centered, to reduce issues with multicollinearity and 
model convergence.  The overall state budget per capita rate was a significant predictor 
of the police budget per capita rate, so that for every dollar increase in the state budget, 
the police budget increased 3.2 cents (t(169) = 40.512, p < .001).   
In the random intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ2) was 2022.797199, 
which was reduced to 365.22496 by the addition of the state budget to the model, 
indicating the variation in the state budget explains 91% of the variance at Level 1.  
Additionally, a nested model comparison supported the inclusion of the state budget, 
(χ2(1) = 402.212, p < .001).  The research question primarily centers on examining 
variance in the rate of police spending as compared to the total state budget (i.e., does it 
grow at the same rate?), as opposed to variance in the relationship between judicial 
spending and the total state budget (i.e., for every dollar increase in the state budget, how 
much does police spending change?); therefore, the slope for the total state budget was 
modeled only as a fixed effect to preserve parsimony and avoid model convergence 
issues.   
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Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model.  Time was added 
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2015 (most recent year data are 
available).  As the state budget is already in the model, the interpretation of the time 
coefficient changes from change over time to the unique pattern of change over time of 
the police budget, after controlling for the total state budget.  In 2015, for every dollar 
increase in the total state budget, the police budget increased only 2 cents (t(168) = 7.783, 
p < .001).  However, over time, the police budget grew faster than the state budget (ꞵ10  = 
3.85, t(168) = 7.783, p < .001).  The Level 1 variance was reduced to 34.57509, so that 
92% of the variance at Level 1 was explained.  A nested model comparison supported the 
inclusion of time, (χ2(1) = 23.129, p < .001).   
The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the 
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 187.068, p < .001), indicating states did 
not change their judicial budgets over time at the same rates.  A nested model comparison 
also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states (χ2(2) = 93953, p 
< .001).  The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 4% (σ2 = .01407).   
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type, 
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all 
years.  Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined 
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in 
that response type.  There were no significant results.  See table 40 for additional details 
on these analyses.  The state police budget over time is shown graphically in Figure 14.   
Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the 
model.  The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it 
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now no longer represents the unique rate of change for the police budget across all years 
in the model, but only up to the break point, which was coded separately for each state as 
the year of their Olmstead litigation.  The new variable of the post-litigation slope 
represents any deviation from the pre-litigation slope, again, only for the police budget’s 
unique effect after controlling for the total state budget.   
In the new model, on average across all ten states, for every dollar increase in the 
total state budget, the police budget increased 2.1 cents (t(158) = 8.241, p < .001).  
Controlling for the post-litigation period, the pre-litigation police budget grew 
significantly over time, beyond what would be expected based on the total state budget 
(𝛽10= 3.795, t(9) = 3.378, p = .008). The post-litigation did not significantly deviate from 
the pre-litigation trend (𝛽20= -.726, t(158) = -.885, p = .377); essentially, on average 
across the states, the police budget continued to grow faster than the state budget after 
litigation, much as it did prior to litigation.  Unsurprisingly, the Level 1 variance was not 
reduced, and a nested model comparison did not show significant improvement (χ2(1) = 
.643, p > .5).  An additional nested model comparison did not support allowing the post-
litigation slope to vary randomly (χ2(3) = 7.534, p = .056).    
However, the “jump” (variation in linear change not adequately accounted for by 
the slope in the pre- or post-litigation phase) in police budget the year after litigation was 
not significant on average (t(157) = .917, p = .361), not significant when allowed to vary 
randomly, (t(9) = .515, p = .619), but showed significant variation by state (χ2(9) = 
59.282, p < .001) with a significant nested model comparison for allowing the jump to 
vary randomly (χ2(3) = 26.388, p < .001).  These results indicate that while there may not 
be evidence for a jump for all states on average, the degree to which states experience a 
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jump after litigation varies, so some states may have an effect while others may not.  
 To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a 
state’s police budget growth trajectory, both immediately and for the subsequent years, 
by Olmstead response type, each approach was tested for a significant impact on the post-
litigation slope and jump.  Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered 
and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated 
engagement in that response type.  There were no significant results.  See table 41 for 
more details on these analyses.   
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used 
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010).  There remained 
significant variation between states in their per capita spending on police in 2015 (χ2(9) = 
285.756, p < .001), average rate of increase pre-litigation (χ2(9) = 81.044, p < .001), and 
average sharp change immediately post-litigation (χ2(9) = 58.647, p < .001), encouraging 
consideration of additional factors.  A total of 97% of the Level 1 variance was explained 
by the final model (σ2 = 120.90089).  See Table 42 for more details. 
 
Model 4Eiii 
 For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of 
correctional spending trends provided statistical support for using GCM.  Specifically, 
there was significant variation by state (Level 2) in the mean per capita rate of 
correctional spending over time (χ2(9) = 282.75, p < .001), which was $210.28.  
Additionally, the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance 
in correctional spending attributable to between state differences, as opposed within state 
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differences) was .602 (Davis & Scott, 1995).   
 Before adding the fixed effect of time, the per capita spending rate of the entire 
state budget will be added into the model.  Variations like inflation, state budget 
shortfalls, or the general health of the state’s economy will have a less misleading impact 
on the interpretation of the dependent variable if the model accounts for the overall state 
budget.  For reference, on average across states, the total state budget per capita rate grew 
by $292.79 per year (t(169) = 43.006, p < .001) for a total of $10729.29 in 2015.  The 
state budget was entered group-mean centered, to reduce issues with multicollinearity and 
model convergence.  The overall state budget per capita rate was a significant predictor 
of the state correctional budget per capita rate, so that, on average across all states and 
years, for every dollar increase in the state budget, the correctional budget increased 2 
cents (t(169) = 26.196, p < .001).   
In the random intercept only model, the Level 1 variance (σ2) was 1821.66094, 
which was reduced to 361.67827 by the addition of the state budget to the model, 
indicating the variation in the state budget explains 80% of the variance at Level 1.  
Additionally, a nested model comparison supported the inclusion of the state budget, 
(χ2(1) = 274.847, p < .001).  The research question primarily centers on examining 
variance in the rate of judicial spending as compared to the total state budget (i.e., does it 
grow at the same rate?), as opposed to variance in the relationship between judicial 
spending and the total state budget (i.e., for every dollar increase in the state budget, how 
much does judicial spending change?); therefore, the slope for the total state budget was 
modeled only as a fixed effect to preserve parsimony and avoid model convergence 
issues.   
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 Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model.  Time was added 
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2015 (most recent year data are 
available).  As the state budget is already in the model, the interpretation of the time 
coefficient changes from change over time to the unique pattern of change over time of 
the correctional state budget, after controlling for the total state budget.  In 2015, for 
every dollar increase in the total state budget, the correctional budget increased only 3.4 
cents (t(168) = 13.52, p < .001).  The correctional budget grew at a slower rate than the 
state budget (β10 = -4.19, t(168) = -5.524, p < .001).  The Level 1 variance was reduced 
by 3% to 306.63081, and a nested model comparison supported the inclusion of time, 
(χ2(1) = 28.069, p < .001).   
 The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the 
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 60.351, p < .001), indicating states did 
not change their correctional budgets over time at the same rates.  A nested model 
comparison also supported allowing the slope of time to vary randomly across states 
(χ2(2) = 26.093, p < .001).  The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 4% (σ2 = 
.01407).   
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type, 
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all 
years.  Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined 
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in 
that response type.  There were no significant results.  See table 43 for additional details 
on these analyses.  State per capita correctional spending over time is shown graphically 
in Figure 15.   
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Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the 
model.  The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it 
now no longer represents the unique rate of change for the correctional budget across all 
years in the model, but only up to the break point, which was coded separately for each 
state as the year of their Olmstead litigation.  The new variable of the post-litigation slope 
represents any deviation from the pre-litigation slope, again, only for the correctional  
budget’s unique effect after controlling for the total state budget.   
In the new model, on average across all ten states, for every dollar increase in the 
total state budget, the correctional budget increased 2.4 cents.  Controlling for the post-
litigation period, the pre-litigation correctional budget did not grow at a rate significantly 
different from the total state budget (𝛽10= .29, t(9) = .237, p = .818). However, the post-
litigation period showed a significant slowing of growth in the correctional state budget 
(𝛽20= -4.057, t(158) = -4.674, p < .001).  The Level 1 variance was only slightly reduced 
by 1% to 212.95413, and a nested model comparison showed significant improvement 
(χ2(1) = 16.352, p < .001).  This indicates that on average, states grew their correctional 
state budget at the same rate as their general budget, until litigation, at which point it 
significantly slowed.  
 The post-litigation slope did not vary significant (χ2(9) = 6.476, p > .5), and did 
not significantly improve the model when varying, therefore it will be modeled as fixed 
(χ2(3) = .862, p > .5).  However, while the “jump” (variation in linear change not 
adequately accounted for by the slope in the pre- or post-litigation phase) in correctional 
budget the year after litigation was not significant on average (t(157) = 1.42, p = .157), 
not significant when allowed to vary randomly, (t(9) = .978, p = .354), it did show 
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significant variation by state (χ2(9) = 27.205, p = .002) with a significant nested model 
comparison (χ2(3) = 15.131, p = .002) .   
 To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a 
state’s correctional budget growth trajectory, both immediately and over subsequent 
years, by Olmstead response type, each approach was tested for a significant impact on 
the post-litigation slope and jump.  Each response type binary variable was entered 
uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 
indicated engagement in that response type.   
The Ninth Circuit had a significant jump upwards in its per capita funding for 
corrections immediately after litigation.  The pre-litigation slope remained insignificant, 
indicating the correctional budget did not grow beyond what would be expected given the 
growth of the total state budget (𝛽10 = -.309, t(9) = -.302, p = .769).  The post-litigation 
slope showed significant stagnation, and was actually decreasing each year, after 
controlling for the total state budget (𝛽20 = -3.021, t(147) = -3.607, p < .001).  Other 
states on average did not have a significant change immediately post-litigation (𝛽30 = -
5.524, t(8) = -1.123, p = .294).  Every dollar increase in the total state budget brought a 
2.3 cent increase in the correctional budget (t(147) = .023, p < .001).   
In the model for the Third Circuit, prior to litigation, the correctional budget was 
not growing significantly, beyond what would be expected given the growth of the total 
state budget (𝛽10 = .232, t(9) = .231, p = .823).  After litigation, states other than 
Pennsylvania, on average, were decreasing their correctional budget every year, after 
controlling for the total state budget (𝛽20 = -4.052, t(147) = -6.259, p < .001).  
Pennsylvania was significantly different from the other states by decreasing their 
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correctional budget less than other states each year, after controlling for the total state 
budget (𝛽21 = 2.212, t(147) = 2.072, p = .04).  Neither Pennsylvania (𝛽31 = 1.395, t(8) = 
.058, p = .956) nor the other states had an immediate change after litigation (𝛽30 = 7.574, 
t(8) = 1.045, p = .327).  Every dollar increase in the total state budget brought a 2.1 cent 
increase in the correctional budget (t(147) = 7.762, p < .001).  See table 44 for additional 
details on theses analyses.   
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used 
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010).  There remained 
significant variation between states in their correctional budget per capita rate in 2015 
(χ2(9) = 243.914, p < .001) and average rate of increase pre-litigation (χ2(9) = 21.992, p = 
.009), but not in the average sharp change immediately post-litigation (χ2(8) = 3.875, p > 
.5), encouraging consideration of additional factors for all but the latter.  A total of 90% 
of the Level 1 variance was explained by the final model (σ2 = 189.00418).  See Table 45 
for more details.   
 
Model 4F 
 For the first stage of model building, the random intercept only model of the 
incarceration rate provided statistical support for using GCM.  Specifically, there was 
significant variation by state (Level 2) in the mean rate of people incarcerated over time 
(χ2(9) = 4150.99, p < .001), which was 4.05.  Additionally, the Intraclass Correlation 
(ICC) for Level 2 (the proportion of the variance in disability benefit rates attributable to 
between state differences, as opposed to within state differences) was .952 (Davis & 
Scott, 1995).   
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Next, the fixed effect of time was added to the model.  Time was added 
uncentered and coded so the intercept represents 2016 (most recent year data are 
available).  Time was not a significant predictor of change in the incarceration rate when 
examining 1996-2016 (𝛽10 = .002, t(199) = .358, p = .721).  The average across states in 
2016 was 4.06.  The Level 1 variance (σ2) from the random intercept only model 
(0.15131) was not reduced.  Additionally, a nested model comparison showed the fixed 
effect of time did not significantly improve the fit of the model, (χ2(1) = .12828, p > .5).   
The model was rerun with the effect of time allowed to vary randomly across the 
states, and there was significant variation (χ2(9) = 221.74, p < .001), indicating states did 
not change their incarceration rate over time in the same way.  A nested model 
comparison showed allowing the effect of time to vary significantly improved the fit of 
the model, as compared to the model with the fixed effect of time (χ2(2) = 115.415, p < 
.001).  The Level 1 variance was reduced by 51% (σ2 = 0.07345).   
To examine potential differences in change over time by Olmstead response type, 
each approach was tested for a significant impact on the intercept and slope across all 
years.  Each response type binary variable was entered uncentered and examined 
individually in its own model; they were coded so value of 1 indicated engagement in 
that response type.  The Ninth Circuit had the only significant result, with their 
incarceration rates growing slower than other states, (𝛽11 = .06, t(8) = -2.33, p = .048).  
See table 46 for additional details on these analyses.  The incarceration rate from 1996-
2016 is shown graphically in Figure 16.   
 Next, the fixed effect of the post-litigation slope was added uncentered to the 
model.  The addition of this variable changes the interpretation of the time variable, so it 
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now no longer represents the rate of change across all years in the model, but only up to 
the break point, which was coded separately for each state as the year of their Olmstead 
litigation.  The new variable of the post-litigation slope represents any deviation from the 
pre-litigation slope.  In the new model, on average across all ten states, every year prior 
to litigation brought an increase of .048 in the incarceration rate (t(9) = 2.491, p = .034), 
but the incarceration rate significantly slowed in the post-litigation period (𝛽20 = -.107, 
t(189) = -7.492, p < .001).  The Level 1 variance was reduced by 12% to 0.05583, and a 
nested model comparison showed significant improvement (χ2(1) = 47.192, p < .001).   
When the post-litigation slope was allowed to vary randomly by state, it remained 
significant (𝛽20 = -.107, t(9) = -4.656, p = .001) and significantly varied (χ2(9) = 18.849, p 
= .026), indicating states vary in the degree to which litigation impacted their 
incarceration rates.  A nested model comparison was significant (χ2(3) = 16.653, p < 
.001).  The Level 1 variance was reduced by an additional 3% (σ2 = 0.05172).  However, 
the “jump” (variation in linear change not adequately accounted for by the slope in the 
pre- or post-litigation phase) in incarceration rates the year after litigation was not 
significant on average (t(179) = 1.665, p = .098), and did not show significant variation 
by state (χ2(9) = 14.127, p = .117), and did not significantly improve the fit of the model 
when allowed to vary randomly (χ2(4) = 1.218, p > .5).  The jump was subsequently not 
included in any future models.   
To examine potential differences in the degree to which litigation impacted a 
state’s incarceration rates by Olmstead response type, each approach was tested for a 
significant impact on the post-litigation deviation.  Each response type binary variable 
was entered uncentered and examined individually in its own model; they were coded so  
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value of 1 indicated engagement in that response type.  There were no significant results, 
although Florida and the Third Circuit approached significance; the Third Circuit’s 
nested model comparison also approached significance (χ2(9) = 14.127, p = .117).  See 
Table 47 for additional details.   
Finally, all results were combined and restricted maximum likelihood was used 
because it is the better estimator for small samples (Peugh, 2010).  The final model only 
involved a pre- and post-litigation slope.  There remained significant variation between  
states in their incarceration rates in 2016 (χ2(9) = 1064.129, p < .001), average rate of 
increase pre-litigation (χ2(9) = 47.017, p < .001), and average rate of increase post-
litigation (χ2(9) = 18.716, p = .027), encouraging consideration of additional factors.  A 
total of 65% of the Level 1 variance was explained by the final model (σ2 = 0.05195).  
See Table 48 for more details.  
 
Hypothesis 5 
 Hypothesis 5 looked at the missing data from the other four hypotheses.  For all 
four hypotheses, there was no missing data at Level 2 (the state level).  Membership in 
each of the 5 Olmstead response types was individually coded as a binary Level 2 
variable.   
 However, Level 1 (repeated measures) had multiple missing data points (see 
Table 49).  For Hypothesis 1, no data were available for 2003 on any states, and 
Delaware (2001 & 2008), Florida (2005), Minnesota (2017), North Carolina (2004 & 
2013), and New Hampshire (2004-2005) were all missing at least one year.  For both 
models in Hypothesis 2, Florida had no reported expenditures in 2013 and five states 
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(California, Delaware, Florida, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania) did not report 
expenditures for 2016 prior to these analyses.   
In Hypothesis 3, no data were available for 2003 on any states, and California 
(2005-2006), Delaware (2001-2002 & 2008), Florida (2004-2005), Maryland (2001 & 
2004), Minnesota (2006 & 2017), North Carolina (2004), New Hampshire (2002 & 2004-
2006), and Pennsylvania (2005) were all missing data.  For Hypothesis 4, only Models 
4C, 4D, and 4Ei-4Eiii were missing data at Level 1; for 4C, 50% of the data were 
missing.  California was missing all but 2010, Delaware was missing 2008, Florida was 
missing 2013-2017, Georgia had no data, Maryland was missing 2013-2017, Minnesota 
was missing 2014-2015, North Carolina was missing 2007-2008 and 2016-2017, New 
Hampshire had no data, Pennsylvania was missing 2012-2017, and Washington was 
missing no data.   
For Model 4D, only three data points were missing: Delaware in 2008, and 
Pennsylvania in 2015 and 2016.  For Models 4Ei-4Eiii, BJS reports for 2001 and 2003 
were inexplicably missing the variables used for this analysis in both the PDFs and the 
spreadsheets.  All missing data described here are summed in Table 50.   
Total missing data for all analyses in the dissertation was 7.5%.  Overall, 
Minnesota had the least missing data, followed by the Ninth Circuit states, the Third 
Circuit, the DOJ states, and Florida.  Besides the dependent variable measuring 
readmission to any psychiatric hospital within thirty days of discharge from the state 
hospital, rates of mental health treatment in the community had the most missing data.  
Incarceration rates, suicide rates, and rates for disability benefits were reported perfectly 
for all states.   
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Summary of Results 
 All states showed trends of deinstitutionalization across time.  For non-DOJ 
states, this trend slowed significantly after litigation, while DOJ states continued at the 
same pace.  Meanwhile, only Minnesota showed an increase in the number of people 
receiving services in the community, and Minnesota’s rate of growth actually slowed 
slightly after litigation.   
 On average over time, states grew their community mental health budget at the 
same rate as their general budget.  This rate of growth remained the same after litigation, 
except for DOJ states which increased their spending faster than other states after 
litigation.  States funded their state psychiatric hospitals at the same rates both before and 
after litigation, with no significant differences based on Olmstead response type.   
 The rate of people receiving disability benefits grew each year, but this rate of 
growth slowed after litigation.  The Ninth Circuit states saw a significant decrease 
immediately after litigation and had a lower rate of people receiving disability benefits in 
2015.  The rate of people filing for disability benefits also increased each year, and this 
rate of growth also slowed after litigation.  The Third Circuit had a significant jump up in 
the filing rate immediately after litigation.  However, the approval rate for those filing for 
disability benefits was decreasing each year, although the rate of decline slowed after 
litigation.   
 Suicide rates on average were increasing over time, and the rate of growth 
doubled after litigation for states other than Florida.  Florida, however, cut its suicide rate 
of growth in half after litigation.  DOJ states saw a significant, immediate jump up in 
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their suicide rates after litigation, although this trend seems to be drive by New 
Hampshire alone.   
 For all states, the employment rates of consumers decreased each year, and this 
trend did not significantly change after litigation.  However, immediately after litigation, 
there was a significant jump up in employment rates, which was smaller for DOJ states 
and larger for Minnesota.  The incarceration rate for states was slowly growing prior to 
litigation, but then declined after litigation, with no significant differences between 
Olmstead response types.   
 On average, states grew their judicial budgets significantly slower than the overall 
state budget, but there were no significant differences between Olmstead response types 
or pre/post litigation.  On average, states grew their police budget significantly faster than 
the overall state budget, but this rate of growth slowed after litigation.  There were no 
significant differences between Olmstead response types.  For the state correctional 
budget, prior to litigation, it grew at the same rate as the overall state budget, but after 
litigation, the rate of growth significantly slowed, so that the correctional budget was 
growing significantly slower than the overall state budget.  The Third Circuit did not 
slow as much after litigation as the other states, and the Ninth Circuit had an immediate 
increase after litigation in correctional spending.  See Table 48 for a summary of results.   
 DOJ states, the Third Circuit, and Florida had the highest rates of missing data 
across all variables, (8.2-8.6%) while Minnesota had the lowest rate of missing data 
(5.2%).  The rates of disability applications, approvals, and beneficiaries, along with the 
suicide rate, had no missing data, while the readmission rate to any psychiatric hospital 
had the highest percentage of missing data at 50%.  The present study had 7.5% missing 
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data overall.   
 
CHAPTER 9: THE PRESENT STUDY: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The discussion is divided into four parts: discussion of empirical results, legal 
analysis of Olmstead applications in light of the empirical results, limitations of the 
current study, and future directions for further research.   
 
Empirical Results 
 Hypothesis 1.  Hypothesis 1 examined changes in the hospitalization rate per 
thousand members of the general population for the state psychiatric hospital only.  The 
original hypothesis was that most states, regardless of plan type, would be successful in 
reducing the institutionalized population in their state.  This hypothesis was supported; on 
average, all states showed a trend of deinstitutionalization across all years.   
When examining all states on average from 2001 to 2017, there was a significant, 
general trend of deinstitutionalization, resulting in fewer people in state psychiatric 
hospitals.  Each year, the rate of hospitalization went down .032 instances per 1000 
members of the state’s general population.  In 2017, the average across states was .276 
hospitalizations in the state psychiatric hospital for every 1000 people.   
Upon closer examination, this trend varied between pre- and post-litigation 
periods, and the DOJ states had significant deviations from the average post-litigation 
trend as well.  When all states’ effects were averaged together, there was a significantly 
faster rate of deinstitutionalization prior to litigation than after.  The annual decrease went 
from .054 instances per 1000 to .022 instances per 1000.  While considering these trends, 
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it is important to note that three states - Florida, Maryland (Ninth), and Pennsylvania 
(Third) – all had litigation in 2001, so they have only one data point in the pre-litigation 
phase of this data analysis.   
Once DOJ’s significant differences were accounted for in the model, other states 
on average had a decrease of .068 instances per year prior to litigation but slowed after 
litigation to an annual decrease of .011 instances.  This change was just shy of significant.  
DOJ states, however did not slow at all, maintaining an annual decrease of .07 instances.  
The difference between DOJ’s post-litigation pace and the other states’ post-litigation 
pace was significant.  The final model accounted for 80% of the variance in 
hospitalizations rates, indicating its explanatory power is remarkable. 
Additionally, some states seem to have encountered a floor effect in the later 
years, as seen in Figure 3.  Several states maintained a steady, low rate of hospitalizations 
beginning as early as 2001.  This may have contributed to the significant slowing of 
deinstitutionalization on average post-litigation.  This finding is consistent with a need to 
establish a baseline number of state psychiatric hospital beds to maintain in order to 
ensure a full continuum of care is available to those who may need it.   
Overall, these findings are remarkable because they show a national trend of 
deinstitutionalization that was not quickened by Olmstead litigation.  Rather, at best, DOJ 
states were able to continue the pace of pre-litigation while other states on average 
slowed.  These findings call into question the assumptions of the courts that Olmstead 
litigation would improve the state’s efforts at deinstitutionalization.   
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 Hypothesis 2 - Model 2A.  Model 2A examined changes in the per capita funding 
rate of community mental health treatment.  The original hypothesis was that unless an 
Olmstead plan included specific requirements for increasing community-based treatment 
financial resources, such as required by the Ninth Circuit, community-based services will 
be funded the same or less, despite expected increases in their service population due to 
deinstitutionalization.  This hypothesis was partially supported.   
 When examining all states on average in available years from 1997 to 2016, there 
was a significant, general trend of increased funding for community mental health 
treatment.  Each year, states increased funding by $3.93.  In 2016, the average across 
states was $119.78 spent on community mental health resources per member of the state 
population.   
 However, once the effect of the total state budget was included in the model, 
community mental health funding did not have a unique predictive effect, indicating that 
there was no change in community mental health funding above what would be expected 
based on the changes in the overall state budget.  Pennsylvania (the Third Circuit) was 
significantly different from other states; over the years, it was increasing its spending by 
$7.35 more each year than other states, ending in 2016 with a per capita rate $188.57 
more than the average of other states.   
Once the model was split in pre- and post-litigation periods, DOJ states were the 
significant spenders, instead of Pennsylvania.  After litigation, only DOJ states increased 
their spending significantly more rapidly than other states, by about $4 per year.  
However, Pennsylvania’s differential increase in funding post-litigation only approached 
significance (p = .08).  On average, other states’ community mental health budgets grew 
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at the same rate as their general budget, and this did not vary significantly after litigation.  
The final model accounted for 86% of the variance in community mental health funding, 
indicating its explanatory power is remarkable. 
 Overall, this hypothesis was only partially supported because the Third Circuit did 
not bear out the hypothesis.  Florida and the Third Circuit were the only response types to 
not require either an increase in funding or substantial community mental health resource 
development.  Florida did not significantly deviate from the average state trend, which 
was increasing in step with the total state budget both before and after litigation.  
Therefore, Florida was not getting additional funding to their community treatment 
resources, despite the arguably expected increase in need for community treatment due to 
a continuing trend of deinstitutionalization.  Conversely, Pennsylvania had significant 
spending increases over the entire observed time period, showing strong funding support 
for its community treatment resources, beyond what would be expected just from growth 
of the overall state budget.  However, this trend existed before litigation, therefore, was 
not a product of it.  A review of Figure 4 shows Pennsylvania clearly out spending other 
states, while Florida’s line remains flat at the bottom of the graph.   
 
Hypothesis 2 - Model 2B.  Model 2B examined changes in the per capita funding 
rate for state psychiatric hospitals.  When examining all states on average in available 
years from 1997 to 2016, there was a significant, general trend of increased funding for 
state psychiatric hospitals.  Each year, states increased funding by 28 cents.  In 2016, the 
average across states was $35.86 spent on state psychiatric hospitals per member of the 
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state population.  On average across all years and states, for every dollar increase in the 
total state budget, the state psychiatric hospital budget increased .07 cents.   
Once the total state budget and time were modeled together, neither had unique 
predictive utility for the state psychiatric hospital budget.  As both were significant 
predictors independently, it is likely there was too much overlap between the two 
predictors for either of them to make a unique contribution.  This is supported by the 
finding that including both predictors, with the slope for time allowed to vary randomly, 
reduced the residual variance and significantly improved the fit of the model, as indicated 
by a nested model comparison.   
On average, states did not significantly change their state psychiatric hospital 
budget post-litigation, immediately or over time.  However, both the Ninth Circuit and 
Minnesota had interesting differences from the other states.  The Ninth Circuit had an 
immediate increase in funding the year after litigation, while Minnesota had an 
immediate drop.  The final model accounted for 68% of the variance in state psychiatric 
hospital funding, indicating its explanatory power is quite high.   
Of note, the Ninth Circuit cases all found in favor of the state, while most other 
cases resulted in a judgment against the state or a settlement agreement requiring 
substantial development of community resources to meet the requirements of Olmstead.  
It is possible that surviving a lawsuit increased confidence in the state psychiatric 
hospitals, thereby creating a protective effect on funding.   
Additionally, Minnesota faced four additional years of negotiating a settlement 
agreement after litigation ended.  Each settlement agreement rejected by the trial court 
over those years was rejected because it was too vague or did not meet the needs of 
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enough people.  Minnesota may have dipped its funding of the state psychiatric hospital 
immediately after litigation in anticipation of needing funds for the community services 
its settlement agreement would ultimately require.  Minnesota did increase its funding 
each year post-litigation by more than other states on average, but this difference fell just 
shy of significance.   
 
 Hypothesis 3.  Model 3 examined changes in the rate of people receiving mental 
health treatment in the community.  The original hypothesis was that the numbers served 
in the community would not show a significant increase, despite a significant 
deinstitutionalization trend, leaving open the possibility of transinstitutionalization or 
people with SMI otherwise not being adequately treated in the community.  This 
hypothesis was supported.  Overall, Minnesota was the only Olmstead response type to 
show significant growth in the rate of people receiving mental health services in the 
community, and this was primarily before their litigation.   
 On average from 2001 to 2017, states were increasing the occurrence of 
community mental health treatment by .436 instances per 1000 people, with a 2017 
average of approximately 18 per 1000 receiving mental health services in the community.  
However, this growth trend seemed to be driven by Minnesota.  Minnesota alone was 
increasing its community treatment numbers by 1.31 instances per 1000 people each 
year; after parsing out Minnesota’s effect, the other states on average did not show a 
significant annual increase.   
Dividing the model into pre- and post-litigation periods revealed that on average, 
states increased people receiving community services by .633 instances per 1000 per year 
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prior to litigation, and this rate slowed, but not significantly, after litigation.  While 
considering these trends, it is important to note that three states - Florida, Maryland 
(Ninth), and Pennsylvania (Third) - all had litigation in 2001, so they have only one data 
point in the pre-litigation phase of this data analysis.  Again however, after untangling 
Minnesota’s effect, the other states did not have an increase on average, before or after 
litigation.  Meanwhile, Minnesota increased by 2.53 instances each year before litigation, 
and .93 instances each year after litigation.  The final model accounted for 70% of the 
variance in the rate of people receiving mental health services in the community, 
indicating its explanatory power is quite high.   
 Overall, the growth trend was less than would be expected if all 
deinstitutionalized people were adequately receiving services in the community as 
numbers were lowered in the state psychiatric hospital.  These findings are especially 
remarkable in light of other research which has shown a general increase of people 
seeking mental health services across all walks of life during the observed years 
(Mackenzie, Erickson, Deane, & Wright, 2014).  Most of those individuals are receiving 
mental health treatment from their primary care providers in the form of 
psychopharmaceuticals (Mackenzie et al., 2014), and thereby, would not be seeking 
services from the state mental health agency.  However, even ripples of that trend do not 
seem to be showing in this analysis.   
 Perhaps most significant is that no Olmstead response type, regardless of overall 
growth over time, showed an increase, significant or otherwise, after litigation.  This 
again confounds the express expectation of the courts that after litigation, formerly 
hospitalized people will be absorbed into community services.  While people in the 
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general community may be accessing services through private practitioners, people with 
SMI are more likely to have insurance through Medicare or Medicaid and subsequently, 
receive services through state mental health agencies (McAlpine & Mechanic, 2000).  
This finding raises significant questions about how people, especially people with SMI, 
are accessing services in the community.   
 
 Hypothesis 4 - Hypothesis 4 examined changes in ten variables related to access 
to mental health and supportive services (e.g., supported employment, etc.) in the 
community, such as suicide rates in the general population and employment rates among 
SMHA consumers.  The original hypothesis was that Olmstead response types that 
focused only on deinstitutionalization, like the Third Circuit, or substantially limiting 
consumer choice and agency, like the DOJ model would be associated with more 
negative, collateral outcomes, such as an increase in suicide rates and lower employment 
rates.  The hypothesis had mixed support.   
 
Model 4Ai.  Model 4Ai examined changes in the percentage of people receiving 
disability benefits.  When examining all states on average from 2001 to 2015, there was a 
small but significant increase of .13% every year.  In 2015, the average across states 
indicated that 6.32% of the general population received disability benefits.  The analysis 
did not reveal any significantly different growth rates over all observed years, but Ninth 
Circuit states did have significantly lower percentages of people receiving disability 
benefits in 2015.  Both the Third Circuit and the DOJ states had rates in 2015 that 
approached being significantly higher than the averages of the other states.   
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Once the model was broken into pre- and post-litigation sections, overall, there 
was a small increase of .15% every year that slowed to .10% after litigation, an almost 
significant change.  The Ninth Circuit states had a significant, immediate decrease in the 
growth rate of the percentage of people receiving disability benefits the year after 
litigation, and the DOJ had the opposite effect.  However, when modeled together, the 
DOJ’s increase became insignificant, indicating that the Ninth Circuit had the stronger 
effect.  While considering these trends, it is important to note that three states - Florida, 
Maryland (Ninth), and Pennsylvania (Third) - all had litigation in 2001, so they have only 
one data point in the pre-litigation phase of this data analysis.  The final model accounted 
for 98% of the variance in the rate of people receiving disability benefits, indicating the 
model explains almost all of the variance in disability benefit rates.   
These findings indicate there may be a connection between Olmstead response 
type and disability benefit rates.  The Ninth Circuit approach was characterized by 
personalized assessments for services needed in the community and funding for 
community services, so it is possible that with this approach, as people are being 
transferred into the community, they are having more success in employment, and are 
subsequently less reliant on benefits.  Additionally, just as disability benefits are available 
to all people with disabilities, whether physical or mental, Olmstead response types affect 
all people with disabilities, not only people with SMI.  The association between the Ninth 
Circuit and lower disability benefits rate may be driven by people with physical 
disabilities, people with mental health related disabilities, or both.   
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Model 4Aii.  Model 4Aii examined changes in the rate of people filing for 
disability benefits.  Looking at trends from 2001 to 2015, there was a significant increase 
each year of .015 for an average filing rate in 2015 of 1.3.  When examined in pre- and 
post-litigation periods, the filing rate increased by .028 units each year prior to litigation, 
but then significantly slowed after litigation to average annual increase of .014.   
While Olmstead response types did not show significant differences when 
examining all years combined, the Third Circuit did show a significantly different trend 
after litigation.  Specifically, on average, all other states had a jump down - a decrease in 
the filing rate beyond what would be expected given the general trend of change over 
time.  In the year immediately following litigation, the other states on average had a 
decrease of .089; however, the Third Circuit actually had a jump up, by .236.  While 
considering these trends, it is important to note that three states - Florida, Maryland 
(Ninth), and Pennsylvania (Third) - all had litigation in 2001, so they have only one data 
point in the pre-litigation phase of this data analysis.  The final model accounted for 42% 
of the variance in the rate of people filing for disability benefits indicating its explanatory 
power is very good, although additional significant predictors would be useful.   
These findings further support a potential connection between Olmstead response 
type and disability benefit rates.  The Third Circuit’s Olmstead response type was 
characterized by an emphasis on discharging people from the hospital, without additional 
requirements.  If people are discharged but unable to connect to services in the 
community to support employment, an increase in applications for disability benefits 
could be a natural consequence.   
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Model 4Aiii.  Model 4Aiii examined changes in the rate at which applications for 
disability benefits were approved.  When examining all states on average from 2001 to 
2015, there was overall trend of declining approval rates for applications.  Specifically, 
each year the approval rate dropped by .82%, on average.  By 2015, the average approval 
rate was 30.84%.   
Upon closer examination, this trend varied between pre- and post-litigation 
periods.  Prior to litigation, states were decreasing their approval rates by 1.03% each 
year, on average, while after litigation, states on average were diminishing their approval 
rates by .61% each year – a significant shift.  Looking both at all observed years and at 
the pre- and post-litigation model, no Olmstead response types showed significant 
differences in the rate of disability benefits application approvals.  Again, it is important 
to note that three states - Florida, Maryland (Ninth), and Pennsylvania (Third) - all had 
litigation in 2001, so they have only one data point in the pre-litigation phase of this data 
analysis.  The final model accounted for 83% of the variance in disability approval rates, 
indicating the explanatory value of the model is remarkable.   
Considering all three of the models developed for part A of Hypothesis 4 shows 
an overall trend of disability benefits rates increasing, filing rates increasing, and 
approval rates decreasing.  All three rates slowed after litigation, which is somewhat 
counterintuitive.  If many people are being integrated into the community from the state 
psychiatric hospital, it would make sense for some of them to be ready for employment 
while others may find necessary support in disability benefits, at least for some time after 
discharge.  Also, it should be noted that several other major economic shifts happened 
during the observed time period, not the least of which was the Great Recession in 2008.  
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However, while specific economic events such as that may be a confound for an 
individual state, it should not be a confound for the overall model as states had rolling 
litigation dates from 2001 to 2013.   
 
Model 4B.  Model 4B examined changes in the annual suicide rate in the general 
population.  When examining all states on average from 1999 to 2016, there was an 
overall trend of gradual growth.  Specifically, each year brought an average increase of 
.19 in the suicide rate, with the rate in 2016 being 13.65.  Upon closer examination, this 
trend varied between pre- and post-litigation periods, and Florida and DOJ states had 
significant deviations from the average trend as well.   
Prior to litigation, each state had an average annual increase of .126, which 
doubled after litigation, except for Florida.  Florida’s rate actually slowed, by more than 
half, after litigation.  However, DOJ states also experienced a remarkable jump, above 
and beyond its annual increase growing faster.  The jump up was an increase over ten 
times that of the average annual increase.  The average across states in 2016 was 13.78.  
The final model accounted for 77% of the variance in the suicide rate, indicating its 
explanatory power is quite high.   
Upon examination of individual states’ rates of growth (see Figure 11), it is clear 
there is one state that seems to be driving the DOJ increases – New Hampshire.  Without 
an in-depth policy review of all major shifts in the New Hampshire policies or economic 
outcomes around the exponential growth of the suicide rate, it may be difficult to 
understand the factors that contributed to this change.  However, one fact that was 
different for New Hampshire, as compared to other DOJ states, is obvious upon review of 
  
 
170 
Table 2 (p. 68).  Among the DOJ states, New Hampshire has the least development 
required for crisis services, with only a handful of crisis apartments and a mobile unit 
required – no centers and no hotline.  Additionally, no required community education for 
police, correctional settings, or other community services on the available crisis response.  
It is possible that a lack of crisis services in New Hampshire contributed to the dramatic 
increase in suicide rates in that state in the last few years.  As Olmstead litigation 
primarily involves finding ways to shift people into the community, it is crucial to 
understand how different approaches may provide differing levels of support to people 
once they are in the community, and how this may impact their ability to cope and adjust 
to the new challenges they face.   
 
Model 4C.  Model 4C was intended to examine changes in the readmission rate to 
any psychiatric hospital within thirty days of discharge from the state psychiatric 
hospital.  As noted in the methods and results section, 50% of the data necessary to test 
this model was unavailable.  While many dependent variables chosen for this dissertation 
had missing data, this was the only variable with so much missing data that a model 
could not be estimated.  Missing data is addressed by Hypothesis 5.   
 
Model 4D.  Model 4D examined changes in the employment rate among SMHA 
consumers.  When examining all states from 2007 to 2017, there was overall trend of 
growth, such that on average, each state had an annual increase of .3% for a 2017 average 
of about 20%.  However, upon closer examination, this rate of growth seemed to be 
driven primarily by Minnesota’s growing employment numbers.  When Minnesota’s 
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effect was parsed out, other states on average showed no growth, while Minnesota’s 
employment rate was quickly increasing.  The DOJ was also significantly different, but in 
the opposite direction; non-DOJ states (including Minnesota) showed slow but steady 
growth, while DOJ states were actually slowly declining.   
Once the observed years were split into pre- and post-litigation periods, 
Minnesota and DOJ states were again significantly deviating from the average trend as 
well.  In both cases, other states were showing a significant annual decrease prior to 
litigation, which switched to an annual increase after litigation, but the change was not 
significant.  For all states, there was an immediate jump up in the employment rate, more 
than would be expected based on the average annual increase.  For Minnesota, this jump 
was even higher than for other states.  In the DOJ states however, the jump was less; this 
difference was significant when modeled on its own, but not significant in the model with 
Minnesota, indicating that the effect from Minnesota was stronger.  While considering 
these trends, it is important to note that five states - Florida, Maryland (Ninth), California 
(Ninth), Washington (Ninth), and Pennsylvania (Third) - all had litigation before 2007, so 
they have only post-litigation in these analyses.  However, Florida, the Ninth Circuit, and 
the Third Circuit did not have any significant deviations from the post-litigation trends.  
The final model accounted for 46% of the variance in the employment rate, indicating its 
explanatory power is very good.   
The employment rate results are interesting for several reasons.  First, the DOJ 
settlement agreements always included ACT teams (which include supported 
employment specialists) and quite often also included requirements to develop general 
supported employment services for hundreds, if not thousands, of consumers.  The lack 
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of significant increases in employment rates among SMHA consumers raises concerns 
about how consumers are being served by supported employment services.  Additionally, 
with only Minnesota showing marked increases, these findings support viewing 
Minnesota’s response type to Olmstead as an example of how to connect consumers to 
positive outcomes, including increased employment rates.   
 
Models 4Ei-4Eiii.  Model 4Ei examined changes in the spending patterns of states 
on their judicial system.  When examining all states on average from 1996-2015, for 
every dollar increase in the total state budget, judicial budget per capita spending 
increased 1.6 cents.  After controlling for the total state budget, the judicial budget 
actually decreased each year by a little over a dollar.  When the observed years were 
divided into pre- and post-litigation periods, the judicial budget prior to litigation 
changed as would be expected given the overall state budget, but after litigation, it 
slowed significantly, and was losing almost two dollars every year.  None of these results 
varied significantly as a result of Olmstead response type.  The final model accounted for 
93% of the variance in judicial spending, indicating that explanatory power of the model 
is remarkable.   
Model 4Eii examined changes in the spending patterns of states on law 
enforcement.  When examining all states on average from 1996-2015, for every dollar 
increase in the total state budget, law enforcement budget per capita spending increased 2 
cents.  After controlling for the total state budget, the law enforcement budget was still 
rapidly increasing each year by almost four dollars.  When the observed years were 
divided into pre- and post-litigation periods, there was not a significant difference; police 
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budgets were outpacing the total state budget before litigation and they continued to do so 
after.  None of these results varied significantly as a result of Olmstead response type.  
The final model accounted for 97% of the variance in law enforcement spending, 
indicating that explanatory power of the model is remarkable.   
Model 4Eiii examined changes in the spending patterns of states on their 
correctional system.  When examining all states on average from 1996-2015, for every 
dollar increase in the total state budget, correctional budget per capita spending increased 
3.4 cents.  After controlling for the total state budget, correctional spending was actually 
decreasing each year by a little over four dollars.  When the observed years were divided 
into pre- and post-litigation periods, the correctional budget prior to litigation changed as 
would be expected given the overall state budget, but after litigation, it slowed 
significantly, and was losing over four dollars every year, very similar to judicial system 
spending trends.  Correctional spending did show significant variation by Olmstead 
response type; the Ninth Circuit states saw a drastic bump in spending immediately after 
litigation while the Pennsylvania slowed its correctional spending after Olmstead 
litigation significantly less than other states on average did.  The final model accounted 
for 90% of the variance in correctional spending, indicating that explanatory power of the 
model is remarkable.   
Overall, all three models explained 90-97% of the variance in their per capita 
spending rates.  Most of that explained variance was accounted for after the total state 
budget was included in the model.  Judicial spending and correctional spending were less 
than would be expected, given the growth of the total state budget, but only after 
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litigation.  Police spending, however, consistently outpaced the general state budget, both 
before and after litigation.   
 
Model 4F.  Model 4F examined changes in the incarceration rates of states.  When 
examining all states on average from 1996 to 2016, there was no consistent change over 
time.  The average incarceration rate in 2016 was 4.06.  The Ninth Circuit states were 
decreasing their incarceration rate over all observed years, while the other states on 
average showed no change.  This finding is particularly remarkable in light of the fact 
that the Ninth Circuit states had such a dramatic bump in correctional spending 
immediately after litigation.  Ninth Circuit states had litigation in 2001 and 2005 – both 
years in the first half of the observed period.  It is possible that the increase in spending 
was for programming that helped reduce future recidivism.   
The lack of growth over all observed years reveal significant shifts when parsed 
into pre- and post-litigation periods.  On average, all states were increasing their 
incarceration rate prior to litigation by .05 instances per year, and then significantly 
slowed after litigation by .06 instances per year.  Both Florida and Pennsylvania 
approached being significantly different from the post-litigation trend by increasing their 
instances of incarceration each year by .06 instances.  Florida’s results should most likely 
be ignored, in light of the caveat from data collection that administrators modified the 
data collection method during the post-litigation period, which resulted in a significant 
jump upwards not otherwise accounted for by the linear slope.  The final model 
accounted for 65% of the total Level 1 variance, indicating that this model’s explanatory 
power is quite high.   
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These findings are significant because after deinstitutionalization, a major concern 
was transinstitutionalization, including shifting people from the state psychiatric hospital 
into the state correctional systems.  A major hypothesis of this dissertation was that 
approaches to Olmstead that mimicked deinstitutionalization without reflection, like the 
Third Circuit, could leave open the door for states to repeat the same mistakes 
deinstitutionalization made sixty years ago.  While this correlational data is insufficient to 
draw any firm conclusions, the associations between the response type and incarceration 
rate open the possibility that those relationships have been created.   
 
 Hypothesis 5.  Hypothesis 5 examined differences in reporting practices by states.  
The original hypothesis was that many states would fail to collect data on outcomes other 
than the institutionalized population in their state, especially if that is the primary 
outcome required by their circuit court or noted in their Olmstead plan.  This hypothesis 
was partially supported.  While the utilization rate of the state psychiatric hospital was 
actually one of the more poorly reported dependent variables, missing a little over 10% of 
its data across states, Minnesota, the Olmstead response type with the most required 
development and outcomes, had the best tracking rate for a diverse range of dependent 
variables.  The Ninth Circuit was next in reporting performance, beating out the Third 
Circuit and Florida, which did not require the state to show improvement on any markers 
other than the state psychiatric hospital census.   
 
Legal Analysis of Each Olmstead Response Type 
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 Olmstead v. L.C. has been referred to as the Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 
for people with disabilities (e.g., Cerreto, 2001).  Olmstead focused on issues of 
segregation and took aim at the stereotypes of incompetence that so often keep people 
with disabilities from experiencing more complete integration into the community.  The 
decision was a watershed moment for disability rights that avoided destroying the 
protections that the ADA had so carefully crafted – specifically, the recognition of 
unjustified segregation as discrimination.   
The opinion was thoughtfully tailored to acknowledge the heterogeneous clinical 
needs of individuals with SMI.  Justice Ginsburg explicitly recognized a place in the 
treatment continuum for inpatient care, even long-term inpatient care.  Each argument in 
the opinion contributed to an overarching theme – while unjustified segregation was 
discrimination, the segregation was only unjustified when both the patient and the 
treatment team agreed there was no reason for the segregation to continue.  If the only 
reason for the segregation was the state’s incompetence in developing quality inpatient 
care, efficient transition programs, and adept community treatment options, that was 
institutionalized discrimination.   
However, for all its directness in defining discrimination in this context, the 
Olmstead opinion is simultaneously vague, in the way that Supreme Court opinions 
typically are.  The bulk of the confusion seems to cluster around the affirmative defense 
the Court described at the end of its opinion, almost as an afterthought.  Under this 
defense, even though the state is violating the ADA, it could survive a lawsuit on the 
grounds that not discriminating in the litigated circumstances would fundamentally alter 
the state’s administration of its programs and cause discrimination against others, by 
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forcing the state to deliver benefits in an uneven manner.  Justice Ginsburg gave two 
examples of an attempt at this defense: one that would work, and one that would not.  
The example given as inadequate was simply the state contending that finances did not 
allow for the plaintiffs’ needs to be met.  Alternatively, a state showing a plan to move 
people into the community as quickly as possible, with a reasonably paced waiting list, 
could provide protection against an Olmstead claim.   
 
Florida 
Florida’s lawsuit in 2001 provided one of the only examples of a state not being 
found in violation of the ADA.  The court held that Florida’s initiation of discharge 
planning upon admission and quick placements after a determination of readiness for 
discharge did not violate the ADA.  This finding seems consistent with the Olmstead 
holding; if people are being prepared for discharge upon admission and quickly placed 
when appropriate, there is no unjustified segregation.  The most remarkable outcome 
associated with Florida was that while suicide rates were increasing among all the other 
states, Florida’s rate decreased after litigation in 2001.  Florida was the only Olmstead 
response type to show this outcome.   
Meanwhile, the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, the DOJ states, and Minnesota all 
took different approaches to defining the affirmative defense left open by the Court.  
Minnesota and the DOJ states, as settlement agreements rather than court opinions, are 
far more detailed in their requirements than the Ninth or Third Circuit.   
 
Third Circuit  
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The Third Circuit decided its approach only two years after the original Olmstead 
decision, in 2001.  The first district court decision was a remarkably toothless application 
of Olmstead.  All of the parties and even the court agreed there was discrimination via 
unjustified segregation under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act – approximately one 
hundred people were being unnecessarily institutionalized against their wishes at any 
given moment during the litigated time period.  However, the court accepted the 
defendants’ averment that the hospital did the best it could with the resources it had, 
despite the lack of any formal procedures even closely approximating the example plan 
given in the plurality opinion of the Olmstead court.  There is no standard for 
development of even a few community placements at a time or requirement for more 
formal discharge-ready lists to monitor more uniformly the amount of time people wait 
for community placements.  Under this analytic framework, it is difficult to imagine any 
improvement to the NSH discharge process that would not be considered a fundamental 
alteration of services.   
While the Third Circuit’s final holding was an improvement over this early 
attempt, and even included a passionate discourse on the rights of people with SMI, it 
still had several fatal flaws.  First, the court had a shift in language from its analysis to its 
conclusory holding that was subtle but eviscerated this crucial decision’s potency.  In its 
critique of DPW’s plan, the court refers to “eligible patients” waiting for discharge.  The 
facts of the case indicate that, at any given time, approximately one-third of the 300 to 
40016 class members (non-forensic patients at NSH) were considered clinically 
                                                 
16  The class had grown to 410 individuals by the second district court decision.  
Frederick L. v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2004b, p. 3. 
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appropriate for discharge by their treatment teams and preferred to live in the community; 
essentially, they are members of the group the Olmstead opinion explicitly considered to 
have a valid claim of discrimination via unjustified segregation (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. 
Zimring, 1999, p. 598).  
However, the Third Circuit ultimately required of DPW that it provide specific 
dates for discharge of an approximate number of patients, in the context of continuing its 
overall trend of deinstitutionalization since the 1950s, and after criticizing the state’s goal 
of closing up to 250 hospital beds annually as being too vague.  In the middle of its 
opinion, the Third Circuit switched from “eligible patients” to all hospital residents.  If 
the Third Circuit requires Pennsylvania to close a certain number of hospital beds each 
year, eventually, there will be no place for people with SMI to receive long-term inpatient 
services.  This would directly violate the insistence of both Justice Ginsburg that the 
ADA does not require States to close all institutions and “plac[e] patients in need of close 
care at risk,” (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 604) as well as Justice Kennedy 
that “it would be a tragic event, then, were the… ADA to be interpreted so that States had 
some incentive, for fear of litigation, to drive those in need of medical care and treatment 
out of appropriate care and into settings with too little assistance and supervision” 
(Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 1999, p. 610).  The Third Circuit would have been 
better advised to select more narrowly tailored brightline, measurable markers.   
Another major flaw was the court’s reasoning when it came to judicial review of 
the state budget.  Separation of powers is a fundamental component of our government; 
managing the state budget has historically been allocated to the executive and legislative 
branch.  However, the Third Circuit court seemed to imagine that placing any 
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requirements on how the state complied with the ADA would require a line by line 
review and approval of the state budget, which was not an argument even entertained by 
any court in any other case.  If a court were to issue an opinion with a new state budget 
and dictate that the legislature should accept it, in the name of interpreting and applying 
the ADA, that would certainly violate the separation of powers.  Conversely, if the court 
were to allow the state to defend against allegations of discrimination, in any form, by 
merely averring it has money problems, then the court is no longer serving its role as 
interpreter and enforcer of statutory and constitutional rights.  It would be ridiculous for a 
state to successfully defend itself against alleged Equal Protection clause violations, such 
as the racial discrimination banned by Brown v. Board of Education (1954), by simply 
saying the court did not have the authority to tell the state how to allocate its public-
school budget.   
A related logical flaw in the Third Circuit’s final opinion was its myopic focus on 
the state psychiatric hospital census.  Without requirements to develop alternative 
treatment delivery systems in the community, the court leaves vulnerable those who are 
discharged.  Arguably, the court is trying to instigate the state psychiatric hospitals to 
discharge more people than ever before, and yet it fails to require the state to develop the 
community options to support such an influx.  In Olmstead, the state hospital had tried to 
discharge one of the plaintiffs to a homeless shelter, which the Court found reprehensible, 
yet the application of Olmstead by the Third Circuit fails to consider how to prevent an 
outcome such as this.  As predicted, the Third Circuit (and everywhere but Minnesota) 
failed to show that the numbers being treated in the community increased after litigation.   
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When considering the policy outcomes of the Third Circuit analyzed by this 
dissertation, several interesting trends surfaced.  First, despite the Third Circuit’s 
emphasis on lowering the state psychiatric hospital census, it did not have a significantly 
faster rate of deinstitutionalization.  The Third Circuit relied heavily upon the reasoning 
that brightline markers would force the state to quickly and efficiently discharge people 
from the state hospital, but they did so with no more success than other states on average.   
The Third Circuit did have a few collateral effects that should also be noted.  On 
none of the collateral outcomes did the Third Circuit fair significantly better than the 
other states.  Instead, the Third Circuit experienced a significant immediate increase in 
the filing rate for disability benefits immediately after litigation, higher incarceration 
rates in the years following litigation, and it decreased its spending on corrections less 
than other states in the years following litigation.   
Overall, the Third Circuit show a number of logical, legal, and policy flaws in its 
application of Olmstead.  The Third Circuit did not display a significantly faster rate of 
deinstitutionalization – it’s one requirement.  It failed to apply the spirit of Olmstead with 
fidelity, as shown by its lack of appreciation for the role of long-term inpatient services in 
the continuum of care for people with SMI as well as its undue hesitation to hold a state 
accountable for discrimination, even if it costs the state money.  The Third Circuit also 
ended up with a number of problematic collateral effects, including incarceration rates 
and spending, as well as disability applications.   
 
Ninth Circuit 
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 Like the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit emphasized a lowered state psychiatric 
hospital census but did not require specific numbers by a specific date.  The Ninth Circuit 
did, however, go beyond the Third Circuit by requiring that states also show funding for 
community services, while lowering the state psychiatric hospital census.  Interestingly, 
the Ninth Circuit showed the opposite pattern of results from the Third Circuit – a drop in 
disability benefit recipients the year after litigation and an overarching decrease in the 
incarceration rate both before and after litigation.  The Ninth Circuit did have a 
significant, immediate bump in correctional spending after litigation, but not a sustained 
change over time. 
 The Ninth Circuit’s approach cured many of the issues in the Third Circuit’s 
approach, including having more comprehensive requirements and not balking at 
requiring funding shifts.  However, the Ninth Circuit did perpetuate the emphasis on 
uncapped deinstitutionalization.  In the cases arising from Washington and California, the 
court lauded the trend of deinstitutionalization while failing to consider where a 
reasonable end might lie.   
 For the purposes of this dissertation, Maryland was included in the Ninth Circuit 
Olmstead response type because while it was clearly not geographically in the Ninth 
Circuit, the ideology represented by its district court decision closely matched the 
rhetoric and reasoning of the Ninth Circuit appellate court.  Maryland flirted with a more 
nuanced view of how to lower hospitalization rates while appreciating the role of 
inpatient services, but ultimately fumbled the execution.   
Specifically, Maryland introduced the idea of a cap on deinstitutionalization for 
the purpose of preserving high-intensity services for those who need them, either acutely 
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or chronically (Williams v. Wasserman, 2001).  This approach more comprehensively 
acknowledged the dynamic and complex nature of providing services to people with 
developmental and psychiatric disabilities.  However, while the Maryland District Court 
acknowledged the need for some hospital beds to remain available permanently, it 
nonsensically undercut its own valuation of inpatient services by applauding the state for 
prioritizing community programs over “institutional” programs.  If the state 
acknowledges the need for programs with high-intensity services, those programs should 
logically be equally valued and (financially) supported as part of a comprehensive 
treatment continuum.  Overall, the Ninth Circuit got closer, but still failed to accurately 
respect the subtlety of valuing inpatient services while still fighting to end discrimination 
via unjustifiable segregation.   
 
Department of Justice 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has litigated many cases related to Olmstead but 
the cases most applicable to the issues addressed by this dissertation took place in 2010-
2013 in Delaware, Georgia, New Hampshire, and North Carolina.  Those settlement 
agreements were chosen because they impacted people with mental illness on a statewide 
level.  They consistently required substantial infrastructure development for community 
mental health services, such as ACT teams, scattered-site supported housing, supported 
employment, and peer services, along with crisis services, short-term residential, and 
inpatient services for psychiatric stabilization in the community.   
Notably, the DOJ also had settlement agreements with nursing homes that served 
primarily adults with SMI, including in New York and Missouri (U.S. v. Marion County 
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Nursing Home District, 2013; U.S. v. State of New York, 2013).  Similar to the other cases 
noted, the DOJ required substantial development of scattered-site housing.  Unlike the 
other cases noted, housing seems to be the only required change.  One theme that seems 
to be consistent across all of these settlement agreements is a one-size-fits-all model for 
community integration.  According to the DOJ, to best integrate into the community from 
a hospital or nursing home, one should preferably live alone in an apartment in a building 
with fewer than 10% of the units occupied by someone with a disability known to the 
state, work in supported employment, and receive mental health services through an ACT 
team.  Additionally, should one decline to move into such a setting and voice a 
preference for staying in an assisted living facility, even after being informed of the 
opportunity to engage in such services, community service providers are required to 
regularly check in and devise strategies to overcome one’s objections to community 
integration.  Integrate, the way they say, or be pursued until you do.  
It would be difficult to convincingly argue that the DOJ model does not limit 
choice; typically, only one style of housing is acceptable, along with set routes for 
community treatment and supportive services.  While consumers are ostensibly put at the 
center of planning for community integration, the DOJ has clearly defined what is 
appropriate and acceptable for them to choose, making their “person-centered planning” 
seem superficial.  This approach to community integration, while it wraps itself in 
evidence-based services that have been championed by the recovery movement (e.g., 
Becker, Drake, & Naughton, 2005), seems incongruent with the recovery principles of 
self-determination and empowerment due to its lack of choice (e.g., Rappaport, 1987).   
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Beyond these ideological concerns, DOJ states have shown an association with 
some problematic collateral outcomes.  While DOJ states did not slow on 
deinstitutionalization rates after Olmstead litigation as most states did, and DOJ states did 
increase spending on community mental health services more than other states post-
litigation, there were some concerning associations with suicide rates and employment 
rates.  While most states were decreasing their employment rates each year, there was 
also a significant immediate increase after litigation which DOJ states experienced only 
to a muted degree.  Additionally, while suicide rates on average among the ten states 
were increasing prior to litigation (.12 instances increase per year), and then doubled after 
litigation (.25 instances increase per year), DOJ states also had a significant immediate 
jump up the year after litigation that was over ten times the average annual increase prior 
to litigation (1.64 instances).  As noted in the discussion earlier, this sharp increase 
seemed to be driven primarily by New Hampshire, which did have fewer crisis services 
developed as a result of the DOJ settlement than many other DOJ states.   
 
Minnesota 
 Finally, Minnesota’s litigation began in 2011 but its settlement agreement was not 
accepted by the court until 2015.  Of all the Olmstead response types, Minnesota’s 
approach seems to be the most comprehensive.  It involved all the development of a DOJ 
settlement with none of the choice restriction, as well as the community treatment 
alternatives funding championed by the Ninth Circuit without an unwarranted emphasis 
on lowering the state psychiatric hospital numbers without a cap.   
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 Minnesota was the only Olmstead approach style to actually show an increase in 
the rate of people receiving mental health services in the community, although this trend 
was present prior to their litigation date.  Additionally, while Minnesota’s state 
psychiatric hospital had an immediate decrease in funding after litigation, it had its 
funding increased more than the other states each year, potentially signaling support for 
the state psychiatric hospitals as part of the treatment continuum.  Finally, Minnesota had 
a jump up in employment rates immediately after litigation that was significant when 
compared to the other states, and particularly noticeably in comparison to DOJ states.   
 Ultimately, the legacy of Olmstead is only as valuable as the enforcement of its 
integration mandate.  As the courthouse is proving the primary battleground for civil 
rights, including disability rights, how courts interpret and apply Olmstead intimately 
impacts its likelihood of creating the desired change.  Consideration of the observed, 
associated outcomes can only aid courts in their task of applying Olmstead to 
complicated fact patterns.   
 
Limitations 
 There are many limitations in the results and conclusions of this dissertation, 
perhaps the most pressing of which is the fact that these analyses are correlational in 
nature.  There exist too many potential confounds in a non-experimentally designed 
study, such as other state mental health policies, uncontrolled and/or unexpected events, 
and unknown moderators.  On a practical level, however, a truly experimental approach 
will almost certainly never be feasible on the required scale.  The results of the present 
study reinforced the credibility of the analytical approach applied here; while this 
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correlational data is insufficient to draw any firm conclusions, the associations between 
the response type and dependent variables open the possibility that these relationships of 
interest have been created.   
Observed years varied from analysis to analysis depending on availability of data; 
some states in some analyses only had one year prior to litigation, which is not ideal.  
Conversely, some states, particularly DOJ states, experienced Olmstead litigation quite 
recently and have not had the chance to show change over many years.  Additionally, this 
dissertation only looked at ten states, which is a fairly limited number of cases.  Many 
sources of data were inconsistent across states or across years, by failing to operationally 
define data in the same way or failing to collect it consistently.  Data collection was so 
poor in some respects that one model could not be estimated at all given the gross lack of 
data.   
 
Future Directions 
Future research has many directions to go from here, as this area of research is 
relatively new.  First, this line of research could be expanded to include more states.  It is 
likely there are more states that have developed Olmstead plans that would fit into one of 
these categories (or create their own) but did so outside of litigation and subsequently 
were not part of this review.  DOJ has intervened in multiple other state mental health 
systems and psychiatric hospitals, but not technically on Olmstead grounds (e.g., Civil 
Rights for Institutionalized Persons Act [CRIPA]); therefore, there may be states with 
essentially DOJ-Olmstead policies that were not included in this review.  Similarly, it is 
likely there are more relevant outcomes that could be addressed for each state.   
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While future directions in this line of research could benefit by zooming out, as in 
collecting data on additional states and additional outcomes, it could also benefit by 
zooming in, and looking at states individually, on a case level basis, to determine how 
policies, whether related to Olmstead or not, have influenced major outcomes.  
Eventually, it would be helpful to narrow down overall state approaches to major policy 
problems and individual active ingredients that could be generalized across multiple 
settings.   
 
CHAPTER 10: RECOMMENDATIONS 
The work of this dissertation has led to a number of recommendations which are 
based on empirical findings, ideological considerations, and legal analysis.  
 
1) States should develop a base number of state psychiatric hospital beds, as 
well as a base number of short-term psychiatric hospital beds, considering 
population and need, and fund their psychiatric hospitals appropriately 
given this base number.   
 
 Despite acknowledgements by several courts that even long-term inpatient 
psychiatric units have a legitimate place in the treatment continuum, state psychiatric 
hospitals continue to be the pariah of mental health treatment.  The Treatment Advocacy 
Center (2016) notes that compared to other similarly developed countries only New 
Zealand, Chile, Italy, Turkey, and Mexico provided fewer state psychiatric inpatient beds 
per capita than the United States.  While many researchers identify 40-60 beds per 
100,000 members of the general population as a foundational guide (Treatment Advocacy 
Center, 2016), each state should realistically identify its own need for short- and long-
  
 
189 
term hospitalization beds.   
 
2) States should consistently collect data and provide resources for its analysis 
to improve services.   
 
 Much of this dissertation’s idealized analyses have been limited by the 
availability of data.  Specifically, better counts of mental health service provision, both 
inpatient and outpatient, should be collected.  Inpatient services should have additional 
information available, such as the type of services provided (e.g., competency restoration 
versus risk reduction for not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), etc.), diagnosis, length 
of stay by reason committed, and length of wait for community placement after 
determination of discharge readiness.  All data should be made publicly available to 
encourage transparency and public policy research.  When providing data on civil and 
forensically involved clients, data points should include whether the individual is 
committed civilly for danger to self, danger to others, or grave disability, and whether the 
individual is forensically committed for competency evaluation, competency restoration, 
NGRI risk reduction, or sexually violent risk.   
 
3) States should ensure that their Olmstead plans preserve choice for 
consumers.   
 
 Providing consumers with meaningful, informed choice is required to be 
ideologically consistent with the recovery movement.  Choice should be available across 
services provided in the community - housing, medication management, employment 
opportunities, psychological services, and case management.  This requires a continuum 
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of services to be offered from which consumers can freely choose, rather than the 
designation of preferred recovery path to the exclusion of alternatives.   
 
4) States should ensure that community providers are providing quality 
services and are sufficiently funded to provide services for those leaving the 
state psychiatric hospital.   
 
 It is unrealistic and unfair to expect community providers to be able to 
accommodate an influx of individuals discharged from the state psychiatric hospitals 
without providing appropriate resources.  Furthermore, community providers who care 
for those discharged from the state psychiatric hospital should be evaluated regularly to 
ensure quality provision of services.  The quality assurance mechanisms in the DOJ 
settlement agreements provide a helpful starting framework for this type of quality 
evaluation.   
 
5) States should provide for coordination of services between the state 
psychiatric hospital and community providers.   
 
 
 The empirical results of Hypothesis 3 of this dissertation suggest that individuals 
being discharged from the state psychiatric hospital are not being absorbed into available 
community mental health services, outside of possibly Minnesota.  Coordination of 
services between the state psychiatric hospital and community providers can contribute to 
consumers receiving the services they need in the community.  Additionally, lack of 
coordination between the state psychiatric hospital and community mental health centers 
is commonly considered a major factor in the trends of transinstitutionalization observed 
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after deinstitutionalization; providing this coordination now would help states ensure 
their Olmstead plans do not unreflectively repeat the mistakes of deinstitutionalization.   
 
 
 
6) States should develop comprehensive crisis services available in the 
community.   
 
 New Hampshire’s data shows an alarming recent spike in suicide rates across 
several years.  While the present study does not establish a causal link between 
availability of crisis services in the community and suicide rates, such a relationship is 
not only possible, but logical.  Even in the absence of empirical support, there are 
ideological and ethical reasons to provide comprehensive crisis services for consumers 
experiencing psychiatric emergencies.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Olmstead was a landmark disability rights case, with nationwide implications.  
The Court held that if a person who has been institutionalized for developmental, mental, 
or physical disability wants to move into a less restrictive setting and is found to be 
appropriate for that level of care by a mental health professional, the state must have 
reasonable accommodations in place to allow that person to do so.  Failure to comply 
with these standards is a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and not 
justified solely by a lack of state resources.   
Not all circuits interpreted the Olmstead case similarly, creating nationally 
disjointed criteria for a “good” Olmstead plan.  For some states, the plans or policies put 
forward in response to Olmstead seem to be merely extensions of the 
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deinstitutionalization policy that gained traction nationally in the 1950s by requiring only 
long-term hospitalization bed reduction.  Other states took a more comprehensive 
approach, requiring considerable development of community resources.   
This dissertation began with legal research, which identified five Olmstead 
response types in the litigation subsequent to the original U.S. Supreme Court decision.  
These Olmstead response types are distinct sets of criteria for how states are to comply 
with the requirements of Olmstead, such as decreasing the state psychiatric hospital 
census, generally funding community resources, or developing particular types of 
services in the community.  This dissertation investigated the relationship between these 
Olmstead response types and fifteen dependent variables over twenty years, including 
parts of the state budget, employment rates, suicide rates, pursuit of disability benefits, 
incarceration rates, mental health treatment rates, and data collection.   
All states showed lower state psychiatric hospital census numbers, but only 
Minnesota showed an increase in community treatment rates.  The Ninth Circuit states 
had lower rates of people on disability benefits, while the Third Circuit had a significant 
increase in filings for disability benefits immediately after litigation.  Suicide rates were 
much lower in Florida but showed alarming increases in the DOJ state of New 
Hampshire.  Minnesota had greater increases in employment rates after litigation, and all 
states had slower incarceration rates after litigation.  States managed their budgets in 
different ways after litigation, but the most remarkable finding is that there was not an 
increase in funding for community mental health treatment after litigation outside of DOJ 
states.  DOJ states, the Third Circuit, and Florida had the highest rates of missing data 
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across all variables, (8.2-8.6%) while Minnesota had the lowest rate of missing data 
(5.2%).   
Overall, the results of the present study have important implications for how 
states apply Olmstead.  These findings can be used to guide policy makers as they 
attempt to craft mental health policy that honors the spirit of Olmstead while creating 
outcomes that meaningfully contribute to consumers’ quality of life.  The findings can 
also be used to apply Olmstead in ways that are ideologically consistent with the recovery 
movement.   
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Appendix of Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1.  Nationwide average daily census of the state psychiatric hospitals from 1903 to 
2003.  Citations for the seven anchored points on the chart are provided throughout the 
text of this section.   
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Figure 2.  Procedural history of the Olmstead case.  United States Supreme Court opinion 
addressed in this section is indicated in the procedural history by being bolded and 
underlined.   
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Figure 3.  State psychiatric hospitalization rates over time.   
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Figure 4.  Community Mental Health Treatment Budget per capita rates over time.  
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Figure 5.  Total state budget per capita rates over time.   
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Figure 6.  State psychiatric hospital budget per capita rates over time.  
  
  
 
212 
 
Figure 7.  Community Mental Health Treatment rates.   
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Figure 8.  Rates of people receiving disability benefits over time.   
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Figure 9.  Disability benefits filing rates over time.   
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Figure 10.  Disability benefits application approval rates over time.   
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Figure 11.  Suicide rate over time.   
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Figure 12. Percentage of employed consumers over time.   
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Figure 13.  State judicial budget per capita rates over time.   
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Figure 14. State police budget per capita rates over time.   
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Figure 15.  State correctional budget per capita rates over time.   
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Figure 16. Incarceration rate over time.   
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Table 1.  Side by side comparison of the language from the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, § 202 and from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504.  Corresponding 
passages marked by matching underlining, italicizing, or bolding for ease of comparison.   
“No otherwise qualified handicapped 
individual in the United States… shall, solely 
by reason of his handicap, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving federal 
financial assistance.” 
“No qualified individual with a disability shall, 
by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of 
the services, programs, or activities of a 
public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity.” 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 202 
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Table 2. Comparison of major terms of Department of Justice settlement agreements by 
state. 
DOJ 
Services by 
State 
Georgia  
(2010) 
Delaware 
(2011) 
North 
Carolina 
(2012) 
New Hampshire 
(2013) 
Target 
Population 
DD & SMI 
(~9000 SMI) 
-Forensic 
status 
-Chronically 
homeless 
-Currently in 
SPH  
-Frequent SPH 
or ER admits  
-To be released 
inmates 
SMI  
-Forensic 
status 
-Chronically 
homeless 
-Currently in 
SPH or 
private 
hospital 
-Frequent 
SPH or ER 
admits  
-Criminal 
justice 
involved 
SMI 
-Adult Care 
Homes 
-SPH 
-Homeless or 
unstable 
housing 
-Diverted 
from adult 
care home due 
to this 
settlement 
SMI 
-Adult care 
homes 
-SPH 
-Frequent SPH 
or ER admits 
-Criminal justice 
involvement due 
to mental health 
-Unable to get 
services in the 
community 
Crisis 
Services 
6 centers 
 
3 res programs 
 
35 hosp beds 
 
18 apartments 
 
Hotline 
 
Mobile Unit-1 
hr 
 
2 centers 
 
1 acute unit 
 
4 apartments 
 
Hotline 
 
Mobile Unit-1 
hr 
Centers 
 
Acute units 
 
Hotline 
 
Mobile Unit-1 
hr 
4 apartments 
 
Mobile Unit-1 hr 
Community 
Education 
None Police, 
Corrections, 
Hospitals on 
Crisis services 
 
Judges & 
Police on 
services for 
forensic pop 
Police, 
Corrections, 
Hospitals on 
Crisis services 
None 
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ACT 22 teams 
7-10 members 
10:1 clients 
Dartmouth 
11 teams 
7-10 members 
10:1 clients 
Dartmouth 
50 teams 
Dartmouth or 
TMACT 
50 teams 
10:1 (except 
psychiatrist) 
Case 
Manage-
ment 
8 teams, 3-4 
members, 
20/30:1 
 
14 intensive, 10 
members, 
20/30:1 
 
45 individual, 
1:50 
4 intensive, 10 
members 
25:1 
 
25 individual, 
1:35 
 
Community 
support teams 
and case 
management 
None 
Supported 
Housing 
Up to 9000 
50% scatter 
Bridge funding 
All needs met 
All scatter 
Bridge 
funding 
3000 slots,  
2750 scatter 
site 
600 slots,  
increase to 
prevent > 6 
month wait, all 
scatter site, 
which is only 2 
or 10% 
  
medically 
complex housing 
available, 16 
each 
Supported 
Employ-
ment 
550 
EBP model 
1100 SE 
1100 rehab   
2500 
EBP 
1000 
Dartmouth 
Family and 
Peer 
Supports 
Peer - all in 
ACT & CSTs + 
835 
1000 Peer and 
Psychosocial 
Rehab 
Family - yes 
Peer - 3 centers 
open 44 hrs/wk 
Transition 
Planning 
Each SPH gets a 
case manager 
and transition 
specialist 
Every 
hospitalized 
person meets 
with a team 
with 5 days, 
then every 30 
days, escalate 
case if not 
discharged, 
Starts 
immediately, 
done within 
90 days 
(escalated if 
not), disability 
cannot be a 
barrier to 
discharge, 
Starts 
immediately, 
diverse team, list 
barriers and steps 
to overcome; 
post-transition 
visits by 
community 
providers to 
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team includes 
a community 
provider 
psychiatric 
advance 
directives, and 
crisis plans 
check adjustment 
Improper 
admissions 
From SPH to 
ASL or SNF, 
unless 
medically 
required or 
“they were 
informed when 
they chose to do 
so” 
None People with 
SPMI to adult 
care homes; if 
they insist, 
must 
document 
efforts made 
and continue 
in-reach  
People with 
SPMI to adult 
care homes; if 
they insist, must 
document efforts 
made and 
continue in-reach 
Client/ 
Guardian 
Counseling 
None None Provide visits 
to community 
providers, 
consults with 
current 
community 
clients, and 
monitor 
anyone who 
declines 
Provide visits to 
community 
providers, 
consults with 
current 
community 
clients, and 
annually 
recontact anyone 
who declines 
Quality 
Assurance 
Annual review: 
In person 
interviews 
Records review 
Outcome data 
Network 
analysis - cost 
and availability 
Community 
provider 
contracts are 
performance 
based; 
reviewed 
every other 
year; collect 
outcome 
variables; 
public annual 
report  
Sufficient 
providers; 
QofL surveys; 
outcome 
variables for 
overall goals; 
public annual 
report 
Sufficient 
providers, each 
reviewed every 
two years; 
performance-
based contracts; 
assess common 
transition 
barriers & gaps 
in services  
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Table 3. Summary of case information.  
Case Name State Year Model Outcome 
US v. Georgia Georgia 2010 DOJ Settlement Agreement 
US v. Delaware Delaware 2011 DOJ Settlement Agreement 
US v. North 
Carolina 
North Carolina 2012 DOJ Settlement Agreement 
US v. New 
Hampshire 
New 
Hampshire 
2013 DOJ Settlement Agreement 
Frederick L. v. 
Dept. of Public 
Welfare 
Pennsylvania 2001 Third 
Circuit 
Trial court ruling in 
favor of the state 
vacated and remanded 
by appellate court 
Sanchez v. 
Johnson 
California 2005 Ninth 
Circuit 
Trial court ruling in 
favor of the state 
affirmed by appellate 
court 
Arc of 
Washington 
State, Inc. v. 
Braddock 
Washington 2005 Ninth 
Circuit 
Trial court ruling in 
favor of the state 
affirmed by appellate 
court 
Williams v. 
Wasserman 
Maryland 2001 Ninth 
Circuit 
Trial court ruling in 
favor of the state 
Jensen v. 
Minnesota Dept. 
of Human 
Services 
Minnesota 2011 
(finalized 
in 2015) 
Minnesota Settlement Agreement 
Johnson v. 
Murphy 
Florida 2001 Florida Trial court ruling in 
favor of the state 
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Table 4. Summary of Olmstead Response Types 
Olmstead 
Response Type 
States Description 
Third Pennsylvania ● Written  
● Set dates by which an approximate 
number of people will be discharged 
from state hospitals 
● Explicit discharge criteria 
● “a general description of the 
collaboration required between the local 
authorities and the housing, 
transportation, care, and education 
agencies to effectuate integration into the 
community” 
Ninth California, 
Washington, 
Maryland 
● Increases in funding for community 
services, including waiver programs, 
despite budget constraints 
● Regular, personalized evaluations for 
readiness to transition and community 
services needed 
● A general deinstitutionalization trend 
DOJ New Hampshire, 
North Carolina, 
Delaware, 
Georgia 
● Intensive community service 
development, included crisis services, 
ACT teams, and other supportive services 
● Process development for transition 
planning 
● Quality assurance systems 
Minnesota Minnesota ● Intensive community service 
development, including affordable 
housing, supported employment, and 
mental health services 
● Consumer choice among services 
● Trend of deinstitutionalization 
● Consumer input in development 
Florida Florida ● Discharge planning started at admission 
● Coordination with community providers 
for discharge 
● Typically no waiting list, most 
discharged 30-60 days from eligibility 
determination - delay was for 
coordination of services 
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Table 5. Dependent Variables, Covariates, and Data Sources.  
Dependent 
Variable 
Model Data Source Available at 
Rate of people 
served in the state 
psychiatric hospital  
 
1 
NRI/SAMHSA 
data, 2001-2017 
http://www.nri-incdata.org/ & 
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/ 
Per capita 
expenditures for 
community mental 
health services  
 
2A 
NRI/SAMHSA 
data,  
1990, 1997, 2001-
2007, 2009-2016 
http://www.nri-incdata.org/ & 
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/ 
Per capita 
expenditures of the 
state psychiatric 
hospital 
 
2B 
NRI/SAMHSA 
data, 1990, 1997, 
2001-2007, 2009-
2016 
http://www.nri-incdata.org/ & 
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/ 
Rate of people 
served by 
community mental 
health providers  
 
3 
NRI/SAMHSA 
data, 2001-2017 
http://www.nri-incdata.org/ & 
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/ 
Percent of general 
population receiving 
disability benefits  
 
4Ai 
SSA Disability 
Claim Data, 2001-
2015 
https://catalog.data.gov/datase
t/ssa-disability-claim-data 
Filing rate for 
disability benefits 
 
4Aii 
SSA Disability 
Claim Data, 2001-
2015 
https://catalog.data.gov/datase
t/ssa-disability-claim-data 
Approval rate for 
disability benefits  
 
4Aiii 
SSA Disability 
Claim Data, 2001-
2015 
https://catalog.data.gov/datase
t/ssa-disability-claim-data 
Annual suicide rate 4B CDC’s National 
Vital Statistics 
System, 1999-2016 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvs
s/index.htm 
Readmission to any 
psychiatric hospital  
4C SAMHSA’s 
Uniform Reporting 
System, 2007-2017 
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/ 
Employed 
percentage of 
SMHA consumers  
4D SAMHSA’s 
Uniform Reporting 
System, 2007-2017 
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/ 
Per capita  BJS Justice https://www.bjs.gov/index.cf
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expenditures on 
judicial system  
4Ei Expenditure and 
Employment 
publication series, 
1996-2015 
m?ty=dcdetail&iid=286 
Per capita 
expenditures on law 
enforcement  
 
4Eii 
BJS Justice 
Expenditure and 
Employment 
publication series, 
1996-2015 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cf
m?ty=dcdetail&iid=286 
Per capita 
expenditures on 
corrections  
 
4Eiii 
BJS Justice 
Expenditure and 
Employment 
publication series, 
1996-2015 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cf
m?ty=dcdetail&iid=286 
Rate of people 
incarcerated  
4F BJS National 
Prisoner Statistics 
Program, 1996-
2016 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cf
m?ty=dcdetail&iid=269 
Per capita 
expenditures on total 
state budget 
2A, 
2B,  
4Ei-
4Eiii 
BJS Justice 
Expenditure and 
Employment 
publication series, 
1996-2015 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cf
m?ty=dcdetail&iid=286 
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Table 6.  Descriptive statistics for covariates and dependent variables in Hypotheses 1-4.   
Model N Mean S.D. Range Skew Kurtosis 
1 - SPH rate 153 .525 .404 .12-1.92 1.687 2.122 
2A - Com Tx 
spending 
164 82.47 58.103 11.19-281.43 1.199 1.525 
2B - SPH 
spending 
164 33.248 11.314 13.29-60.71 .326 -.594 
3 - Com Tx rate 144 14.859 7.313 .88-33.02 .767 -.445 
4Ai - disability 
benefits 
150 5.41 .986 3.61-7.67 .32 -.657 
4Aii - disability 
filing rates 
150 1.191 .228 .72-1.71 .343 -.607 
4Aiii - 
disability 
approval rates 
150 36.554 8.73 23.84-66.22 1.032 .723 
4B - suicide 180 12.031 2.076 8.2-18.6 .36 -.155 
4C - 
readmission 
55 9.92 6.392 0-40 2.404 8.946 
4D - 
employment 
107 18.48 8.489 4-39 .99 .256 
4Ei - judicial 
spending 
180 115.963 44.805 50.08-252.45 1.176 1.028 
4Eii - LEO 
spending 
180 253.95 78.074 125.8-427.7 .432 -.759 
4Eiii - 
correctional 
spending 
180 210.278 67.879 73.34-391.62 .399 -.229 
4F - 
incarceration 
rate 
210 4.048 1.775 1.11-9.01 .699 .282 
Covariate - total 
state budget 
129 8718.72 1872.86 4658-13123 -.038 -.666 
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Table 7. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in hospitalization rates over time.  
Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - intercept -0.017 -0.082 .937 
Ninth circuit - slope .029 1.000 .346 
DOJ - intercept .074 .311 .764 
DOJ - slope -.057 -2.114 .067 
Florida - intercept .001 .003 .998 
Florida - slope .039 .864 .413 
Third Circuit - intercept -.153 -.482 .643 
Third Circuit - slope .022 .48 .644 
Minnesota - intercept -.007 -.021 .984 
Minnesota - slope .022 0.473 .649 
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Table 8. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on hospitalization rates 
growth rate.  Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit .012 .606 .561 
DOJ  -.105 -7.623 <.001 
Florida  .03 1.139 .288 
Third Circuit  -0.005 -.17 .87 
Minnesota  .042 1.135 .289 
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Table 9.  Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 1.   
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  Standard 
error 
 t-ratio  Approx. 
d.f. 
 p-value 
For INTRCPT1, π0 
    INTRCPT2, β00 0.257162 0.069993 3.674 9 0.005 
For TIME slope, π1 
    INTRCPT2, β10 -0.068159 0.022888 -2.978 9 0.016 
For POSTLIT slope, π2 
    INTRCPT2, β20 0.057059 0.026857 2.125 8 0.066 
   DOJ, β21 -0.058886 0.017404 -3.383 8 0.010 
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Table 10.  Correlations for dependent variables in models 2A & 2B.  All correlations are 
significant (p < .001).  
Models 2A & 2B Community Tx PC SPH PC Total State PC 
Community Tx PC *** *** *** 
SPH PC .764 *** *** 
Total State PC -.286 -.485 *** 
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Table 11. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the state per capita spending on 
community mental health over time.  Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - intercept 6.439 .131 .899 
Ninth circuit - slope .256 .127 .902 
DOJ - intercept -60.784 -1.455 .184 
DOJ - slope -2.746 -1.649 .138 
Florida - intercept -97.431 -1.42 .193 
Florida - slope -3.803 -1.338 .218 
Third Circuit - intercept 188.567 4.255 .003 
Third Circuit - slope 7.353 3.797 .005 
Minnesota - intercept 54.576 .755 .472 
Minnesota - slope 3.119 1.081 .311 
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Table 12. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth rate of a 
state’s per capita spending on community mental health.  Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - jump .406 .022 .983 
Ninth circuit - slope -0.536 -0.541 .59 
DOJ - jump -37.834 -2.284 .052 
DOJ - slope 4.035 2.172 .032 
Florida - jump -15.821 -.517 .619 
Florida - slope -.601 -.485 .629 
Third Circuit - jump 53.651 1.982 .083 
Third Circuit - slope -1.425 -1.164 .247 
Minnesota - jump 16.148 .57 .584 
Minnesota - slope 3.046 .798 .427 
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Table 13.  Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 2A.   
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  Standard 
error 
 t-ratio  Approx. 
d.f. 
 p-value 
For INTRCPT1, π0 
    INTRCPT2, β00 37.007326 42.427750 0.872 9 0.406 
For TIME slope, π1 
    INTRCPT2, β10 1.522745 1.530932 0.995 9 0.346 
For POSTLITS slope, π2 
    INTRCPT2, β20 0.514873 0.827686 0.622 96 0.535 
   DOJ, β21 4.040242 1.944383 2.078 96 0.040 
For JUMP slope, π3 
    INTRCPT2, β30 11.197716 11.825354 0.947 8 0.371 
   DOJ, β31 -38.779687 17.940041 -2.162 8 0.063 
For TOTSTPC slope, π4 
    INTRCPT2, β40 0.008239 0.003277 2.514 96 0.014 
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Table 14. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the state per capita spending on 
the state psychiatric hospital over time.  Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - intercept 4.757 .549 .598 
Ninth circuit - slope .684 1.474 .179 
DOJ - intercept 10.105 1.349 .214 
DOJ - slope .101 .213 .836 
Florida - intercept -18.026 -1.504 .171 
Florida - slope -.147 -.188 .856 
Third Circuit - intercept -8.348 -.649 .534 
Third Circuit - slope -1.017 -1.443 .187 
Minnesota - intercept -10.507 -.827 .432 
Minnesota - slope -.668 -.897 .396 
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Table 15. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the state’s per capita 
spending on the state psychiatric hospital.  Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - jump 7.861 3.595 .007 
Ninth circuit - slope .339 .825 .411 
DOJ - jump -1.976 -0.726 .488 
DOJ - slope -0.346 -0.436 .664 
Florida - jump -3.109 -.544 .601 
Florida - slope .635 1.042 .30 
Third Circuit - jump -2.736 -.484 .641 
Third Circuit - slope -.849 -1.506 .135 
Minnesota - jump -8.833 -2.665 .029 
Minnesota - slope 2.881 2.057 .042 
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Table 16.  Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 2B.   
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  Standard 
error 
 t-ratio  Approx. 
d.f. 
 p-value 
For INTRCPT1, π0 
    INTRCPT2, β00 37.245040 10.633127 3.503 9 0.007 
For TIME slope, π1 
    INTRCPT2, β10 0.305497 0.398239 0.767 9 0.463 
For POSTLITS slope, π2 
    INTRCPT2, β20 -0.191288 0.306857 -0.623 96 0.535 
   MINN, β21 2.770001 1.413458 1.960 96 0.053 
For JUMP slope, π3 
    INTRCPT2, β30 -2.334069 1.901595 -1.227 7 0.259 
   NINTH, β31 6.301491 2.173770 2.899 7 0.023 
   MINN, β32 -7.947018 3.239407 -2.453 7 0.044 
For TOTSTPC slope, π4 
    INTRCPT2, β40 -0.000142 0.000854 -0.167 96 0.868 
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Table 17. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in community treatment rates 
over time.  Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - intercept -4.324 -0.654 .532 
Ninth circuit - slope -0.134 -0.299 .773 
DOJ - intercept -5.024 -0.822 .435 
DOJ - slope -0.517 -1.324 .222 
Florida - intercept -9.019 -0.91 .389 
Florida - slope -0.356 -0.523 .615 
Third Circuit - intercept 14.414 1.559 0.158 
Third Circuit - slope .71 1.091 .307 
Minnesota - intercept 17.986 2.092 .07 
Minnesota - slope 1.311 2.399 .043 
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Table 18. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on a state’s community 
treatment growth rate.  Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - slope .148 .725 .489 
Ninth circuit - jump -1.897 -1.00 .319 
DOJ - slope -.538 -1.628 .142 
DOJ - jump .112 .065 .948 
Florida - slope -.031 -.116 .91 
Florida - jump 2.151 .684 .496 
Third Circuit - slope .26 .84 .425 
Third Circuit - jump 1.173 .388 .699 
Minnesota - slope .74 1.549 .16 
Minnesota - jump 4.597 1.634 .105 
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Table 19. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 3.   
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  Standard 
error 
 t-ratio  Approx. 
d.f. 
 p-value 
For INTRCPT1, π0 
    INTRCPT2, β00 19.848541 3.057508 6.492 9 <0.001 
For TIME slope, π1 
    INTRCPT2, β10 -0.108047 0.410245 -0.263 8 0.799 
   MINN, β11 2.639673 1.115875 2.366 8 0.046 
For POSTLIT slope, π2 
    INTRCPT2, β20 0.452460 0.564740 0.801 8 0.446 
   MINN, β21 -2.045298 1.735373 -1.179 8 0.272 
For JUMP slope, π3 
    INTRCPT2, β30 -2.130260 0.904915 -2.354 113 0.020 
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Table 20.  Correlations for dependent variables in models 4Ai-4Aiii.  All correlations are 
significant (p < .001).  
Models 4Ai-4Aiii % receiving benefits Filing Rate Approval Rate 
% receiving benefits *** *** *** 
Filing Rate .764 *** *** 
Approval Rate -.286 -.485 *** 
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Table 21. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the percent of people receiving 
disability benefits over time.  Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - intercept -1.386 -2.866 .021 
Ninth circuit - slope -.044 -1.644 .139 
DOJ - intercept 0.975 1.85 .102 
DOJ - slope .036 1.402 .199 
Florida - intercept .072 .072 .944 
Florida - slope -0.024 -.53 .61 
Third Circuit - intercept 1.71 2.04 .076 
Third Circuit - slope .04 .907 .391 
Minnesota - intercept -1.147 -1.235 .252 
Minnesota - slope -.01 -.214 .836 
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Table 22. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on a state’s disability 
benefits growth rate.  Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - jump -.278 -2.925 .019 
Ninth circuit - slope .048 2.098 .069 
DOJ - jump .261 2.786 .024 
DOJ - slope -.065 -2.208 .058 
Florida - jump -.221 -1.03 .333 
Florida - slope -.003 -.073 .943 
Third Circuit - jump .161 .718 .493 
Third Circuit - slope .043 1.265 .242 
Minnesota - jump .25 1.394 .201 
Minnesota - slope -.031 -.607 .561 
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Table 23. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Ai. 
Fixed Effect 
 Coefficient  Standard 
error 
 t-ratio  Approx. 
d.f. 
 p-value 
For INTRCPT1, π0 
    INTRCPT2, β00 6.239522 0.313652 19.893 9 <0.001 
For TIME slope, π1 
    INTRCPT2, β10 0.149022 0.019770 7.538 9 <0.001 
For POSTLITS slope, π2 
    INTRCPT2, β20 -0.046256 0.021325 -2.169 9 0.058 
For JUMP slope, π3 
    INTRCPT2, β30 0.145100 0.083494 1.738 8 0.120 
   NINTH, β31 -0.342450 0.091994 -3.723 8 0.006 
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Table 24. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the filing rate for disability 
benefits over time.  Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - intercept -0.269 -2.028 .077 
Ninth circuit - slope -.013 -1.553 .159 
DOJ - intercept 0.078 .533 .609 
DOJ - slope .0001 .007 .995 
Florida - intercept .293 1.314 .225 
Florida - slope .014 1.065 .318 
Third Circuit - intercept .0384 1.841 .103 
Third Circuit - slope .013 1.002 .346 
Minnesota - intercept -.254 -1.119 .296 
Minnesota - slope .002 .155 .881 
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Table 25. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on a state’s disability 
benefits filing growth rate.  Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - jump .032 .505 .614 
Ninth circuit - slope .005 .606 .546 
DOJ - jump -.038 -.549 .584 
DOJ - slope -.027 -1.522 .13 
Florida - jump .081 .743 .459 
Florida - slope .009 .872 .385 
Third Circuit - jump .249 2.376 .019 
Third Circuit - slope .006 .579 .564 
Minnesota - jump -.049 -.413 .68 
Minnesota - slope -.003 -.088 .93 
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Table 26. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Aii.   
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  Standard 
error 
 t-ratio  Approx. 
d.f. 
 p-value 
For INTRCPT1, π0 
    INTRCPT2, β00 1.344303 0.074119 18.137 9 <0.001 
For TIME slope, π1 
    INTRCPT2, β10 0.027969 0.006120 4.570 9 0.001 
For POSTLITS slope, π2 
    INTRCPT2, β20 -0.013963 0.007700 -1.813 127 0.072 
For JUMP slope, π3 
    INTRCPT2, β30 -0.088821 0.032780 -2.710 127 0.008 
   THIRD, β31 0.235764 0.107187 2.200 127 0.030 
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Table 27.  Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the percent of people being 
approved for disability benefits over time.  Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - intercept 0.836 .214 .836 
Ninth circuit - slope .256 .832 .43 
DOJ - intercept 2.21 0.615 .556 
DOJ - slope -.055 -.185 .858 
Florida - intercept -3.698 -.631 .546 
Florida - slope .267 .555 .594 
Third Circuit - intercept -3.51 -.598 .567 
Third Circuit - slope -.47 -1.012 .341 
Minnesota - intercept -.635 -.106 .918 
Minnesota - slope -.248 -.517 .619 
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Table 28. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth rate of 
people being approved for disability benefits.  Significant results bolded.  
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - jump -.392 -.209 .84 
Ninth circuit - slope .026 .10 .921 
DOJ - jump .842 .47 .651 
DOJ - slope .088 .182 .856 
Florida - jump -1.53 -.532 .609 
Florida - slope -.023 -.068 .946 
Third Circuit - jump -5.338 -2.118 .067 
Third Circuit - slope -0.492 -1.634 .105 
Minnesota - jump 3.092 1.031 .333 
Minnesota - slope .707 .91 .365 
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Table 29. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Aiii: 
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  Standard 
error 
 t-ratio  Approx. 
d.f. 
 p-value 
For INTRCPT1, π0 
    INTRCPT2, β00 32.115060 2.003999 16.025 9 <0.001 
For TIME slope, π1 
    INTRCPT2, β10 -1.025067 0.152514 -6.721 9 <0.001 
For POSTLITS slope, π2 
    INTRCPT2, β20 0.422552 0.165851 2.548 119 0.012 
For JUMP slope, π3 
    INTRCPT2, β30 -0.735949 0.942719 -0.781 9 0.455 
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Table 30. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the state suicide rate over 
time.  Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - intercept -1.94 -1.551 .16 
Ninth circuit - slope -.061 -.988 .352 
DOJ - intercept .591 .458 .659 
DOJ - slope .016 .263 .8 
Florida - intercept 2.182 1.083 .31 
Florida - slope -.06 -.626 .549 
Third Circuit - intercept 1.111 .529 .611 
Third Circuit - slope .088 .93 .38 
Minnesota - intercept -.341 -.16 .877 
Minnesota - slope .072 .756 .471 
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Table 31. Effect of Olmstead response type on differences in the degree to which 
litigation impacted a state’s suicide rate.  Significant results bolded.  
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - slope .037 .585 .559 
Ninth circuit - jump -.891 -1.435 .189 
DOJ - slope -.011 -.104 .917 
DOJ - jump 1.726 3.725 .006 
Florida - slope -.214 -3.207 .002 
Florida - jump -.844 -.853 .418 
Third circuit - slope .042 .495 .622 
Third circuit - jump -1.129 -1.172 .275 
Minnesota - slope .011 .058 .954 
Minnesota - jump -1.965 -2.339 .047 
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Table 32.  Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4B. 
Fixed Effect Coefficient Standard 
error 
t-ratio Approx. 
d.f. 
p-value 
For INTRCPT1, π0 
   INTRCPT2, β00 13.777789 0.726402 18.967 9 <0.001 
For TIME slope, π1 
   INTRCPT2, β10 0.125918 0.042367 2.972 9 0.016 
For POSTLIT slope, π2 
   INTRCPT2, β20 0.130907 0.045736 2.862 148 0.005 
 FLORIDA, β21 -0.187113 0.053042 -3.528 148 <0.001 
For JUMP slope, π3 
   INTRCPT2, β30 -0.340885 0.348181 -0.979 7 0.360 
 DOJ, β31 1.639002 0.552609 2.966 7 0.021 
 MINN, β32 -0.667877 0.808642 -0.826 7 0.436 
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Table 33. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the state employment rate over 
time.  Significant results bolded.  
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - intercept -5.396 -.97 .36 
Ninth circuit - slope .312 .603 .563 
DOJ - intercept .01 .002 .999 
DOJ - slope -1.168 -3.535 .008 
Florida - intercept -1.139 -.128 .901 
Florida - slope -.065 -.081 .937 
Third Circuit - intercept -2.195 -.242 .815 
Third Circuit - slope .753 .933 .378 
Minnesota - intercept 16.454 2.271 .053 
Minnesota - slope 1.72 3.004 .017 
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Table 34. Effect of Olmstead response type on differences in the degree to which 
litigation impacted a state’s employment rate.  Significant results bolded.  
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - slope -8.264 -1.188 .239 
Ninth circuit - jump -.488 -.546 .6 
DOJ - slope -0.02 -.008 .994 
DOJ - jump -1.165 -3.324 .01 
Florida - slope -3.312 -.294 .77 
Florida - jump -.753 -.569 .585 
Third circuit - slope -4.649 -.411 .683 
Third circuit - jump .12 .088 .932 
Minnesota - slope .189 .051 .959 
Minnesota - jump 1.999 3.732 .006 
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Table 35. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4D.   
Fixed Effect Coefficient Standard 
error 
t-ratio Approx. 
d.f. 
p-value 
For INTRCPT1, π0 
   INTRCPT2, β00 18.629480 4.055918 4.593 9 0.001 
For TIME slope, π1 
   INTRCPT2, β10 -1.395262 0.602288 -2.317 9 0.046 
For JUMP slope, π2 
   INTRCPT2, β20 2.151445 0.661954 3.250 7 0.014 
 DOJ, β21 -0.902142 0.428759 -2.104 7 0.073 
 MINN, β22 1.739253 0.510765 3.405 7 0.011 
For POSTLIT slope, π3 
   INTRCPT2, β30 1.946639 1.853417 1.050 76 0.297 
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Table 36.  Correlations for covariates and dependent variables in models 4Ei-4Eiii.  All 
correlations are significant (p < .001).  
Models 4Ei-
4Eiii 
Total State 
Budget 
Police 
Budget 
Judicial 
Budget 
Corrections 
Budget 
Total State 
Budget 
*** *** *** *** 
Police Budget .767 *** *** *** 
Judicial Budget .752 .749 *** *** 
Corrections 
Budget 
.695 .717 .808 *** 
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Table 37. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the judicial budget over time.  
Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - intercept 36.57 1.31 .227 
Ninth circuit - slope -.14 -.188 .856 
DOJ - intercept -21.19 -.772 .463 
DOJ - slope .421 .612 .558 
Florida - intercept -16.677 -.363 .726 
Florida - slope -.685 -.606 .561 
Third Circuit - intercept -.104 -.002 .998 
Third Circuit - slope .442 .389 .707 
Minnesota - intercept -12.33 -.268 .796 
Minnesota - slope -.583 -.519 .618 
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Table 38. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth rate of a 
state’s spending trajectory for the judiciary.  Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - jump 4.528 .5 .63 
Ninth circuit - slope -.716 -.502 .629 
DOJ - jump 6.992 .861 .414 
DOJ - slope .361 .188 .856 
Florida - jump 13.445 .988 .352 
Florida - slope -3.31 -1.909 .093 
Third Circuit - jump -4.003 -.272 .792 
Third Circuit - slope 1.787 .87 .409 
Minnesota - jump -26.156 -1.964 .085 
Minnesota - slope .772 .236 .819 
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Table 39. Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Ei. 
Fixed Effect  
Coefficient 
 
Standard 
error 
 
t-ratio 
 
Approx. 
d.f. 
 
p-value 
For INTRCPT1, π0 
           INTRCPT2, β00 115.375776 10.281684 11.221 9 <0.001 
For TIME slope, π1 
INTRCPT2, β10 1.361884 0.764618 1.781 9 0.109 
For POSTLITS slope, π2 
INTRCPT2, β20 -1.433964 1.447019 -0.991 9 0.348 
For JUMP slope, π3 
INTRCPT2, β30 4.394083 4.924145 0.892 9 0.395 
For TOTSTPC slope, π4 
INTRCPT2, β40 0.008873 0.001344 6.602 139 <0.001 
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Table 40. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the police budget over time.   
Significant results bolded.  
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - intercept 31.144 .765 .466 
Ninth circuit - slope -.79 -.536 .607 
DOJ - intercept -37.83 -1.014 .34 
DOJ - slope .389 .281 .786 
Florida - intercept 94.447 1.672 .133 
Florida - slope 2.815 1.345 .216 
Third Circuit - intercept -76.93 -1.301 .229 
Third Circuit - slope -3.604 -1.84 .103 
Minnesota - intercept 10.51 .165 .873 
Minnesota - slope 1.574 0.713 .496 
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Table 41. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth rate of a 
state’s spending trajectory for the police.  Significant results bolded.  
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - slope -.784 -.683 .496 
Ninth circuit - jump 2.562 .175 .866 
DOJ - slope 2.916 1.251 .213 
DOJ - jump 9.532 .671 .521 
Florida - slope .06 .041 .967 
Florida - jump -3.734 -.165 .873 
Third circuit - slope .076 .052 .958 
Third circuit - jump -35.57 -1.821 .106 
Minnesota - slope 3.969 .963 .337 
Minnesota - jump -26.858 -1.094 .306 
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Table 42.  Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Eii.   
Fixed Effect Coefficient Standard 
error 
t-ratio Approx. 
d.f. 
p-value 
For INTRCPT1, π0 
   INTRCPT2, β00 107.361425 31.371188 3.422 9 0.008 
For TIME slope, π1 
   INTRCPT2, β10 3.628343 1.100376 3.297 9 0.009 
For POSTLITS slope, π2 
   INTRCPT2, β20 -1.120258 0.769212 -1.456 148 0.147 
For JUMP slope, π3 
   INTRCPT2, β30 3.954319 7.641481 0.517 9 0.617 
For TOTSTPC slope, π4 
   INTRCPT2, β40 0.021448 0.002431 8.821 148 <0.001 
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Table 43. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the per capita rate of 
correctional spending over time.  Significant results bolded.  
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - intercept 78.963 2.218 .057 
Ninth circuit - slope 1.826 2.001 .08 
DOJ - intercept -34.075 -.872 .408 
DOJ - slope -.29 -.294 .776 
Florida - intercept -18.994 -0.286 .782 
Florida - slope -2.322 -1.57 .155 
Third Circuit - intercept 14.429 .218 .833 
Third Circuit - slope .479 .3 .772 
Minnesota - intercept -88.845 -1.484 .176 
Minnesota - slope -1.649 -1.093 .306 
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Table 44. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth rate of a 
state’s correctional spending trajectory.  Significant results bolded.  
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - slope -.44 -.458 .647 
Ninth circuit - jump 42.311 4.548 .002 
DOJ - slope -1.676 -.625 .533 
DOJ - jump -25.529 -2.073 .072 
Florida - slope -1.258 -1.207 .229 
Florida - jump -17.593 -.747 .476 
Third circuit - slope 2.218 2.072 .04 
Third Circuit - jump 1.395 .05 .956 
Minnesota - slope 6.79 1.463 .146 
Minnesota - jump -17.697 -.88 .405 
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Table 45.  Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4Eiii 
Fixed Effect Coefficien
t 
Standard 
error 
t-ratio Approx. 
d.f. 
p-value 
For INTRCPT1, π0 
   INTRCPT2, β00 5.898549 33.394996 0.177 9 0.864 
For TIME slope, π1 
   INTRCPT2, β10 -0.195836 1.008736 -0.194 9 0.850 
For POSTLITS slope, π2 
   INTRCPT2, β20 -3.626070 0.699438 -5.184 147 <0.001 
  THIRD, β21 1.963789 1.070871 1.834 147 0.069 
For JUMP slope, π3 
   INTRCPT2, β30 -4.693997 5.042134 -0.931 8 0.379 
  NINTH, β31 42.392700 9.538792 4.444 8 0.002 
For TOTSTPC slope, π4 
   INTRCPT2, β40 0.022106 0.002730 8.097 147 <0.001 
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Table 46. Effect of Olmstead response type on changes in the incarceration rate over 
time.  Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - 
intercept 
-1.13 -1.09 .308 
Ninth circuit - slope -.06 -2.33 .048 
DOJ - intercept 1.166 1.218 .258 
DOJ - slope -0.014 -0.476 .647 
Florida - intercept 1.554 .97 .36 
Florida - slope .054 1.195 .266 
Third Circuit - 
intercept 
.156 .093 .928 
Third Circuit - slope .072 1.691 .129 
Minnesota - intercept -2.182 -1.429 .191 
Minnesota - slope .05 1.083 .311 
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Table 47. Effect of Olmstead response type on litigation impact on the growth of a state’s 
incarceration rate.  Significant results bolded.   
Degrees of Freedom = 8 Coefficient t p 
Ninth circuit - slope -.033 -1.06 .32 
DOJ - slope -.062 -1.563 .157 
Florida - slope .117 1.807 .108 
Third Circuit - slope .119 1.854 .101 
Minnesota - slope -.014 -.213 .837 
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Table 48.  Final estimation of fixed effects for Model 4F.   
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  Standard 
error 
 t-ratio  Approx. 
d.f. 
 p-value 
For INTRCPT1, π0 
    INTRCPT2, β00 3.832945 0.502542 7.627 9 <0.001 
For TIME slope, π1 
    INTRCPT2, β10 0.040431 0.012355 3.273 9 0.010 
For POSTLIT slope, π2 
    INTRCPT2, β20 -0.108038 0.023800 -4.539 9 0.001 
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Table 49. Summary of Results for Hypotheses 1-4.   
 
 
Model 
Number. 
Dependent 
Variable 
(Years) 
Growth Curve Model Piecewise Growth Curve Model 
 
Trend for 
all states on 
average 
over all 
observed 
years  
Trends 
over all 
observed 
years for 
specific 
Olmstead 
response 
types 
 
Pre- 
litigation 
trends  
 
Post- 
litigation 
trends for 
all states on 
average  
Post- 
litigation 
trends for 
specific 
Olmstead 
response 
types 
1. Number 
of people 
served in the 
state 
psychiatric 
hospital in 
the past year 
per 1000 
members of 
the state 
general 
population 
(2001-2017) 
 
Each year, 
there was a 
decrease of 
.032 
instances 
per 1000 
people, with 
the average 
in 2017 
being .276 
No 
significant 
differences, 
although 
DOJ 
approached 
a 
significantly 
faster 
deinstitution
- alization 
rate (𝛽 = -
.057, p = 
.067) 
 
 
Each year, 
there was a 
decrease of 
.054 
instances 
per 1000 
people on 
average 
across states  
After 
litigation, 
this pace 
slowed 
significantly; 
there was an 
annual 
decrease of 
.022 
instances per 
1000 people; 
no jump 
 
Non-DOJ 
states: 
decrease of 
.068 
instances 
per year 
and slowed, 
almost 
significantl
y,  after 
litigation 
 
DOJ states: 
did not 
slow after 
litigation 
2A. Per 
capita 
expenditures 
for 
community 
mental 
health 
services 
(1990, 1997, 
2001-2007, 
2009-2016) 
Each year, 
states 
increased 
spending by 
$3.93, for an 
average in 
2016 of 
$119.78; 
when the 
total state 
budget is 
controlled 
for, time 
was not a 
significant 
predictor 
Each year, 
the Third 
Circuit 
increased its 
spending by 
$7.35 more 
than the 
other states  
After 
controlling 
for the total 
budget, 
there was no 
change over 
time prior to 
litigation 
 
No 
significant 
changes on 
average post-
litigation  
DOJ 
increased 
its 
spending 
$4.04 more 
than other 
states post-
litigation  
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2B. Per 
capita 
expenditures 
of the state 
psychiatric 
hospital 
(1990, 1997, 
2001-2007, 
2009-2016) 
Time and 
total state 
budget were 
significant 
predictors 
individually, 
but when 
modeled 
together, 
neither had 
unique 
predictive 
utility 
 
 
No 
significant 
differences 
 
Time and 
total state 
budget were 
not 
predictive 
when 
modeled 
together 
 
No 
significant 
changes on 
average post-
litigation 
Ninth: 
immediate 
increase 
after 
litigation 
 
Minnesota: 
immediate 
decrease 
after 
litigation,  
then 
annually 
increased 
funding 
more than 
other states 
 (p = .053) 
3. Number 
of people 
served by 
community 
mental 
health 
providers in 
the past year 
per 1000 
members of 
the state 
general 
population 
(2001-2017) 
 
Each year, 
there was an 
increase of 
.436 
instances 
per 1000 
people, with 
the average 
in 2017 
being 18.14 
 
Minnesota 
grew its rate 
of people 
receiving 
mental 
health 
services in 
the 
community 
faster than 
other states, 
by 1.31 
instances 
per year 
Each year, 
there was an 
increase of 
.633 
instances 
per 1000 
people on 
average 
across 
states; 
however, 
this average 
increase was 
driven 
solely by 
Minnesota 
(2.64 
increase per 
year; other 
states 
together had 
no 
significant 
annual 
increase 
when 
controlling 
 
On average, 
states 
continued to 
not 
significantly 
change; 
however, 
there was an 
immediate 
decrease of 
2.576 
instances per 
1000 the year 
after 
litigation  
 
Minnesota’
s rate of 
growth 
slowed, but 
not 
significantl
y 
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for 
Minnesota)  
4Ai. % of 
general 
population 
receiving 
disability 
benefits 
(2001-2015) 
Each year, 
there was an 
increase of 
.13%, with 
the average 
in 2015 
being 6.32% 
The Ninth 
Circuit had a 
1.39% lower 
rate in 2015, 
as compared 
to the other 
states 
Each year, 
there was an 
increase of 
.14% on 
average 
across states 
After 
litigation, 
this rate 
slowed on 
average, 
almost 
significantly 
(𝛽 = -.046, p 
= .058)  
The Ninth 
Circuit’s 
slope after 
litigation 
did not 
vary, but 
there was a 
significant 
jump down 
the year 
after 
litigation 
(𝛽 = -.343) 
4Aii. Filing 
rate for 
disability 
benefits 
(2001-2015) 
Each year, 
there was an 
increase of 
.015, with 
the average 
in 2015 
being 1.299 
No 
significant 
differences 
Each year, 
on average 
across 
states, there 
was an 
increase of 
.025 
The pre-
litigation 
pace 
significantly 
slowed after 
litigation, by 
.0167 
The Third 
Circuit had 
a 
significant 
jump up in 
filing rate 
immediatel
y after 
litigation 
4Aiii.  
Approval 
rate for 
disability 
benefits 
(2001-2015) 
Each year, 
there was a 
decrease of 
.82%, with 
the average 
in 2015 
being 
30.84%.   
No 
significant 
differences 
Each year, 
on average 
across 
states, there 
was a 
decrease of 
1.03% 
The 
prelitigation 
decreasing 
pace 
significantly 
slowed after 
litigation to 
.61% 
decreases 
each year 
No 
significant 
differences 
4B. Annual 
suicide rate 
per 100,000 
members of 
the general 
population 
(1999-2016) 
Each year, 
there was an 
increase of 
.19, with the 
average in 
2016 being 
13.65 
No 
significant 
differences 
No 
significant 
annual 
change  
Each year, 
there was an 
increase of 
.21 
Florida’s 
annual 
increase 
slowed 
significantl
y, but DOJ 
states 
quickened 
significantl
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y 
4C. 
Readmissio
n to any 
psychiatric 
hospital 
within 30 
days of 
discharge 
from the 
state 
psychiatric 
hospital 
(2007-2017) 
 
 
Insufficient 
data to run a 
model 
    
4D. 
Employed 
percentage 
of SMHA 
consumers 
(includes 
those “not in 
the 
workforce,” 
e.g., on 
disability 
benefits) 
(2007-2017) 
Each year, 
there was an 
increase of 
.3%, with 
the average 
in 2017 
being 
20.05% 
DOJ saw 
decreasing 
rates of 
employment
, while 
Minnesota 
saw 
increases 
much higher 
than other 
states 
No annual 
change 
No annual 
change 
DOJ had an 
almost 
significantl
y 
immediate 
decrease in 
employmen
t post-
litigation 
while 
Minnesota 
had a 
significant 
immediate 
increase 
4Ei. Per 
capita 
expenditures 
on judicial 
system 
(1996-2015) 
Grew slower 
than the 
state total 
budget 
No 
significant 
differences 
Grew at the 
same rate as 
the total 
state budget 
Slowed 
significantly 
No 
significant 
differences 
4Eii. Per 
capita 
expenditures 
on law 
enforcement 
(1996-2015) 
Grew faster 
than the 
total state 
budget 
No 
significant 
differences 
Grew faster 
than what 
would be 
expected 
given the 
growth in 
total state 
budget 
Did not vary 
significantly 
from the pre-
litigation 
trend 
No 
significant 
differences 
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4Eiii. Per 
capita 
expenditures 
on 
corrections 
(1996-2015) 
Grew slower 
than the 
total state 
budget 
No 
significant 
differences 
Grew as 
would be 
expected 
given the 
total state 
budget 
Significantly 
slowed 
Third 
Circuit 
spending 
did not 
slow as 
much as the 
other states 
(p = .069) 
while the 
Ninth 
Circuit had 
a 
significant 
immediate 
increase 
4F. Number 
of people 
incarcerated 
per 1000 
members of 
the state 
general 
population 
(1996-2016) 
No 
significant 
annual 
change, with 
an average 
in 2016 of 
4.06 
Ninth 
Circuit 
actually 
showed a 
decrease 
over all 
years 
Each year, 
there was an 
average 
increase of 
.048 
This 
significantly 
slowed, so 
each year 
there was an 
average 
annual 
decrease of 
.06 
No 
significant 
differences 
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Table 50.  Total numbers and percentages of missing data by Olmstead response type and 
dependent variable.   
Dependent 
Variable (# 
of years 
observed) 
Ninth 
Circuit  
Third 
Circuit  
DOJ 
 
Florida  
 
Minnesota 
 
Totals 
SPH 
hospitalizatio
n (17) 
3 (5.88%) 1 (5.88%) 10 
(14.71%) 
2 (11.8%) 2 
(11.77%) 
18 
(10.6%) 
SPH 
spending 
(17) 
1 (1.96%) 1 (5.88%) 2 (2.94%) 2 (11.8%) 0 (0%) 6 
(3.5%) 
Community 
Tx spending 
(17) 
1 (1.96%) 1 (5.88%) 2 (2.94%) 2 (11.8%) 0 (0%) 6 
(3.5%) 
Community 
Tx (17) 
7 
(13.73%) 
2  
(11.77%) 
11 
(16.18%) 
3 (17.7%) 3   
(17.7%) 
26 
(15.3%) 
Disability 
benefits (15) 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Disability 
filing (15) 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Disability 
approval (15) 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Suicide rate 
(17) 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Rehospitaliza
tion rate (11) 
15 
(45.46%) 
6  
(54.55%) 
27 
(61.36%) 
5 (45.5%) 2 
(18.18%) 
55 
(50%) 
Employment 
rate (11) 
0 (0%) 2 
(18.18%) 
1 (2.3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 
(2.7%) 
Judicial 
spending 
(20) 
6 (10%) 2 (10%) 8 (10%) 2 (10%) 2 (10%) 20 
(10%) 
Police 
spending 
(20) 
6 (10%) 2 (10%) 8 (10%) 2 (10%) 2 (10%) 20 
(10%) 
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Correctional 
spending 
(20) 
6 (10%) 2 (10%) 8 (10%) 2 (10%) 2 (10%) 20 
(10%) 
Incarceration 
rate (21) 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Totals (233) 47 
(6.72%) 
19 
(8.16%) 
77 
(8.26%) 
20 
(8.58%) 
12 
(5.15%) 
174 
(7.48%) 
 
